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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
 
As inequality in the United States intensifies and social mobility declines (Neckerman 
and Torche 2007; Atkinson 2008), life course processes that restrict or stimulate upward mobility 
are increasingly central to the sociological study of stratification (DiPrete and Eirich 2006; Hout 
and DiPrete 2006).  In particular, scholarship on cumulative advantage provides competing 
theoretical explanations for how stratification unfolds over the life course.  Research on the 
“scarring” effect posits that previous spells of marginal status leads to subsequent disadvantage 
(Mayer 2009:419), but the “turning points” literature suggests disruptive life events create 
pathways to new economic opportunities for low-status groups (Sampson and Laub 2005:14). 
Using panel data from the 2003 New Immigrant Survey and the 2001-2003 Survey of Income 
and Program Participation, I interrogate these two explanations and the leverage they offer when 
investigating the effect of legalization on the hourly wages and occupational standing of 
unauthorized Latin American immigrants to the United States.  
Prior studies show that immigrants who received amnesty through provisions of the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 experienced wage gains (Rivera-Batiz 
1999; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002), suggesting that legalization acts as a turning point.   
More recent research, however, suggests that the penalty for unauthorized status has increased 
since IRCA and that, as a result, the benefits of legalization have weakened or completely eroded 
(Lofstrom, Hill and Hayes 2013).  This latter research supports the scarring hypothesis, whereby 
unauthorized status is an attribute that scars workers and ultimately worsens their labor market 
conditions even after legalization. Building on these studies, I ask whether and how legalization 
improves the hourly wages and occupational standing of previously unauthorized Latin 
American immigrants. 
This research is especially important now for two reasons.  First, because immigrants are 
expected to drive future U.S. population growth (Passel and Cohn 2008; Pitkin and Myers 2011) 
even as mobility prospects for all workers stagnate (Gottschalk 1997; Neckerman and Torche 
2007), understanding the labor market trajectories of contemporary immigrants is crucial to 
reduce inequality in the United States.  Second, sociological scholarship has been slow to 
integrate the study of migration and stratification, even as legal status has emerged as a nexus of 
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inequality within the immigrant population (Massey 2007).  Given the presence of over 11 
million unauthorized immigrants – nine million of which are Latin American (Passel and Cohn 
2009) – legal status is the “single largest and most potent barrier to Hispanic socioeconomic 
mobility and integration in the United States” (Massey and Pren 2012:15).  As a result, many 
Latino immigrants are at risk of joining the ranks of the “new urban underclass,” (Massey 
2007:157) whereby legalization “constitutes massive upward mobility” (Jasso 2011:1303). In 
this dissertation, then, I explore how contemporary immigration to the United States is distinctly 
interconnected with processes of stratification through legal status.  
Labor Market Inequality in the United States 
Reversing the post-World War II trend of what Goldin and Margo (1992:1) refer to as 
“wage compression,” or the narrowing of the wage structure, earnings inequality in the United 
States has increased severely in recent decades (Atkinson 2008; Congressional Budget Office 
2011).  During the postwar period, the median incomes of workers grew rapidly and the benefits 
of economic expansion were broadly distributed throughout the wage distribution (Danziger 
1995).  However, this trend gave way to a widening of the wage distribution as earnings 
inequality worsened beginning in the 1970s (Morris and Western 1999; Neckerman and Torche 
2007; Card and DiNardo 2002; Katz and Autor 1999; Gottschalk and Smeeding 2000). 
Goldin and Margo (1992) calculate the difference between the log of weekly wages at the 
90th and 10th percentiles over time, a measure where larger values indicate more wage dispersion 
between workers at the 90th and 10th percentiles. For men working full-time, the difference 
between the log of weekly wages at the 90th and 10th percentiles was 1.45 in 1940, but that 
statistic fell to 1.06 by 1950. The measure remained below 1.2 until 1970, when it rose to 1.32; it 
rose once again in 1985, when it returned to the 1940-levels (1.46).  Although the United States 
did experience significant wage compression for several decades following World War II, that 
trend was undone beginning in the 1970s when the wage distribution in the U.S. widened.   
Similarly, Morris and Western (1999) examine wages in the U.S. from 1973 to 1996.  For 
workers at the bottom of the wage distribution, real wages fell 13 percent during this period, with 
the sharpest declines occurring during the 1980s.  Median wages, they find, stagnated during the 
1970s and 1980s, and then declined in the 1990s.  Overall, wages for the median worker fell 10 
percent in 1973-96.  Morris and Western (1999:626) find that the only group to experience 
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growth in wages over this period were workers at the 90th percentile, leading them to summarize 
the period as a time when “virtually everyone lost ground, and those at the bottom lost the most.”   
A report by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (2011) found that from 1979-2007, 
average after-tax household income for the top one percent of wage-earners increased 275 
percent.  During the same period, after-tax income increased 40 percent among those in the 21st 
through 80th percentiles of the income scale, and increased only 18 percent for those in the lowest 
quintile.  Moreover, the share of total income that went to the top quintile of wage-earners 
increased from 50 to 60 percent over the 28 year period (with a majority of the gains going to the 
top one percent of households), while the share of total income decreased for all other income 
quintiles.  Overall, then, the United States has seen not only a dramatic widening of the 
disparities in how income is distributed, but also more concentrated income in the highest 
quintile of wage-earners.  
The United States is also experiencing decreasing levels of social mobility (Gottschalk 
1997; Breen and Johnson 2005; Esping-Andesen 2007).  For example, research using data from 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) finds that long-run earnings inequality over the life 
course among U.S. workers has surged in recent decades (Haider 2001).  Much of the decline in 
earnings and occupational mobility is due to the limited access to economic opportunity for low-
wage workers (Gottschalk and Moffit 2009).  According to an analysis by Gottschalk (1997) 
using the PSID, from 1973 to 1994 there was an absolute and relative decline in the wages of 
male workers in the bottom tail of the wage distribution.  Moreover, Gottschalk finds that, of 
workers in the bottom quintile in 1974, 42 percent remained there throughout the period under 
study.  Similarly, Long (1999) uses data from the 1992 and 1993 panels of the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation and finds that 30 percent of minimum wage workers were still 
employed in minimum wage jobs a year later; after two years, that share remained at 20 percent.  
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth from 1979 to 1991, 
Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) find substantial declines in mobility between wage quintiles in the 
U.S. economy over time.  Buchinsky and Hunt’s analysis demonstrates that, over time, the 
probability of remaining in a particular occupational sector has sharply increased; this means that 
workers, regardless of where they are positioned in the wage distribution, are likely to remain 
there over the course of their work careers.  Furthermore, this research indicates that very little 
mobility occurs where workers move from the bottom of the wage distribution to the upper 
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levels of the distribution, and that most of the movement that does occur is limited to adjacent 
quintiles at the bottom of the wage hierarchy.  
Corak (2006) provides a cross-national comparison of generational-income dynamics, 
examining how income patterns are reproduced across generations by country, and finds that 
there is significant variation across wealthy nations. The United Kingdom and the United States 
offer the least amount of socioeconomic mobility, as almost 50 percent of the earnings advantage 
of high-income young adults (relative to low-income young adults) is because they are the 
children of high-earning parents.  In countries such as Canada, Finland, Norway, and Denmark, 
the advantage of having high-earning parents falls to less than 20 percent, while in Sweden, 
Germany, and France, it ranges from 27 to 40 percent.  Moreover, a report by the Pew Economic 
Mobility Project (2012) that examined mobility cross-nationally using a range of measures found 
that, among industrialized nations, the United States is the country with the strongest link 
between parental education and children’s economic and educational outcomes, and that this 
relationship is particularly strong for children with low-educated parents.  Collectively, these 
studies indicate that the United States faces dual problems of intensifying inequality and 
declining mobility.  
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Figure 1.1: Income Gini Ratio for U.S. Households, 1980-2012 
 
 
Figure 1.1 provides the income Gini ratio for U.S. household income from 1980 to 2012.  
The Gini ratio is a measure commonly used to indicate the level of inequality within a specific 
population (Allison 1978).  The Gini ratio ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 representing perfect 
inequality and 0 representing perfect equality.  In other words, the larger the Gini coefficient, the 
more income inequality within a given population. The data presented here, which come from 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, reflect the growing trend of income inequality in the U.S. 
in recent decades.  The Gini ratio in 1980 was .40, but has grown steadily since that time to reach 
.48 in 2012.  Thus, as prior studies and Figure 1.1 demonstrate, the U.S. income distribution has 
become steadily unequal over the past few decades.   
 These trends powerfully shape the context of reception and labor market conditions that 
contemporary immigrants face (Bean and Lowell 2004).  Holzer et al. (2011) find that, in the 
U.S., only 33 percent of the foreign-born are employed in the top two wage quintiles, compared 
to 41 percent of the U.S.-born.  Meanwhile, only 38 percent of the U.S.-born are employed in the 
0.36 
0.38 
0.40 
0.42 
0.44 
0.46 
0.48 
0.50 
1980 1990 2000 2010 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,  
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2  
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bottom two quintiles, compared to nearly half of all immigrants.  Similarly, Wright and Dwyer 
(2003) highlight the barriers to mobility that Latin American immigrants in particular face by 
examining U.S. job growth patterns across time.  They find that between 1994 and 2000, Latino 
immigrants filled 47 percent of low-quality jobs, while non-Latino immigrants filled only 17 
percent of jobs in the bottom tiers. This implies that Latin American immigrants, when compared 
to immigrants from other regions and to U.S.-born workers, are increasingly isolated in low-
wage sectors of the economy where opportunities for advancement may be limited.   
While all workers face an increasingly polarized labor market, immigrants (and Latin 
American immigrants, in particular) are the most likely to fill the jobs in the U.S. economy that 
are the lowest-paying and offer the fewest opportunities for future advancement.  Past research 
has found, for instance, that while Latin American immigrants may experience some upward 
mobility throughout their work experience, they face barriers such as low levels of human capital 
and lack of English proficiency that limit their chances at securing more stable employment 
(Myers and Cranford 1998; Park and Myers 2010). Surveying the impediments to mobility 
experienced by the foreign-born population from Latin America, Bean, Gonzalez-Baker, and 
Capps (2001:694) state that “the key sociological research question for the future is…the extent 
to which sufficient economic opportunities are emerging that provide pathways for later 
generations of immigrant and other ethnic groups to move out of low-paying jobs in 
disadvantaged sectors of the labor market.” In this dissertation, then, I examine if legalization – a 
key life course event in the lives of unauthorized immigrants – provides opportunities for Latin 
American immigrants to improve their life chances.   
Occupations and Inequality  
Although the literature on wages illustrates one way in which the U.S. labor market is 
increasingly unequal, research also shows that a growing share of workers face more precarious 
work conditions and fewer opportunities.  Recent social science research on “job quality” 
(Holzer et al. 2011:5; Kalleberg 2011:5) finds that, due to large-scale structural changes in the 
U.S. economy, political system, and political and institutional framework in recent decades, the 
labor market has become increasingly polarized, with more individuals working in occupations 
with low wages, fewer opportunities for mobility, and more economic uncertainty. “During the 
past several decades,” Kalleberg (2001:179) writes, “employers have had free rein to implement 
workplace practices that were designed to increase their flexibility, cut labor costs, and maximize 
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shareholder value in response to greater price competition, technological change, globalization, 
and other social and economic forces.”  These shifts have transformed the structure of the U.S. 
labor market, resulting in more jobs in low-paying industries like the service sector and sales 
while shedding jobs in stable, middle-income occupational sectors like white-collar 
administrative support and blue-collar manufacturing.   
 Holzer et al. (2011:51) describe the “hollowing out of the middle” of the U.S. job market 
as a process where high-quality jobs still exist and continue to be created, but are becoming more 
difficult for workers to obtain at the same time that occupations in the middle of the income 
distribution are dwindling.  Using data from 1992 to 2003, Holzer and colleagues find that 
overall U.S. employment during the period shifted away from the middle of the income 
distribution and into upper and lower tails.  Moreover, the occupational composition of the 
income distribution also underwent shifts over time; in 2003, occupations in the upper quintiles 
were more likely to be in financial, professional, or health care sectors and less likely to be in 
manufacturing or production industries relative to 1992.  For example, the share of the highest-
paying jobs represented by manufacturing occupations declined by over one-third from 1992 to 
2003. This broadly reflects a trend where jobs at the top end of the wage distribution are moving 
away from sectors where less-skilled workers were able to secure stable employment in the past 
(such as manufacturing and production industries) and toward sectors that require advanced 
skills and training.   
 Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson (2000:265) coined the term “bad jobs” as an umbrella 
term to describe the characteristics of occupations at the bottom end of the occupational 
hierarchy.   They define an occupation as a “bad job” if the job is in the bottom quintile of the 
wage distribution, does not provide health insurance or a pension, and is temporary in nature or 
offers a limited number of hours.   Using Current Population Survey data from 1995, they find 
that the primary occupation of one in seven U.S. workers qualifies as “bad” on all three of the 
dimensions, while 24 percent qualify on at least one dimension.  Overall, white men are the least 
likely to experience bad jobs, while women, Hispanics, and racial minorities are the most likely 
to experience this form of disadvantage in the labor market.   
Studies on occupational attributes discussed above highlight the extent to which jobs 
have both economic and noneconomic rewards and suggest that social scientists need to look 
beyond individual wages to better understand labor market stratification (Mouw and Kalleberg 
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2010). As Kalleberg (2011:2) states, “jobs are the main way by which individuals are linked to 
the economy and are slotted into places within the system of social stratification.”  As a result, 
the characteristics and conditions of occupations have important implications for the 
socioeconomic position and future prospects of mobility for workers.  Recognizing the need to 
better capture individual outcomes within the context of the broader economy, sociologists have 
developed a set of theoretical and methodological tools that focus on the specific characteristics 
of occupations.   
In particular, social stratification researchers make the case that class position is best 
measured using the occupational structure rather than relying on the broader categories 
traditionally used in class analysis (Grusky and Sorensen 1998; Grusky and Weeden 2001; 
Weeden 2002; Weeden and Grusky 2005; Weeden et al. 2007; Weeden and Grusky 2012).  For 
instance, the Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) scheme that is commonly used is typically 
represented as a seven-class system: service workers, routine non-manuals, petty bourgeoisie, 
skilled craft workers, unskilled manual workers, farmers, and agricultural workers; the 
disaggregated occupational structure developed by Weeden (2002) and Weeden and Grusky 
(2005), on the other hand, contains 126 occupational categories.  
This line of reasoning suggests that, rather than conceptualizing stratification in terms of 
several large, macro-level social classes, there is more explanatory power in using disaggregated 
class categories represented by occupations. These researchers argue that employing a 
disaggregated class map to analyze social stratification allows researchers to better capture the 
ways in which mobility is shaped by movement between deeply institutionalized occupational 
boundaries rather than between large class classifications (Grusky and Weeden 2001).  
Research indicates that, relative to aggregate class systems, occupational categories are 
an effective way to predict the life chances, lifestyles, and political and social attitudes of 
individuals (Weeden and Grusky 2012).  Weeden and Grusky (2005) offer several explanations 
for this.  First, they suggest that occupations are associated with stereotypes, which serve to 
attract some kinds of workers but not others.  Second, the social closure of occupations (whereby 
workers in a particular occupation tend to share the same training and tend to interact 
predominantly with each other) tends to reinforce certain attitudes and characteristics.  Lastly, 
employers tend to construct occupations in a similar fashion across industries, leading to a 
general consistency within occupations across industries and geographical regions.  Through 
  9 
these processes, nominal occupational categories are transformed into sociologically meaningful 
ones (Grusky and Sorensen 1998; Weeden and Grusky 2005).   
“Occupations,” Weeden and Grusky (2005:142) write, “shape behavior through the 
additional sociological forces of self-selection, differential recruitment, socialization, and 
interactional closure, all of which become activated in the context of institutionalized 
categories.”  As a result, occupational structures are an information-rich map that serve as an 
“omnibus measure of life conditions” (Weeden and Grusky 2005:145) and provide the 
“geography of social structure . . . by describing important differences between structural 
locations” (Sørensen 2000:1526–27).  This body of literature provides a theoretical framework 
for researchers to look beyond wages as a measure of stratification in the labor market, and to 
connect the individual to the broader social and economic context using occupational schemes.  
In this dissertation, then, I examine a set of occupation-specific outcomes to provide a more 
structural and sociological perspective about how legalization provides access to new economic 
opportunities not conveyed by traditional measures such as hourly wages.   
Cumulative Advantage and Mobility 
By analyzing the labor market trajectories of immigrants that transition form 
unauthorized to legal status, this dissertation examines how the life course trajectories of 
immigrants are influenced by legal status.  In the field of social stratification, researchers often 
use the theory of cumulative advantage to explain how levels of inequality develop over the life 
course (Allison, Long, and Krauze 1982; O’Rand 1996; DiPrete and Eirich 2006). According to 
this perspective, returns to certain traits, resources, or skills compound over time such that early 
disadvantage progressively increases as time passes. Cumulative advantage, as DiPrete and 
Eirich (2006:271) state, is a framework to examine “inequality across any temporal process…in 
which a favorable relative position becomes a resource that produces further relative gains.” 
Consider, for example, the relationship between education and income.  Although initial 
disparities in educational attainment for a cohort of workers will yield differences in earnings at 
labor market entry, over time the more highly educated group will experience greater opportunity 
for advancement and improved returns, leading to increased levels of inequality (Elman and 
O’Rand 2004). The cumulative advantage perspective, then, examines the extent to which groups 
are embedded in social and economic contexts and explains how inequality is contoured by these 
contexts over the life course.   
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Factors that contribute to cumulative advantage include cognitive abilities, education, 
career position, income, wealth, health, and social capital (DiPrete and Eirich 2006; Mayer 
2009).  However, the cumulative advantage process may follow any number of pathways 
because it hinges on which individual or group characteristics produce benefits in a given 
institutional context.  As O’Rand (1996:230) notes, the traits or statuses that are rewarded 
depend on “interrelated institutional arrangements stemming from the market and the state that 
constitute the systemic determinants of inequality.”  Therefore, the cumulative advantage 
perspective interprets how, across varying social structures and contexts, certain characteristics 
constrain or expand opportunities over time.  
While cumulative advantage has proved to be a useful tool for social scientists studying 
how disparities between groups change over time, DiPrete and Eirich (2006) argue in their 
critique of the cumulative advantage literature that the concept has been too broadly applied as 
an explanation for inequality.  Rather than an explanation by itself, cumulative advantage should 
be considered an expansive term for a series of mechanisms that can occur over the life course 
and shape mobility. DiPrete and Eirich (2006:292) assert that, going forward, cumulative 
advantage research should focus explicitly on the theoretical mechanisms responsible for 
producing different mobility pathways; “more precise theorizing and more systematic empirical 
study of these mechanisms,” they write, “are needed in order to move beyond the use of 
[cumulative advantage] as a descriptive characterization of diverging trajectories toward a deeper 
understanding for the reasons why trajectories diverge.” Following the critique of DiPrete and 
Eirich, this dissertation evaluates the explanatory power of two cumulative advantage 
mechanisms in the context of immigrant legalization and labor market outcomes. Below, I 
describe the two key theoretical mechanisms that contribute to the development of stratification 
over the life course: scarring and turning points.  
Scarring  
Stratification researchers often invoke the concept of scarring to explain persistent 
inequality, where past life events produce subsequent disadvantage. Often, scar effects have 
substantial consequences for mobility over the life course (Mayer 2009).  As a result, scar effects 
are recognized as one primary mechanism through which the life course process creates or 
exacerbates inequality (Diprete and McManus 2000; Gangl 2006).   
Prior research on the scarring effect of unemployment on future labor market outcomes is 
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important for the present analysis.  Studies indicate that spells of unemployment have long-
lasting adverse effects on the wages, occupational mobility, and job stability of workers 
experiencing job loss (DiPrete 1981; Diprete 2002; Gangl 2004; Couch and Placzek 2010).  For 
example, using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from the mid-1970s, 
Ruhm (1991) finds that previously unemployed workers, after regaining employment, earned 16 
to 18 percent less than comparable workers who were continuously employed during the same 
time period.  Kletzer and Fairlie (2003) use the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY) 
and find that job displacement is associated with both earnings loss and the loss of hours worked 
in the years following unemployment, suggesting that experiencing unemployment decreases 
wages and reduces the occupational standing of displaced workers.   
Additional studies using other data sources have similar findings of lower wages as well 
as significant noneconomic penalties of past job displacement (Farber 1996; Stevens 1997). For 
instance, Brand (2006) finds that workers with prior unemployment spells experience lower job 
quality than comparable workers who did not experience job loss, including lower occupational 
status and fewer employer benefits such as pensions and health insurance coverage.  Further, 
studies report that the best predictor of a future spell of unemployment is previous experience 
with unemployment (Arulampalam, Gregg, and Gregory 2001).   
Although disadvantaged statuses like unemployment have detrimental effects on labor 
market prospects, negative effects persist well beyond the actual duration of the status, 
suggesting future economic prospects are scarred by prior experiences.   In this dissertation, I 
treat previous unauthorized status as a possible scarring mechanism in the labor market 
trajectories of immigrants.  In the case that unauthorized status does scar immigrant employment 
outcomes, it is conceivable that even after receiving legal status, immigrants with prior 
unauthorized status will continue to experience the disadvantages associated with unauthorized 
status in the labor market.    
Turning Points 
A turning point is defined as a change in the direction of an individual’s life course 
(Sampson and Laub 2005).  Turning points in life course research are commonly identified 
among groups that previously experienced disadvantage but, as a result of a disruptive event or 
transition, are provided with a clear-cut break from the past and an expansion of opportunity 
(Laub and Sampson 1993; Elder 1998). Further, as Rutter (1996) notes, turning points with long 
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lasting effects include those that improve opportunities and result in permanent changes to an 
individual’s environment or status.    
For instance, using a longitudinal sample of adults that had experienced the Great 
Depression as children, Elder (1987) finds that military service had an equalizing effect on 
subsequent economic well-being.  Individuals that entered the military following high school 
experienced more favorable occupational status and job stability than non-veterans, irrespective 
of a respondent’s economic background. Sampson and Laub provide similar findings in research 
on this cohort of workers (1996).  Military service, then, served as a turning point in the life 
trajectory of these individuals, as it provided access to social capital and resources that led to 
improved economic prospects.   
Subsequent research has noted a number of other life course transitions that act as turning 
points.  For example, in the criminology literature, marriage, military service, education, labor 
market activity, and residential change are all considered turning points that produce a 
transformation in life conditions that can reduce the likelihood of recidivism after being released 
from prison (Sampson and Laub 2005).  Within the occupational stratification literature, Warren, 
Hauser and Sheridan (2002) find that prestige of an individual’s first occupation is highly 
correlated to higher earnings later on in life, suggesting that the transition into the labor market is 
a turning point with significant implications for lifetime earnings.   
Thus, from the perspective of these studies, certain disruptive incidents may act as pivot 
points and permit marginalized groups to recover previously lost ground. Turning points are 
characterized by major life course events that, in effect, restructure the kinds of socioeconomic 
opportunities available to a particular social group. As a result of these newly available life 
chances, a turning point may serve as a jumping-off point for economic progress.  In this 
dissertation, I treat the transition to legalization as a possible turning point in the labor market 
trajectories of immigrants and examine whether it provides new avenues to socioeconomic 
mobility that would not be otherwise experienced.    
Immigrant Legal Status and the Labor Market 
The United States has experienced a dramatic demographic change in recent decades, 
with the foreign-born population increasing from 14.4 to 40 million from 1980 to 2010 (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2013). As a result, 13 percent of the U.S. population is now comprised of 
foreign-born individuals. Immigrants from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Mexico account 
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for over half of the total foreign-born population, and Mexicans have the largest share 
representing 30 percent of all immigrants (Grieco et al. 2012).  Immigrants are heavily 
represented in the labor force, and the percent of the total labor force that is foreign-born has 
increased from 6.7 percent in 1980 to 15.6 percent in 2007 (Newburger and Gryn 2009).  
Currently, there are nearly 25 million immigrant workers and, while immigrants are present in all 
industrial sectors, they are overrepresented in construction, services, and agricultural industries.   
One distinguishing characteristic of the contemporary immigration flow is the large 
number of unauthorized immigrants  (Passel and Cohn 2009; Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker 2011; 
Warren and Warren 2013).  Throughout the dissertation, unauthorized immigrant refers to a non-
citizen, foreign-born U.S. resident who does not hold legal permanent residency or has not been 
granted authorization to work and live in the country (Jasso et al. 2008; Passel and Cohn 2009). 
Figure 1.2 provides the estimated number of unauthorized immigrants in 1980 and from 1990 to 
2012. As Figure 1.2 shows, there were two million unauthorized immigrants in 1980.  This 
population, however, experienced precipitous growth throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and by 
2012 there were nearly 12 million unauthorized immigrants residing in the United States.  In 
particular, while immigrants from Mexico, Central and South America, and the Caribbean make 
up around half of the total immigrant population, 8 out of 10 unauthorized immigrants are from 
Latin America (Passel and Cohn 2009). 
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Figure 1.2: Unauthorized Immigrant Population in the U.S., 1980-2012 (millions) 
 
 
Like the foreign-born population overall, unauthorized immigrants are well-represented 
in the labor force.  Presently, there are roughly 8.3 million unauthorized immigrant workers and 
they comprise 5.4 percent of the total labor force (Passel and Cohn 2009).  However, 
unauthorized immigrants experience a significant wage penalty relative to legal immigrant 
workers, and are also more likely to experience precarious labor market conditions and wage 
theft at the hands of employers (Massey et al. 2003; Hall et al. 2010; Donato and Sisk 2012; 
Bernhardt et al. 2013). Moreover, the penalty for unauthorized status has intensified in recent 
decades, and, as a result, legal status has emerged as a nexus of inequality in the immigrant 
population (Massey 2007; Massey 2011; Massey and Pren 2012; Donato and Sisk 2012).  
Legal Status and Inequality 
A large body of social science literature documents the central role of the state in 
producing inequality in the lives of immigrants.  This is especially important when considering 
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the issue of legal status, for, as De Genova (2002:422) argues, migrant “illegality” is, above all, a 
legal category that connotes a certain social relationship to the state.  Indeed, the ways in which 
the state classifies immigrants into certain types of legal categories is a defining aspect of the 
U.S. immigrant experience, and those varying categories carry with them a number of 
implications for immigrant outcomes (Donato and Armenta 2011).  “Immigration laws,” 
Freeman (2004:950) writes, “observed or violated, necessarily precede and often constrain the 
migrants’ interaction with markets, welfare, and cultural regulations.”  
When unauthorized immigrants come into contact with social institutions where their 
legal status serves as a source of disadvantage, Coutin (2003:186) states that “legal reality is 
superimposed on daily life.” Drawing from qualitative research on Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
immigrants, Menjívar (2006:1008) argues that a confluence of legal and socio-historical trends 
produces an immigration context where immigrants often occupy positions of in-between status, 
or “liminal legality,” where they are neither legal nor unauthorized.  Menjívar and Abrego 
(2012:1387) build on this work by developing the concept of “legal violence,” where the 
researchers argue that, through the legal status system of the United States, a “multipronged 
system of laws at the federal, state, and local levels…promotes a climate of insecurity and 
suffering among individual immigrants and their families” 
Along with the other researchers mentioned here, Menjívar’s research emphasizes the 
extent to which the laws and regulations of the state are crucial to the experiences of immigrants 
in the United States. Moreover, conceptualizing legal status as a dynamic, fluid process rather 
than as a fixed, static condition highlights the need for research that investigates how transitions 
from one legal status to another might affect the immigrant experience. For example, research 
indicates that large shares of immigrants experience transitions between legal statuses (Massey 
and Malone 2002; Jasso et al. 2008).  For instance, Malone (2004) estimates that, among 
Mexican migrants with more than one migration trip, over 40 percent experienced a change in 
legal status over time.  Thus, legal status – as well the transition from unauthorized to authorized 
status – are important markers in the life course of U.S. immigrants.   
Legal Status and Labor Market Outcomes 
Prior studies consistently indicate that immigrants are stratified in the U.S. labor market 
by legal status.  Unauthorized workers experience a significant wage penalty relative to legal 
immigrants, even when holding human capital and demographic characteristics constant (Donato 
  16 
and Massey 1993; Donato et al. 2005; Donato et al. 2008; Phillips and Massey 1999; Massey et 
al. 2003). The actual size of that wage disparity varies from study to study, but the finding that 
unauthorized immigrants are disadvantaged relative to legal immigrants in the workplace is very 
robust across studies.   
For example, Hall, Greenman, and Farkas (2010) impute the legal status of immigrants 
found in the Survey of Income and Program Participation and find a gross wage disparity of 17 
percent between unauthorized and legal Mexican immigrant men and a nine percent gap between 
unauthorized and legal Mexican immigrant women.  These gaps are narrowed to eight and four 
percent, respectively, when controls for human capital are included.  Studies using data from the 
Mexican Migration Project (MMP) find even stronger wage penalties for unauthorized status.  
Phillips and Massey (1999) estimate that, on average, the adjusted hourly wages of unauthorized 
Mexican immigrants are 22 percent lower than those of legal Mexican immigrants. Also using 
data from the MMP, Donato and Sisk (2012) find that the adjusted wage penalty of unauthorized 
status among Mexican immigrants from 2003-2009 was 25 percent.   
Moreover, studies also consistently find that, among unauthorized workers, women earn 
less than men (Donato et al. 2008; Hall, Greenman and Farkas 2010; Donato and Sisk 2012; 
Bernhardt et al. 2013).  Using data from the MMP, Donato and colleagues (2008) find that, 
among the Mexican immigrant labor force in the United States, unauthorized female immigrants 
were the most disadvantaged with respect to hourly wages.  Furthermore, they find evidence that 
the gender disparity among Mexican immigrant workers worsened in recent decades.   
However, the penalty of unauthorized status extends beyond hourly wages, as 
unauthorized workers have fewer labor market opportunities and are more likely to accept work 
in precarious occupations and industries relative to legal immigrants (Orrenius and Zavodny 
2009; Bernhardt et al. 2013).  Using a sample of low-wage workers in New York City, Los 
Angeles, and Chicago, Bernhardt and colleagues (2009) find that while foreign-born workers are 
more likely than U.S.-born groups to experience workplace violations (such as being paid less 
than the U.S. minimum wage or not being properly compensated for overtime work), 
unauthorized immigrants are the most likely to be subjected to these kinds of workplace 
violations.  For instance, the study found that 20 percent of legal immigrants in the sample 
earned less than the minimum wage, but that nearly 40 percent of unauthorized immigrants 
reported a minimum wage violation. Similarly, 67 percent of legal immigrants in the sample 
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reported not being properly compensated for overtime hours compared to 85 percent of 
unauthorized workers.  As with wages, gender is also an important factor in workplace 
conditions, as unauthorized women are more likely than men to experience precarious work 
environments and minimum wage violations (Donato et al. 2008; Bernhardt et al. 2009).   
Together, these studies highlight the extent to which workers without legal status operate 
on the margins of the U.S. economy.  Furthermore, these studies reinforce the notion that legal 
status is the central component of inequality within the immigrant population.  Surveying the 
prevalence of unauthorized status among the Latin American immigrant population in the United 
States, Massey and Pren (2012) assert that the penalty of unauthorized status is the most 
significant factor reducing the economic prospects of Latino immigrants.  Massey (2007:157) 
also argues that the confluence of an increasingly unequal economic context overall and the 
severe disadvantage experienced by unauthorized immigrants has resulted in contemporary 
immigration situation where Latinos are at risk of becoming the “new urban underclass.”  In this 
dissertation, then, I explore the extent to which legalization, or the transition from unauthorized 
to legal status, reduces inequality in the immigrant population and provides more avenues for 
socioeconomic mobility among Latin American immigrants.  In the next section, I discuss 
previous studies on the effect of legalization on labor market outcomes.  
Legal Status Transitions 
The United States last conducted a large-scale legalization program after passage of the 
1986 Immigrant Reform and Control Act (IRCA).  IRCA was conceptualized as a set of policies 
to limit the flow of unauthorized immigrants to the United States (Donato et al. 1992; Donato 
and Carter 1999).  To do so, it relied on three main provisions: increased border security, 
workplace enforcement to discourage employers from hiring unauthorized immigrants, and an 
amnesty program to regularize the status of the existing unauthorized immigrant population.  
Overall, IRCA provided legal status to roughly three million unauthorized immigrants.     
Although there is no formal, ongoing legalization program for immigrants at present, 
research indicates that large proportions of immigrants who ultimately receive legal status have 
experienced spells of unauthorized status.  As Massey and Malone (2002) point out, although 
popular notions of immigration remain dominated by the romanticized, European experiences of 
earlier immigration waves, the contemporary immigration experience is much more likely to 
involve multiple trips and changes in legal status over time.  Correspondingly, among 
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immigrants that receive legal permanent resident (LPR) status (authorization to live and work 
permanently in the U.S.), less than third are arriving in the U.S. for the first time.   
Not surprisingly given the prevalence of unauthorized status in recent years, scholars 
using the New Immigrant Survey (NIS) pilot data estimate that more than 30 percent of 
immigrants that received legal permanent resident status in 1996 had previous unauthorized 
experience (Massey and Malone 2002; Jasso et al. 2008).  Furthermore, based on the first full 
wave of the NIS, Jasso (2011) finds that approximately 40 percent of 700,000 immigrants 
receiving green cards in 2003 had, at one time, been present in the United States without 
authorization.   
Research using the New Immigrant Survey to examine legal status transitions finds that 
immigrants transition from unauthorized to legal status through a number of avenues, including 
both family ties and employment networks (Massey and Malone 2002; Jasso et al. 2008; Jasso 
2011).  According to Jasso and colleagues (2008), 30 percent of spouses of U.S. citizens married 
for less than two years experienced previous unauthorized status, and that this increases to 65 
percent for spouses of U.S. citizens married more than two years. Half of the immigrants 
sponsored by a legal permanent resident spouse had previously been in the country without 
legalization.  In addition, 36 percent of new LPR recipients sponsored by employers had 
unauthorized experience, as did nearly 20 percent of spouses of employer-sponsored green-card 
recipients.  Thus, previous unauthorized experience is both commonplace among green-card 
recipients and spread throughout visa categories.   
Previous non-legal experience varies widely by national origin, even among nations that 
send large numbers of immigrants to the United States. Although relatively few LPR recipients 
from the Philippines (13.5 percent), China (11 percent), India (3.6 percent) and Vietnam (2.3 
percent) had prior unauthorized experience, those from Latin American nations such as Mexico 
(73.7 percent), El Salvador (65.4 percent), the Dominican Republic (45.2 percent), and the 
continent of South America (43.2 percent) had high levels of previous unauthorized experience 
(Jasso et al. 2008). Using data from the MMP and the Latin American Migration Project, 
Riosmena (2010) also finds that, among LPR recipients from Nicaragua, the Dominican 
Republic, and Mexico who took their first U.S. trip prior to receiving legal permanent residence, 
more than 90 percent had previously migrated without authorization. Latin American immigrants 
are also disproportionately represented among the previously unauthorized. Mexicans, for 
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example, are only 15 percent of all LPR recipients but represent 35 percent of previously 
unauthorized LPR recipients (Jasso et al. 2008). Thus, while unauthorized experience is common 
among immigrants from many national origins, it is most highly concentrated among immigrants 
from Latin America.    
Legalization and Labor Market Outcomes  
Broadly speaking, prior research reveals that transitioning from unauthorized to 
authorized increases wages and occupational standing.  This literature is based primarily on the 
experiences of the approximately three million unauthorized immigrants legalized through IRCA 
in 1986 as measured in the Legalized Population Survey (LPS), a longitudinal survey of 
immigrants legalized through IRCA.   
In one study, Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) use the LPS to investigate the effect of 
legalization on Latin American immigrant men.  The authors utilize a quasi-experimental design 
by adding a comparison group of Latino men from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY79) to isolate the impact of legalization on the LPS respondents. The authors find 
that wage gains following legalization were largely driven by the change in legal status rather 
than broad macroeconomic trends experienced by the labor market.  Moreover, they estimate that 
hourly wages of legalized men in the LPS rose by 6 percent due to legalization, and that the 
wages of the legalized sample would be 14 to 24 percent higher if they had no previous 
unauthorized status.     
Similarly, Rivera-Batiz (1999) uses LPS and cross-sectional data from the 1990 Census 
to examine the effects of legalization on wages. Rivera-Batiz (1999) shows that previously 
unauthorized immigrant men and women who received IRCA’s amnesty experienced significant 
wage growth in the four years following legalization; hourly wages of men and women legalized 
through IRCA increased by 13 and 17 percent, respectively.  Furthermore, using a decomposition 
method, Rivera-Batiz concludes that the changes in wages over time are due to legalization 
rather than changes in observed characteristics of the LPS respondents.  Using a variety of other 
data sources, additional research has also found that IRCA legalization improved wages for Latin 
American immigrant men, with estimates ranging from 10 percent (Pan 2012; Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Bansak 2011) to 21 percent (Lozano and Sorensen 2011).   
Researchers have also taken advantage of other, smaller scale legalization programs to 
examine how legal status transitions shape earnings, albeit largely using cross-sectional data 
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without legal status indicators.  Using Census data from 1990 and 2000, Orrenius, Zavodny, and 
Kerr (2012) find that the 1992 Chinese Student Protection Act, which extended legal permanent 
residence to Chinese nationals on temporary U.S. visas following the Tiananmen Square protest, 
significantly increased the earnings of Chinese immigrants during the 1990s.  Mukhopadhyay 
(2012) finds similar results for employment-based immigrants that transition from temporary 
visas to legal permanent residence, using data from the New Immigrant Survey.  Drawing from 
the Current Population Survey, Kaushal (2006) finds that the Nicaraguan Adjustment and 
Central American Relief Act of 1997 raised the wages of male immigrants that fit the 
demographic profile of those that received legal status by 3 to 4 percent.   
Using cross-sectional data from the National Agricultural Workers Survey from 2000 to 
2006, Kandilov and Kandilov (2010) use propensity score matching to compare the outcomes 
legal and unauthorized men in the agricultural industry and estimate the effect of legalization.  
They find that legalization provides a five percent wage increase, but that the benefits of 
legalization are not limited to wages, as legalized workers are more likely to receive employer-
sponsored health insurance.  This suggests that legalization leads not only to higher wages, but 
also improved occupational standing.   
Other studies also find that the benefits of legalization are not limited to wages.  Taylor 
(1992) notes that perhaps the greatest beneficiaries from IRCA’s legalization program were those 
in the Special Agricultural Worker program, who, post-legalization, transitioned out of farm 
work and into industries with more possibilities for mobility.  Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2000) 
find that previously unauthorized immigrant men who received amnesty through IRCA moved 
into occupations that are higher up the occupational ladder after legalizing.  Powers, Seltzer and 
Shi (1998) find that men in the Legalized Population Survey commonly experienced upward 
mobility, moving from farm work to the service industry or janitorial occupations.  Moreover, as 
Hernandez-Leon and Zuniga (2000) posit, those legalized through IRCA were provided greater 
geographic mobility and were better able to take advantage of economic opportunities in 
emerging, new destination states.    
While there is a general consensus that legalization improves the labor market outcomes 
of men, there is mixed evidence as to the effect of legalization for women.  Some studies find 
that while legalized women earn less than their male counterparts, they experience similar 
increases in wages following legalization (Rivera-Batiz 1999; Amuedo-Dorantes and Basnak 
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2011).  Other findings suggest that women do not experience a boost in wages from legalization 
and that they are largely concentrated in domestic labor occupations, even after legalization 
(Powers, Seltzer and Shi 1998; Cobb-Clark and Kossoudji 1999; Pan 2012). In ethnographic 
work on Mayan immigrants from Guatemala living in Houston, Hagan (1998) finds that the 
social networks of women were constrained relative to men due to their propensity to work in 
informal sectors such as domestic service.  This limited women’s ability to obtain legal status 
through IRCA, as they lacked the social capital and formal resources needed to apply for 
amnesty.  In the same way, it is possible that these same kinds of constraints also limit the 
occupational mobility of women that do gain legal status.   
Although the New Immigrant Survey is a valuable source of data with which to 
investigate how legalization affects labor market outcomes, to date the only published study that 
uses these data and examines the effect of legalization on immigrant wages is by Lofstrom, Hill 
and Hayes (2013). Using NIS retrospective employment and migration data, Lofstrom et al. 
conclude that, relative to continuously legal immigrants, low-skilled, previously unauthorized 
immigrants do not experience significant increases in earnings following legalization, and that 
high-skilled, previously unauthorized workers experience only modest increases in wages after 
receiving LPR status.  Thus, the authors (2013:172) conclude, “improvements in employment 
outcomes from a new legalization program are limited, and for many possibly zero.” 
The Lofstrom et al. analysis is a useful starting point for continued research on this topic, 
but there are several ways in which the analysis can be enhanced. First, their work includes no 
comparison groups beyond the continuously legal immigrants. Following the method 
implemented by Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002), a more robust analysis must include various 
comparison groups to isolate the effect of transitioning from unauthorized to legal, and to 
examine differences within groups. Furthermore, the analysis does not examine how legalization 
for previously unauthorized immigrants may alter the wage-generating process as legal status 
changes over time.  Comprehensively analyzing within-group changes over time allows 
researchers to examine how gaining legal status may have transformed the way in which those 
immigrants interact with the labor force (Rivera-Batiz 1999; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002).  
Moreover, although Lostrom et al. provide some analysis by gender, there is no detailed 
comparison of how outcomes differ between men and women.  Lastly, while Lofstrom and 
colleagues examine occupational distributions over time for immigrants in the NIS, there is no 
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systematic analysis of how occupational standing was impacted by legalization.  Thus, more 
analysis is necessary to better understand the labor market consequences of legalization for 
previously unauthorized immigrants. 
Durable Inequality and Legal Status Transitions 
From a social stratification perspective, legal status is a form of categorical inequality as 
described by Tilly (1998).  Tilly (1998:6) argues that “durable inequality” – or, inequality that 
persists over the life course – often occurs in the form of institutionalized categorical pairs, such 
as male/female and white/nonwhite.  As the research reviewed above indicates, in the case of 
U.S. immigrant labor markets, the categorical pair that most powerfully shapes the experiences 
of the foreign-born is that of authorized/unauthorized.  As Tilly describes, differences across 
these categorical pairs, which are often ascribed to individual performance, are in fact produced 
by social mechanisms.  For groups like unauthorized immigrants, durable inequality is produced 
through “authoritatively organized categorical differences in rewards for performance,” visible 
through, for instance, the systematic pay gap between legal and unauthorized immigrants 
(1998:14). More importantly, the structural nature of durable inequality creates a situation where 
disparities are rooted in the legal and institutional production of the categories themselves and 
not in beliefs or attitudes.  Thus, structural changes to the construction of the categories are 
required to impact durable inequality and transform the relationship between the categories and 
the rewards.  Tilly’s concept of durable inequality provides insight into how a category like 
unauthorized status can produce inequality, as well as the structural changes needed to reduce 
that inequality. 
Moreover, the durable nature of inequality produced by unauthorized status takes on 
greater importance considering that immigrants are expected to drive population growth even as 
economic prospects for many workers decline (Passel and Cohn 2008; Pitkin and Myers 2011).  
Demographic projections indicate that a majority of U.S. population growth in coming decades 
will be attributable to immigration.  In particular, this is expected to have a significant impact on 
the size of the Latino population, as Latinos are projected to comprise nearly one-third of the 
U.S. population by 2050 (Passel and Cohn 2008).   
Given these estimates and the increasingly unequal economic context into which 
contemporary immigration takes place, the concerns voiced by Massey (2007:157) regarding the 
development of a “new urban underclass” comprised of unauthorized Latino immigrants and 
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their offspring raise important questions regarding the study of social stratification and 
international migration.  Even as legal status has emerged as a nexus of inequality within the 
immigrant population, sociological scholarship has largely ignored the synergy between the 
fields of migration and stratification (Massey 2011).  My dissertation explores how 
contemporary immigration to the United States is distinctly interconnected with processes of 
stratification through legal status.  
 Figure 1.3 is a conceptual figure that provides an overview of possible legal status life 
course pathways that I examine in the dissertation, and it shows how legal status is associated 
with cumulative advantage over time.  The dark blue circles represent immigrants that have legal 
status to live and work in the United States; the dark blue arrow connecting the dark blue circles 
represents the life course pathway of immigrants who remain continuously authorized, at t1 and 
t2.  On the other hand, the light blue circles represent immigrants with unauthorized status and 
the arrow connecting the light blue circles represents the life course pathway of remaining 
continuously unauthorized (at t1 and t2).  In accordance with the studies reviewed above, Figure 
1.3 indicates that authorized status is associated with higher levels of cumulative advantage.  
Conversely, continuously unauthorized immigrants are expected to experience the lowest levels 
of cumulative advantage given their marginalized position in the labor market.  Moreover, as 
Figure 1.3 illustrates, this relationship between legal status and disadvantage is expected to 
remain steady over the life course under the assumption that immigrants remain in their 
respective legal status categories.    
However, the major empirical and theoretical contribution of my analysis is to investigate 
the consequences of transitioning from unauthorized to authorized for the labor market 
trajectories of immigrants.  This legal status pathway is portrayed in Figure 1.3 by the diagonal 
arrow (labeled “Legalization”) that connects the light blue circle representing unauthorized 
immigrants at t1 to the dark blue circle representing authorized immigrants at t2.  This arrow 
represents immigrants that, over the course of the immigrant experience, make the transition 
from unauthorized to authorized legal status.  The analysis that follows in this dissertation 
investigates how the transition from unauthorized to legal status changes the relationship 
between cumulative advantage, legal status, and the life course.   
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Figure 1.3: Conceptual Figure of Relationship between Legal Status, Cumulative 
Advantage, and the Life Course 
 
 
Summary 
In an era economic stagnation when immigrants are expected to drive future population 
growth, this research is central to the ongoing debate over U.S. unauthorized immigration 
because it examines the life course mechanisms that reduce or reinforce inequality. Although the 
eight million immigrant workers that lack legal status are significantly disadvantaged relative to 
legal immigrants in the labor market, it is unclear whether a legalization program will close the 
gap between authorized and unauthorized immigrants.  Prior studies show that the earnings of 
unauthorized immigrants legalized through the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act 
increased, but studies of more recently legalized immigrants suggest that the benefits of 
legalization have deteriorated. My research, then, investigates the effects of legalization on the 
hourly wages and occupational standing of unauthorized Latin American immigrants.  
Adopting a cumulative advantage perspective, I hypothesize that legalized immigrants 
either undergo subsequent disadvantage because of their previous unauthorized status (the 
scarring hypothesis) or experience social mobility as a result of the transition to legality (the 
turning point hypothesis). To evaluate these competing hypotheses, I analyze panel data from the 
2003 New Immigrant Survey (NIS) and the 2001 Survey of Income and Program Participation 
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(SIPP) using a quasi-experimental research design to examine the longitudinal outcomes of one 
treatment group (unauthorized immigrants that gain legal status) and three control groups 
(continuously unauthorized immigrants, continuously legal immigrants, and U.S.-born Latinos).  
In the next chapter, I detail the research questions and competing hypotheses of how 
legalization will influence labor market trajectories, based on previous research and theory from 
cumulative advantage framework.  Then, I describe the multiple data sources and quasi-
experimental research design that I use to explore the research questions and test competing 
hypotheses.  
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Chapter 2: Hypotheses, Data, and Methods 
 
 Based on prior research and the cumulative advantage framework described in the 
preceding chapter, this dissertation examines whether unauthorized status scars immigrant 
workers and limits future labor market prospects or if legalization is a turning point that opens up 
new avenues of economic opportunity. In this chapter, I first overview the key research questions 
and hypotheses generated from the cumulative advantage framework. Then, I detail the two data 
sets and the quasi-experimental methods that I use to assess the two competing hypotheses. 
Lastly, I describe the demographic characteristics of the treatment group and the comparison 
groups that are part of the analysis.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 From a social stratification perspective, the cumulative advantage framework suggests 
two possible scenarios for the effect of legalization on labor market trajectories, which are 
detailed in Table 2.1. Broadly speaking, this analysis examines how the labor market trajectories 
of unauthorized immigrants are shaped by legalization. On the one hand, if unauthorized status 
scars immigrant workers, then there will be little or no effect of legalization on immigrant labor 
market outcomes. Conversely, if legalization is a turning point in the employment trajectories of 
immigrants, then immigrants that transition from unauthorized to authorized status will 
experience gains in wages and occupational standing post-legalization.  
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Table 2.1: Key Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Scarring Turning Point
Does legalization improve 
labor market outcomes for 
unauthorized immigrants?
Previous unauthorized 
status constrains benefits of 
legalization
Legalization improves 
outcomes of unauthorized 
immigrants
1. Do transitioners experience 
more hourly wage growth 
and improved occupational 
standing over time relative 
to the comparison groups?
Transitioner outcomes will 
be similar to comparison 
groups
Transitioners will 
experience singular 
improvement in outcomes
2. Do transitioners experience 
a structural break in how 
these labor market outcomes 
are generated from t1 to t2?
Transitioners will not 
experience strucutral break 
Transitioners will 
experience structural break
3. What is the payoff of 
legalization?
Transitioner outcomes will 
not experience payoff
Transitioner outcomes will 
experience substantial 
payoff from legalization
HypothesesResearch Questions 
 
 
 Research question 1 addresses the baseline issue of whether – on a descriptive level – 
immigrants that transition from unauthorized to authorized status, e.g. transitioners (immigrants 
that transition from being unauthorized at t1 to being legal at t2) experience statistically 
significant growth in wages and occupational standing between t1 to t2, and how the pace of that 
growth over time varies from that of comparison groups. The scarring framework suggests that, 
even if there is significant growth in labor market outcomes over time for transitioners, growth 
will not outpace that of comparison groups. The turning point framework, on the other hand, 
posits that legalization will provide a boost to hourly wages and occupational standing of 
immigrant workers not experienced by the other groups.  
 The second research question asks whether there is a structural break in how each labor 
market outcome is generated between t1 to t2. The phrase “structural break” describes the process 
through which determinants of a labor market outcome differ significantly across time periods, 
implying a shift has occured in how labor market outcomes are generated over time (Baltagi 
2008:47). I evaluate this research question using a Chow test (for more information on how the 
Chow test is conducted, please refer to the Methods section). The null hypothesis from a Chow 
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test represents the hypothesis from the scarring literature: due to the scarring nature of 
unauthorized status, legalization will not alter the process through which outcomes are 
determined for legal status transitioners. The alternative hypothesis, expected from turning point 
studies, posits that while transitioners may experience a statistically significant structural break 
between t1 to t2, comparison groups will not. This is based on the idea that labor market 
experiences of unauthorized and authorized immigrants are structurally different, and thus 
immigrants who make this transition in legal status will face dramatically different labor market 
conditions between t1 to t2. Therefore, the Chow test captures this structural shift.   
 The final research question asks how the payoff of legalization and the penalty of 
remaining unauthorized differ. From the perspective of the scarring framework, there is little 
reason to expect differential outcomes for those that legalize and those that remain unauthorized 
because the framework expects the penalty of unauthorized status to linger even after 
legalization. Conversely, the turning point hypothesis expects that legalization is an important 
marker in an unauthorized immigrant’s life course and that it opens up new labor market 
opportunities. Consequently, this hypothesis posits that there will be a substantial payoff for 
legalizing and a strong penalty for remaining unauthorized. This step of the analysis provides an 
opportunity to estimate the size of the benefit, if any, that legalization provides to the wages of 
unauthorized immigrants.  
  29 
Figure 2.1: Legalization and Labor Market Outcomes at t1 and t2, Scarring and Turning 
Point Hypotheses 
 
 To further illustrate the research questions and hypotheses posed in Table 2.1, I now turn 
to Figure 2.1, which builds on the concepts first presented in Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1. Both 
panels in Figure 2.1 refer to the same y-axis, which represents labor market outcomes, and higher 
values on the y-axis indicate more advantaged outcomes. Panel A refers to the scarring 
hypothesis, and Panel B refers to the turning point hypothesis. In each panel, lines represent 
different comparison groups in the analysis – U.S.-born Latinos, continuously legal immigrants, 
and continuously unauthorized immigrants – and the treatment group of legal status transitioners, 
or immigrants that gain legal status between the points in time represented by t1 and t2. The dark 
gray region between t1 and t2 represents the process of legalization, and thus only applies to 
transitioners.  
 Based on studies reviewed in the previous chapter, in Figure 2.1 I hypothesize that legal 
status is strongly associated with labor market outcomes. As a result, it is expected that U.S.-
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born Latinos, who do not face the barriers associated with foreign-born status, will experience 
the most advantaged outcomes over time. Among the foreign-born, I expect that immigrants who 
are continuously authorized will experience better labor market outcomes relative to 
continuously unauthorized immigrants. The hypotheses portrayed in Figure 2, then, apply 
directly to the outcomes of the transitioners as they shift from unauthorized status at t1 to 
authorized status at t2.  
 The scarring hypothesis is depicted in Panel A. It posits that, despite undergoing 
legalization, legal status transitioners will continue to be affected by their past unauthorized 
experience. Under the scarring scenario, transitioners will experience a labor market penalty 
even after gaining authorized status. This is represented in Figure 2.1 by the line that changes 
from red at t1 to purple at t2. After gaining legal status, transitioners will experience some growth 
but they will not reach parity with the continuously legal, indicating that their labor market 
experiences remain scarred by previously unauthorized status.  
 Conversely, the figure under Panel B depicts the turning point hypothesis. In this case, 
legalization provides a clean break for transitioners, as they move from the labor market 
trajectory of continuously unauthorized to continuously legal. Thus, the turning point hypothesis 
differs from the scarring hypothesis in that, after legalization, the labor market experiences of 
transitioners will no longer be affected by their previous status and they will be able to take 
advantage of the new authorized status. In the next section, I now turn to the data and methods 
used to evaluate these competing hypotheses. 
Data and Methods 
Data 
 The analysis uses data from the 2003 New Immigrant Survey (NIS) and the 2001-2003 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Table 2.2 provides an overview of the two 
surveys. The NIS is a survey of the cohort of foreign-born individuals that received legal 
permanent resident (LPR) status in the United States in 2003. The survey draws its respondents 
from a sampling frame of official government administrative records, and thus is a nationally 
representative sample of the population of immigrants that received LPR status in 2003. Legal 
permanent residents are defined as foreign-born persons that receive a visa to live permanently in 
the United States; this can be achieved through a family or employer sponsored visa, adjusting 
from refugee or asylee status, or by acquiring a visa through the diversity lottery program, which 
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provides immigration visas to underrepresented countries in the U.S. immigration flow (Jasso et 
al. 2003).  NIS respondents were sampled from May to November of 2003, and interviews were 
conducted from June 2003 to June 2004.  
Table 2.2: Overview of Data Sources Used in the Analysis 
New Immigrant Survey 
(NIS)
Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP)
Survey Years 2003 2001-2003
Represents Newly admitted legal 
immigrants to U.S.
U.S. population
Survey Design Prospective-retrospective 
panel study
Longitudinal
Legal Status Indicators Yes, reported Yes, imputed (Hall et al. 2010)
Time t1: 1995-2003; t2: 2003  t1: 2001; t2: 2003 
Sample Restrictions Latin American 
immigrants, ages 18-65, 
employed
Latin American immigrants and 
U.S.-born Latinos, ages 18-65, 
employed
 
 
 The NIS collects information on a wide variety of subjects, including detailed 
retrospective migration histories and labor market outcomes, which I use in this analysis to 
examine changes in hourly wages and occupational standing over time. Specifically, the NIS 
collects employment information such as hourly wages, occupation, and industry, from 
respondents at two points in time: when they first migrated to the United States (t1) and at the 
time of the survey after receiving LPR status (t2). Using detailed migration histories, I identify 
each respondent’s legal status at t1, which could be unauthorized or legal; all NIS respondents are 
legal at t2. Respondents that had legal authorization to work at the time of their first U.S. trip are 
referred to as continuously legal.  Respondents that did not have authorization to work at t1 are 
referred to as legal status transitioners, as they transition from unauthorized status at t1 to 
authorized status at t2.  
To categorize the NIS respondents as continuously legal or transitioners, I rely on criteria 
established by Jasso et al. (2008), who used NIS data to examine previous unauthorized 
experience among LPR recipients. LPR recipients are categorized as transitioners if, at t1, they 
report entering without inspection, overstaying a temporary visa (such as a tourist visa), or 
working on a nonimmigrant visa (such as a student visa); at t2, the transitioner sample from the 
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NIS have subsequently received LPR status and are legal immigrants. Respondents in the NIS 
that have maintained authorized status from t1 to t2 are categorized as continuously legal.  
In addition, I use the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), which is a 
longitudinal, nationally representative survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. Like the 
NIS, the SIPP also provides detailed information about labor market outcomes, making the data 
sets very suitable to be used in tandem for this kind of analysis. To make the SIPP more 
comparable to the NIS, I use data only from the first and last SIPP waves, representing t1and t2, 
respectively. Used together in this way, the NIS and SIPP provide two sources of panel data with 
two points in time for each respondent: t1 and t2.  
The 2001-03 SIPP includes variables on immigrant visa status and participation in public 
assistance programs recently used by Hall, Greenman, and Farkas (2010) and Bean, Brown, 
Leach, Bachmeir and Van Hook (2013) to impute the legal status of foreign-born respondents in 
the survey. While detailed migration histories provided in the NIS allows for the direct 
estimation of the legal status, the SIPP does not allow for direct estimation of legal status. 
However, researchers have used immigration status and questions pertaining to public assistance 
program eligibility to impute the legal status of immigrants. As a General Accounting Office 
(2006:20-21) report notes, “The SIPP questions come close to asking about – but do not actually 
allow an estimate of – the number of foreign-born US residents who are currently 
undocumented.” The report goes on to state that, given the detailed nature of the immigrant 
status questions provided in the SIPP, respondents that fall into the “other status not listed” 
category “logically include undocumented persons as well as a small number of persons in 
various legal immigration categories” (2006:20).  
 By applying what is known about the unauthorized immigrant population, however, it is 
possible to identify immigrants in the “other status not listed” category who are temporary legal 
immigrants, thus produce an estimate of those that are unauthorized. This is an imputation 
process developed by Hall, Greenman and Farks (2010) that has subsequently been used by 
Bean, Brown, Leach, Bachmeir and Van Hook (2013) to examine legal status among Latin 
American immigrants.  
To identify unauthorized immigrants in the SIPP, I first take the entire universe of 
foreign-born respondents and categorize those that report being naturalized citizens or legal 
permanent residents. Then, I also examine if any respondents report personally using public 
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assistance programs at any time during the years of the survey (e.g., SNAP, Medicaid, SSI, 
TANF). If immigrants report personally using these programs, they are classified as legal. Any 
immigrants that report being a diplomat or high-ranking government official (or being married to 
such an individual) are also classified as legal. Finally, immigrants who report being enrolled in 
college, or who have a spouse that is enrolled in college, are also classified as legal.  
The resulting sample of immigrants are either unauthorized or on a temporary legal 
status, which, according to the Department of Homeland Security, includes temporary legal 
workers, refugees, and asylees (Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker 2012). The SIPP does not sample 
tourists or other short-term visitors, and students and diplomats (and their spouses) are already 
classified as legal. Mexicans are very rarely granted refugee/asylum (and they make up 75 
percent of the unauthorized SIPP sample). Further, even those few Central Americans that may 
have qualified for Temporary Protected Status (temporary legal status that must be renewed 
periodically by the U.S. government and is granted to immigrants from countries experiencing 
environmental disasters or ongoing conflicts that prevents their return) still face disadvantage 
because of their marginal “liminal legality” (Menjívar 2006). Moreover, Passel and Cohn (2009) 
estimate that that roughly 90 percent of immigrants who are neither naturalized citizens nor legal 
permanent residents are unauthorized. The one category of legal immigrants in the SIPP who are 
not identifiable are those on temporary work visas; however, these workers comprise a very 
small portion of the overall immigrant population.  
Thus, although the sample of immigrants that I classify as unauthorized may contain a 
very limited number of legal immigrants, the overwhelming majority of the respondents in the 
SIPP that are categorized as unauthorized lack legal authorization to live and work in the U.S. 
Moreover, given the scarcity of longitudinal, representative surveys that collect or allow for the 
identification of legal status, this imputation method using the SIPP represents an extremely 
useful and valuable technique for examining immigrant outcomes by legal status. Using this 
method, I extract a sample of continuously unauthorized immigrants (those without work 
authorization) and a sample of continuously legal immigrants (those with work authorization). 
For an additional comparison group, I include a sample of U.S.-born respondents who report 
Hispanic ethnicity. Table 2.3 provides an overview of each group included in the analysis, along 
with its corresponding sample size.  
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Table 2.3: Overview of Samples from NIS and SIPP 
NIS N SIPP N
Treatment Legal Status 
Transitioners
478 --
Comparison Continuously Legal 
Immigrants
357 Continuously Legal 
Immigrants
1,818
Comparison
--
Continuously 
Unauthorized 
Immigrants
406
Comparison
-- U.S.-born Latinos 1,988
Note: Sample sizes represent number of cases (men and women) with valid responses at both 
t1 and t2  
 
Independent Variables  
 Following the quasi-experimental methodology devised by Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 
(2002), I have coded variables in the analysis in the same way so that the measurement of all 
variables across the NIS and SIPP is comparable. Table 2.4 describes the coding of each 
variable. Independent variables included in the multivariate models reflect those included in the 
models described in prior studies (Rivera-Batiz 1999; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002; Hall et 
al. 2010) as well as those in traditional models predicting labor market outcomes (Mincer 1989).  
Furthermore, given the relatively small sample sizes of the transitioners and the 
continuously unauthorized relative to other groups (particularly when analyzing the samples 
separately be gender), the independent variables I selected for the analysis represent a set of 
predictors that, while controlling for the necessary variables that shape labor market outcomes, 
takes into account the risk of overfitting the OLS regression models. This is especially important 
given that I use the same set of predictors for each OLS regression model in the analysis, and so 
the model needs to accommodate varying sample sizes. Overfitting a regression model refers to 
including too many predictors in a model relative to the available number of observations 
(Tibshirani 1996). Overfitting can lead to “models that use up too many degrees of freedom for 
the available sample size [and] tend[s] to produce weights that fluctuate considerably over 
repeated samples” (Babyak 2004:414).  The OLS regression models conducted here provide the 
foundation for a central element of the analysis (the Chow tests for structural change), which are 
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omnibus tests of model fit for particular groups over time.  Based on Babyak’s (2004) 
observation, then, it is crucial that I avoid overfitting the OLS regression models so as not to 
artificially introduce statistical noise into those models.     
Regression models where continuous predictors have been recoded into dichotomous or 
categorical variables are susceptible to overfitting (MacCallum et al. 2002). Royston et al. (2006) 
find that the categorization of continuous predictors leads to a significant loss of power and 
argue that the practice should be avoided in favor of more parsimonious models that do not 
recode continuous explanatory variables. Applying these statistical insights to my analysis, I do 
not recode the continuous predictor variables included in the OLS models (age, years of 
education, and year of U.S. entry).  Further, Babyak (2004:415) uses simulations to estimate the 
minimum number of observations per predictor variable in regression models, finding that 
spurious correlations between variables “increase considerably as the ratio of observations per 
predictor becomes smaller.” For OLS models specifically, Babyak concludes that a minimum of 
10 to 15 observations are needed per predictor variable in order to ensure stable and reliable 
estimates. Thus, the independent variables described in Table 2.4 represent a comprehensive set 
of predictors that take into account the limitations of the data used in the analysis.  
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Table 2.4: Coding of Independent Variables in the Analysis 
Coding
Time 
Variant?
National Origin
Mexico Dichotomous; 1 if Mexico, 0 otherwise No
El Salvador/Guatemala Dichotomous; 1 if El Salvador/Guatemala 0 otherwise No
Other Latin America 
(reference)
-- No
Demographics
Age Continuous; age in years Yes
Age-Squared Continuous; age in years-squared Yes
Female (ref=male) Dichotomous; 1 if female, 0 otherwise No
Married (ref=not) Dichotomous; 1 if married, 0 otherwise Yes
Traditional Immigrant 
State (ref=other)
Dichotomous; 1 if residing in CA, IL, TX, FL, or NY/NJ, 
0 otherwise
Yes
Human Capital
Years of Education Continuous; number of years of education Yes
Female-Educ. Interaction Interaction term between gender and years of education Yes
No English (ref=other) Dichotomous; 1 if respondent reports speaking no 
English, 0 otherwise
No
Entry into U.S. Labor 
Market 
Continuous; year respondent entered into the U.S. labor 
market
No
Industry
Agriculture Dichotomous; 1 if works in agricultural industry, 0 
otherwise
Yes
Construction Dichotomous; 1 if works in construction industry, 0 
otherwise
Yes
Service Sector Dichotomous; 1 if works in service industry, 0 otherwise Yes
Other Industry 
(reference)
-- Yes
 
To account for possible variation across national origin groups, I include variables for 
country of origin. This is complicated by the coding scheme provided in the NIS, which 
collapses many of the country of origin categories to protect the identities of respondents. As a 
result, I measure national origin with two dummy variables representing Mexico and El 
Salvador/Guatemala, respectively, 1 if yes and 0 if no, and the reference category is all other 
Latin American countries. 
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To control for potential age effects, I include controls for age (measured in years) and 
age-squared to capture any possible curvilinear relationships. Marital status is measured with a 
dummy variable, coded 1 if respondents are married and 0 otherwise; this variable accounts for 
variation in family structure across respondents (Jasso et al. 2008). In addition, I include a 
dichotomous indicator for gender (1 if female, 0 if male). I also include geographic location with 
a dummy variable indicating whether respondents live in a traditional immigrant state (Texas, 
Florida, California, Illinois, New York or New Jersey is equal to 1, 0 otherwise).  
As a measure of human capital, I include a variable for education as continuous years. 
This reflects previous research, which has found that education increases returns for immigrants 
in the labor market (Borjas and Tienda 1993). Another human capital measure in the analysis is a 
variable representing English proficiency; prior research shows that increased English 
proficiency increases wages for immigrants (Chiswick and Miller 1999). The variable included 
here represents not speaking English, and is coded 1 if respondent reports speaking no English 
and 0 otherwise. Although a more nuanced version of the English proficiency variable is 
preferred, I code the variable in this way for two reasons. First and foremost, this coding 
enhances the comparability of the measures across the NIS and SIPP. Second, NIS respondents 
only provide information about their English proficiency at one point in time: the point at which 
the survey data was collected in 2003. Thus, it is conceivable that the respondent reports 
speaking English well at the time of the survey but did not speak any English four years prior 
when he/she arrived in the United States. The lack of English ability, in this case, is the only 
category about which I can be relatively certain that an individual remained in across time. For 
instance, it is unlikely that a respondent’s English ability decreased over time.  
Year of U.S. labor market entry is measured as a continuous variable, and represents the 
year that respondents first worked in the United States. It accounts for differential returns to U.S. 
experience for immigrant workers (Phillips and Massey 1999). For U.S.-born Latinos, who are 
natural born citizens and did not immigrate, this variable represents the year the respondent first 
entered the labor market. To account for differential returns to human capital for men and 
women in the labor market, models that contain both men and women respondents include a 
dummy variable for gender and an interaction between gender and education.  
Like previous research (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002), I control for industry in the 
analysis of hourly wages in Chapter 3 with a set of dummy variables indicating employment in 
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traditional immigrant sectors: agriculture, construction, or the service sector. These three sectors 
represent the most common industrial sectors for immigrant workers (Newburger and Gryn 
2009). However, due to the significant and substantive overlap between industry and 
occupational categorizations, the industry in which a worker is employed is likely endogenous to 
the same characteristics that determine a worker’s occupation. Thus, I omit the industry variables 
from the analyses of the occupation-specific outcomes in Chapters 4 and 5.   
In all models, time-variant variables include education, marital status, geographic 
location, age, and industry. Remaining variables are time-invariant and reflect the status of 
respondents at the time of the survey.   
Missing Data 
To maximize the sample sizes in SIPP, I used a hotdeck imputation procedure to impute 
the values of three variables that suffered from substantial amounts of missing data. Although 
multiple imputation is the most efficient and unbiased method of imputation (Horton and Lipsitz 
2001; McKnight, McKnight, Sidani, and Figueredo 2007), my methodological approach 
precludes me from using it. As I detail later in this chapter, my analysis plan relies on comparing 
model fit statistics across pooled and unpooled versions of OLS regression models for different 
comparison groups to evaluate how legalization changes the outcome-generating process over 
time. Multiple imputation requires combining the results of many imputed datasets to produce 
the final results; as a result, however, some statistics are not available in regression models from 
data imputed through multiple imputation. This includes likelihood ratio test statistics, model 
chi-square statistics, and goodness-of-fit statistics. As White, Royston, and Wood (2010:389) 
note, “statistics whose value changes systematically with the sample size cannot be combined 
using [multiple imputation].” Therefore, because multiple imputation is not a viable option for 
this analysis, I use a hotdeck procedure to recover missing data from the SIPP.  
Variables that were imputed include the year of labor market entry (US-born only, 23 
percent missing), year of U.S. entry (foreign-born only, 19 percent missing) and English 
language ability (38 percent missing). The hotdeck procedure is an imputation method that 
tabulates the missing data patterns within a given list of variables and replaces the missing data 
with corresponding values from the cases with no missing data. Each imputation was carried out 
separately for each sample (i.e., for unauthorized immigrants, legal immigrants, and the US-born 
Hispanics). Furthermore, for each imputation I also specified variables that defined the strata 
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within which the imputation was carried out: for the labor market entry and year of U.S. entry 
variables the strata variables were education and age, and for the English language variable the 
strata variable was education.  
Dependent Variables 
 I analyze two outcome variables, both of which are time-variant. The first is 
straightforward: hourly wages of the respondent’s job at t1 or t2, respectively, adjusted for 
inflation and converted into constant 2003 dollars. The hourly wage variable is subject to a fair 
amount of missing data, with 25 percent missing from the NIS samples and 10 percent missing 
across all samples from the SIPP. As a result, I also examine occupation-specific variables to 
measure occupational standing and job quality, which largely avoids missing data (less than 1 
percent missing in the NIS and 7 percent missing in the SIPP). In addition, analyzing 
occupational-specific outcomes is also guided by theoretical considerations, as it allows me to 
examine more structural measures of labor market position and class position as detailed by 
Weeden and Grusky (2005).  
For the occupation-specific outcome variables, I use the March sample of the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) from 1994 to 2004 to produce occupation-level statistics for each 
detailed occupational code by year, gender, and geographic region. The CPS data I use derive 
from the March files found in the IPUMS-CPS project, which produces harmonized versions of 
March CPS data across many years (Ruggles, Alexander, Genadek, Goeken, Schroeder, and 
Sobek 2010).  
One complication in comparing detailed occupational codes across data sets is that they 
often change across years. In this case, detailed occupational codes in the SIPP and CPS were 
both classified according the 1990 Census occupational codes but the NIS is classified by the 
2000 Census codes. To harmonize the NIS categories to the CPS and SIPP, I used a data 
program developed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Meyer and Osborne 2005). This program 
matches the occupational codes from the 1990 and 2000 census codes into a harmonized 
occupational categorization with 340 occupations and it ensures that the detailed occupational 
codes used in my analysis are comparable over time and across data sets.  
Because the NIS respondents’ migration histories go back to 1995 and some respondents 
were interviewed in 2004, I use CPS data from 1994 to 2005. The SIPP interviews occurred 
during the 2000 to 2003 time period. To ensure sufficient sample sizes across detailed 
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occupational categories in each geographic region, I use a three-year moving average and created 
median wages. For instance, the data for 1995 are actually a collapsed file of data from 1994, 
1995, and 1996. This method reduced volatility of the sample sizes and allowed for more stable 
estimation of median wages across occupations.  
 I create 15 geographic regions, which match the most detailed geographic categories 
provided in the public-use version of the NIS. These include six individual states, which 
correspond to the traditional immigrant-receiving states (California, Florida, Texas, New York, 
New Jersey, and Illinois); the remaining nine regions correspond to the broad regional categories 
provided in the Census (Middle Atlantic, New England, West South Central, etc.). These 
regional categories approximate the local labor market context in which respondents are 
embedded. To take into account variation in labor market outcomes by gender, the index is also 
gender specific. Thus, the measure is sensitive to temporal, regional, and gender differences in 
how occupations are positioned and rewarded.  
While previous analyses have created similar indexes using national-level data for a 
given year (Wright and Dwyer 2003; Weeden and Grusky 2005), my analysis extends this 
method by enhancing the detail of prior analysis and more closely approximating respondents’ 
local labor conditions. With this framework, I match the characteristics of CPS occupations to 
the occupations held by respondents in the NIS and SIPP and produce a series of occupation-
specific labor market outcomes. Because this index is year, gender, and region specific, it reflects 
the structural characteristics of respondents’ occupations and conveys important information 
about how occupations are positioned in the local economic hierarchy (Wright and Dwyer 2003). 
 For example, to create the occupational-wage index (OWI), I first used weighted, three-
year moving averages for each year to create gender- and region-specific median wages for each 
detailed occupational category. I then assigned these occupation-specific median hourly wages to 
each respondent in the NIS and SIPP based on the corresponding detailed occupational codes. I 
used a similar process to create occupation-specific variables measuring additional attributes of 
occupations and offer more detail on those variables in Chapter 5. Table 2.5 describes the 
dependent variables examined in each analytic chapter of the dissertation. 
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Table 2.5: Overview of Dependent Variables Used in the Analysis 
Definition Chapter
Earnings
Hourly Wage Hourly wage at job, adjusted to constant $2003 3
Occupational Standing
Measures relative position in the occupational 
hierarchy by year, gender, and region across 
various indicators using data from Current 
Population Survey
3
Occupational-Wage Index 
(OWI)
Median hourly wage in respondent's occupation; 
higher values indicate higher-paying occupations 4
Occupation-Specific 
Characteristics
Set of eight variables that examine the 
demographic composition (niches), benefits, and 
economic security of occupations; see Table 5.1 in 
Chapter 5 for more details 
5
 
To give a sense of how occupations are distributed in the occupational-wage index, I 
provide some examples from the 2003 CPS data. The most common occupations in the top 10 
percent of the median wage distribution include chief executives, physicians, lawyers, dentists, 
and architects. The most common occupations in the bottom quarter of the median wage 
distribution include cashiers, cooks, food preparation workers, janitors, and housekeepers. 
Common occupations located in the middle of the median wage distribution include secretaries, 
sales supervisors, machinists, computer equipment operators, heating/air conditioning 
mechanics, and customer service representatives.   
Sample Restrictions 
The SIPP and NIS samples are limited to men and women employed at both time points 
and between the ages 18 to 64. The immigrant samples are comprised of foreign-born 
respondents from Latin America (Mexico, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean). 
For the U.S.-born Latino sample, I include respondents who reported Hispanic ethnicity (of any 
race). In the NIS, the sample is limited to respondents whose first U.S. trip occurred on or after 
1995. While some NIS respondents made a first U.S. trip before 1995, I limit this analysis to 
those that arrived eight years before the year of the survey to locate the analysis squarely in the 
post-IRCA context when access to legalization related to the amnesty provisions had expired 
(Donato and Carter 1999). Because more than two-thirds of the NIS sample is comprised of 
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immigrants who are adjusting their status and have previous U.S. experience, this longer time 
frame insures sufficient sample sizes for the analysis and better captures the time that it took for 
immigrants to gain legal status.   
Quasi-Experimental Design 
Drawing on the methodology developed by Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) and Cobb-
Clark and Kossoudji (1999) to examine legalization and employment outcomes, I employ a 
quasi-experimental research design with a treatment group and multiple comparison groups to 
isolate the effect of transitioning from unauthorized to authorized status. As Meyer (1995) notes, 
the before and after untreated comparison group approach offers an opportunity to rule out 
competing exogenous explanations, and is strengthened by the inclusion of multiple comparison 
groups. In this analysis, the legal status transitioners from the NIS comprise the treatment group, 
and continuously legal immigrants from the NIS and SIPP, continuously unauthorized from the 
SIPP, and U.S.-born Latinos from the SIPP represent the comparison groups. By examining how 
the labor market trajectories of transitioners differ from the comparison groups, this analytic 
strategy allows me to isolate the effects of legalization.  
While a true experimental design would include a treatment group comprised of a sample 
of unauthorized immigrants that were randomly assigned legal status (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 
2002), such data are not possible. Therefore, my analysis makes use of the best available data to 
create a quasi-experimental research design. In contrast to prior studies, the unique 
methodological contribution of my analysis is that it includes multiple foreign-born comparison 
groups with varying legal statuses and a U.S.-born Latino sample. I argue that these groups 
provide the necessary additional leverage to identify the effect of legalization on labor market 
outcomes over time.  
Sample Selectivity  
 Given that the legal status transitioner group is comprised of unauthorized immigrants 
who gained legal permanent resident status during a period when there was no comprehensive 
legalization program available, it is conceivable that this group is positively selected on 
particular traits or attributes. For instance, it is plausible that the transitioner group represents an 
extraordinarily gifted, resilient, or motivated population of immigrants, as they are able to 
transition from unauthorized to authorized status during a time when access to legal status is 
limited. Unfortunately, I do not have the data to examine social psychological measures like 
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resilience or motivation. However, I can examine the educational levels of transitioners as a 
proxy for skill. Comparing the sample statistics of NIS transitioners to SIPP continuously 
unauthorized shows that transitioners are not overwhelmingly skilled. For instance, 45 percent of 
the transitioner group lacks a high school diploma, compared to 60 percent of the continuously 
unauthorized group. Furthermore, 15 percent of transitioners report speaking no English, 
compared to 19 percent of the continuously unauthorized. Thus, while transitioners may 
represent a population that is slightly more educated and proficient in English than the overall 
unauthorized population, there are large segments of the transitioner group who are low-skill 
workers that closely resemble the continuously unauthorized group.  
 Moreover, when put into the larger context of contemporary immigration, there is little 
reason to suspect that selection is biasing this analysis. As many sociological studies indicate, the 
migration process itself is a selective process, and the probability of U.S. migration is shaped by 
factors such as social capital, community of origin, and migration-related resources from family 
and friend networks (Massey 1990; Massey 1999; Fussell and Massey 2004). Moreover, 
economic studies indicate that immigrants themselves may be subject to further favorable 
selectivity based on skills and potential success in the labor market (Chiswick 1999; Chiquiar 
and Hanson 2002). Thus, it is likely that the initial selection process involved in the migration 
decision is a stronger than whatever selection process is involved in the transition from 
unauthorized to legal status, especially in the absence of any overarching legalization program 
implemented by the government during the period of analysis.  
Orrenius and Zavodny (2005) use MMP data to examine the determinants of self-
selection among unauthorized immigrants from Mexico. They find that a variety of factors, 
including U.S. and Mexico economic conditions are important indicators of whether a Mexican 
male embarks on a migration trip. Their findings indicate that unauthorized Mexican migrants 
are not negatively selected on education. In fact, they find that unauthorized Mexican immigrants 
are more likely to be in the middle of the Mexican education distribution than in the top or the 
bottom. Most importantly, however, these findings suggest that access to a social network that 
contains individuals with previous migration experience dramatically increases the propensity to 
take an unauthorized trip. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that many LPR recipients in the NIS with prior 
unauthorized experience gained legal status through social networks. For instance, researchers 
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(Jasso et al. 2000; Jasso et al. 2008:26) studying the legal status transitions among NIS 
respondents note, “previous illegal experience is heavily linked to the aftermath of the IRCA 
legalization program.” IRCA’s amnesty program had the effect of widely diffusing legal status 
across social networks for Latin American immigrants. A report commissioned by the U.S. 
Commission on Immigration Reform (Woodrow-Lafield 1994) after IRCA was passed 
concluded that a primary reason IRCA failed to stem unauthorized immigration is that the 
legislation ignored the active role of family and social networks in migration flows, who 
petitioned to have spouses, children, and extended family members admitted as legal immigrants 
and added to the backlogs experienced by immigrants from Latin American countries. Thus, 
Woodrow-Lafield (1994:32) writes that the “failure of the legal immigration system to afford 
legal opportunity for family migration may lead to substantial undocumented immigration of 
family members of this cohort of legalized immigrants who have been settled for a decade.” One 
consequence of IRCA, then, was to create a large pool of low-skilled, Latin American 
immigrants with the ability to sponsor the immigration of relatives. Furthermore, these ties to 
legalization grew stronger over time, as IRCA-legalized immigrants naturalized and gained 
greater sponsorship benefits. Thus, taken together, the evidence suggests that it is unlikely that 
the selectivity in the transitioners group is driving the results of this analysis.  
Methods 
The analytic strategy used here follows directly from that used by Kossoudji and Cobb-
Clark (2002), who used a treatment group and a comparison group to examine the effect of 
legalization on the wages of immigrants legalized through IRCA. Using a quasi-experimental 
research design, the focus of this analysis is on within-group changes from t1 to t2. By comparing 
how the labor market trajectories of a diverse set of comparison groups differ from that of the 
treatment group (the legal status transitioners), I investigate if and how legalization alters the 
experiences of previously unauthorized immigrants in the labor market. To pay special attention 
to how the experiences of legalization may be gendered (Cobb-Clark and Kossoudji 1999), I 
examine each group in the analysis as a total sample (including both men and women) and by 
gender. For each dependent variable, the analysis unfolds in four steps.  
Step 1 provides a descriptive picture of how the labor market outcomes vary from t1 to t2 
for all groups in the analysis. Here, I provide the average value of the given outcome at t1 and at 
t2 and the percent change in that value over time to give a sense of the magnitude of change over 
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time. I also provide the results from a within-group difference in means test over time, which 
tests if there is a statistically significant change in the labor market outcome across time periods. 
The difference in means test is conducted using a t-test, as described in Equation 1.  
(1) 
Step 2 provides the foundation for the analysis. Each of the dependent variables in this 
analysis is continuous and transformed to log form for the OLS regressions.  For each group, I 
predict each dependent variable using three different OLS regression models: two separate 
unpooled models using data from t1 and t2, respectively, and a pooled model using data from t1 to 
t2 together.  The independent variables for the OLS regression models are described in Table 2.4.  
The model is provided in Equation 2:  
 (2) 
where each variable is followed by the subscript i, which denotes the indexing by individuals and 
j, which denotes the indexing by time. Y represents the dependent variable, X includes time-
variant characteristics (age, geographic location, education, marital status, and industry of 
employment), X* includes time-invariant characteristics (national origin, gender, English 
language proficiency, and year of U.S. labor market entry), and ε is an error term. Following 
Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002), I conducted the analysis using both the balanced samples 
(using only cases with valid observations for t1 and t2) and the unbalanced samples (using all 
available cases); because the results using both sets of samples are substantively similar, I 
present only the results from the unbalanced samples in the dissertation.  
 After estimating the OLS models described above, I then use the model-fit statistics 
generated in step 2 in the pooled and unpooled models for each sample to conduct a Chow test, 
which tests for evidence of a structural change in how the dependent variable is generated across 
time periods.  Following Balatgi (2008:54-55), this test is shown in Equation 3:  
tobs =
X1 − X2
σ X1−X2
Yij = β0 +β1Xij +β2Xij* +εij
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 (3) 
where is the error sum of squares from an OLS regression where cases from t1 and t2 are 
pooled together,  is the sum of the error sum of squares from separate OLS regressions 
for both t1 and t2 (the unpooled models), T is the sample size divided by the number of groups 
that are being pooled, N is the sample size, and K is the number of predictors in the model.  
This Chow test derives from the econometric literature on panel data and it is an omnibus 
test of whether the parameters of an equation vary from the first data point to the second. As 
Baltagi (2008:47) notes, “the question of whether to pool or not to pool boils down to the 
question of whether the parameters of…this equation vary from one year to the other.” 
Correspondingly, the null hypothesis is that the parameters do not differ across time periods, 
while the alternative hypothesis is that there is a significant difference in the parameters over 
time. Substantively, a failure to reject the null hypothesis indicates that, statistically, the 
outcome-generating process at t1 is indistinguishable from that at t2. Conversely, evidence in 
favor of rejecting the null hypothesis of no change indicates that the outcome-generating process 
varies in a statistically significant way across time periods.  
For this analysis, if the null hypothesis of no difference over time is rejected for a 
particular sample of workers, then there is evidence of a structural break in how outcomes are 
generated over time for that group (Cobb-Clark and Kossoudji 1999; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 
2002). For example, if the Chow test for transitioners provides evidence of a significant 
difference in how hourly wages are generated from t1 to t2, it suggests that this sample has 
undergone some kind of structural change in how it interacts with the labor market. This finding 
is even stronger if none of the comparison groups experience such a shift, indicating the shift is 
attributable to legalization rather than other exogenous factors experienced by the workforce at 
large (Meyer 1995). The aforementioned scenario is consistent with the turning point hypothesis, 
with the results indicating that transitioners experienced singular changes in their labor market 
outcomes not experienced by other groups. On the other hand, if there is no evidence of a 
structural break for transitioners, then that set of findings would be consistent with the scarring 
Fobs =
SSE(gˆ*)− SSE(δˆ*)
(N −1) "K
SSE(δˆ*)
N(T − "K )
SSE(gˆ*)
SSE(δˆ*)
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hypothesis, as the labor market experiences of transitioners would remain statistically similar 
even after undergoing a shift from unauthorized to legal status.  
 The fourth and final step of the analysis uses sample means and the model returns 
generated in the second step to simulate how much of the change in wages and occupational 
standing over time is attributable to legalization. This method has been used in previous research 
to estimate the effect of legalization on wages (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002), and compares 
the predicted means of a particular group at t1 and t2 relative to an alternative scenario; the 
alternative scenario depends on the observed legal status trajectory of the sample. For the 
simulation, I use data from two groups: the legal status transitioners and the continuously 
unauthorized.  
For the transitioners, I first calculate the predicted mean outcome based on the sample’s 
means and returns at t1 and t2, respectively, which comprises the outcomes expected under the 
legalization scenario for this group. As a counterfactual, I use mean-substitution to simulate the 
change in wages and occupational standing that transitioners would experience under the 
scenario that they did not received legal permanent residency and remained unauthorized. This is 
calculated using Equation 4.1:  
 (4.1) 
To simulate the scenario that the transitioner group remains unauthorized, the predicted mean  
at t2 (subscript 2) is calculated using mean substitution, where the means for the transitioner 
group at t2 are applied to the returns for the transitioner group at t1, when that group was 
unauthorized.  
For the continuously unauthorized sample from the SIPP, I first calculate the predicted 
mean outcome based on the sample’s means and returns at t1 and t2, respectively, which produces 
the expected mean values of the dependent variables under the scenario that this sample remains 
unauthorized from t1 to t2. Then, I conduct another mean-substitution exercise to simulate a 
scenario under which the continuously unauthorized immigrants receive legal status in-between 
t1 and t2. This is calculated using equation 4.2:  
 (4.2) 
!Yt2Unauthorized = βt1Transitioner XtTransitioner2
!Yt2Legalized = βt2Transitioner XtContUnauth2
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Here, the predicted mean of the outcome variable at t2 is calculated by applying the sample 
means from the continuously unauthorized at t2 (ContUnauth) to the model returns from 
transitioners at t2 (Transitioner). This approximates the change in outcomes that might be 
expected under the scenario that the continuously unauthorized experienced the same kind of 
labor market experiences as transitioners over time.  
Demographic Profile of Samples 
Before moving to the analysis, I now provide a demographic profile of each sample in the 
analysis. Table 2.6 provides the means of the independent variables in the analysis for each 
group.   
Table 2.6: Demographic Profile of Samples in the Analysis, t1 and t2 (means) 
t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico 0.42 0.42 0.76 0.76 0.13 0.15 0.58 0.58 0.62 0.62
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.04
Demographics
Age 28.5 32.7* 30.8 33.0* 34.2 35.9* 36.2 38.5* 33.1 35.5*
Female (ref=male) 0.48 0.49 0.29 0.29 0.41 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.49 0.49
Married (ref=not) 0.41 0.63* 0.47 0.52 0.52 0.58 0.60 0.63 0.47 0.51*
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.75 0.72 0.76 0.73 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.74
Human Capital
Years of Education 11.7 12.0* 9.3 9.4 12.0 12.3 10.5 10.7 12.2 12.3*
No English (ref=other) 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.28 0.29 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.03
Entry into US Labor Market 1999 1999 1994 1994 2002 2002 1988 1988 1985 1985
Industry (ref=other)
Agriculture 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.02
Construction 0.12 0.12 0.22 0.23 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.07
Service Sector 0.34 0.27* 0.18 0.17 0.28 0.24 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.14
N 457 478 462 446 319 357 1811 1818 2004 1988
Note: * indicates significant within-group difference in means from t1 to t2 (p<.05, two-tailed test); for U.S.-born 
Latinos, national origin variables refer to specifc Latino ancestry group 
Legal Status 
Transitioners 
(NIS)
Cont. 
Unauthorized 
(SIPP)
Cont. Legal 
(NIS)
Cont. Legal 
(SIPP) 
U.S.-Born 
Latinos (SIPP)
 Descriptive statistics of each group in Table 2.6 indicate that the demographic 
characteristics of NIS transitioners are more similar to SIPP immigrant groups than to their 
continuously legal counterparts. For instance, large portions of legal status transitioners, 
continuously unauthorized, and continuously legal (SIPP) groups are from Mexico (42, 76, and 
58 percent, respectively); by contrast, only 15 percent of the NIS continuously legal group is of 
Mexican origin. This reflects the fact that Mexican immigrants are the most likely of all Latin 
American groups to experience a period of unauthorized status en route to legal status (Massey 
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and Malone 2002). Given this, it is not surprising that a larger portion of the continuously legal 
immigrants from NIS would originate from countries other than Mexico, where it is less 
common to accumulate non-legal status. The percent of each sample that is from El Salvador or 
Guatemala, on the other hand, is relatively similar across all groups. 
 With respect to age, the transitioners and the continuously unauthorized are the youngest 
at t1, with a sample mean age of 28.5 and 30.8, respectively. The other groups’ mean ages range 
from 33.1 to 36.2. While U.S.-born Latino and transitioners are relatively gender-balanced, the 
continuously unauthorized is heavily male, with only about one-third of immigrants in this group 
identifying as female. Both the continuously legal groups are 40 percent female. The percent of 
transitioners who are married increases from 41 percent at t1 to 63 percent at t2, and this within-
group increase across time periods is statistically significant. This reflects the role of family 
networks in gaining access to legal status, as many transitioners are gaining legal residency 
through sponsorship by their U.S. citizen or LPR spouse (Jasso et al. 2008). Lastly, around three-
quarters of all samples reside in the traditional immigrant gateway states of California, Texas, 
Illinois, New York/New Jersey, or Florida.  
 Comparing mean years of education, the SIPP immigrant samples appear to be the least 
educated, with NIS samples and U.S.-born Latinos all averaging around 12 years of education. 
However, those means overlook the variation within each sample in regards to educational 
attainment. For instance, while 43 percent of the SIPP continuously legal and 60 percent of the 
continuously unauthorized do not have a high school degree, around 45 percent of the NIS 
transitioner and continuously legal groups lack a high school diploma. The continuously legal 
group is the most recently arrived sample (arrived in 2002 on average) and thus are the least 
likely to speak English; nearly 30 percent report speaking no English. Other immigrant groups 
possess more U.S. experience, and as a result, are less likely to report not speaking any English. 
Thus, immigrant groups are relatively similar in levels of human capital, particularly when 
considering the shares of each group that lack a high school diploma.  
Summary 
 As detailed in Table 2.1, the cumulative advantage framework provides two competing 
explanations for how the transition from unauthorized to legal status may shape the labor market 
trajectories of unauthorized immigrants. The scarring hypothesis suggests that the disadvantage 
associated with being an unauthorized immigrant will persist even after legal status is gained due 
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to the corrosive nature of unauthorized status. Conversely, the turning point hypothesis posits 
that gaining legal status provides avenues to new economic opportunities, and that the labor 
market outcomes of immigrants will benefit from legalization. Using panel data from the 2003 
NIS and the 2001-2003 SIPP to extract one treatment group (legal status transitioners) and three 
comparison groups (continuously unauthorized immigrants, continuously legal immigrants, and 
U.S.-born Latinos), I interrogate these two explanations and the leverage they offer when 
investigating the effect of legalization on the hourly wages and occupational mobility of 
unauthorized Latin American immigrants to the United States. In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I present 
the results from the quasi-experimental analysis.  
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Chapter 3: Hourly Wages 
 
 This analytic chapter investigates changes in the hourly wages of persons who transition 
from unauthorized to authorized legal status. The dependent variable is straightforward: it is 
reported hourly wages earned by respondents at jobs at t1 and t2. This measure is an outcome that 
is common in the stratification and mobility literature, and it is most studied dependent variable 
in studies on legalization and the labor market outcomes of immigrants (Morris and Western 
1999; Rivera-Batiz 1999; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002; Hout and DiPrete 2006). Thus, 
hourly wages represent a baseline measure for an assessment of how legalization affects labor 
market trajectories of legal status transitioners before I move on to occupation-specific outcomes 
in later chapters of the dissertation.  
Using data from the New Immigrant Survey (NIS) and the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP), I begin by examining average hourly wages of each group 
(transitioners, continuously legal, continuously unauthorized, and U.S.-born Latinos) at t1 and t2, 
testing if the difference in these means is statistically significant across time. I then run a series 
of OLS regression models predicting the log of hourly wages for each group and use the model 
fit statistics from these models to assess whether each group experienced a structural break in 
how hourly wages are generated over time. Finally, to examine how much of the wage change 
over time is attributable to legalization, I conduct a mean-substitution exercise that simulates the 
payoff of legalization for hourly wages.  
Descriptive Results 
 Table 3.1 provides average hourly wages (in 2003 constant dollars) at t1 and t2 for all 
groups in the analysis. For respondents (men and women) who transitioned from unauthorized to 
authorized status, average wages increased from $8 to $10.20 per hour, representing a 27.7 
percent increase between t1 and t2 and a difference that is statistically significant (p<.05, two-
tailed test). Moreover, wage gains are similar for men and women. Average hourly wages of men 
rose significantly from $8.30 to $11.10, and among women, average hourly wages increased 
significantly from $7.70 to $9.20. The only gender difference was that men experienced a larger 
percentage change relative to women (35 vs. 20 percent increase, respectively).   
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Table 3.1: Differences in Average Hourly Wages, t1 and t2 
Sample t1 t2
Significant 
Difference?
Percent 
Change N
Legal Status Transitioners
Total 8.0 10.2 Yes 27.7 673
Men 8.3 11.1 Yes 35.1 341
Women 7.7 9.2 Yes 19.7 332
Continuously Legal
Total 10.2 10.2 No 0.9 529
Men 11.3 11.5 No 2.2 327
Women 8.2 8.4 No 3.0 202
Continuously Unauthorized 
Total 9.0 9.5 Yes 6.6 941
Men 9.2 9.8 Yes 7.0 656
Women 8.4 8.8 No 5.0 285
Continuously Legal
Total 11.0 11.7 Yes 6.4 3872
Men 11.9 12.2 No 2.9 2198
Women 9.9 11.0 Yes 11.0 1674
US-Born Latinos
Total 11.8 12.9 Yes 10.1 4355
Men 12.6 13.8 Yes 9.7 2218
Women 10.8 11.9 Yes 10.2 2137
New Immigrant Survey
Survey of Income and Program Participation
Note: “Significant difference” indicates statistically significant within-group difference from t1 to t2 (p<0.05, 
two-tailed test); "Percent Change" column provides within-group percent change in hourly wages across time 
periods; N refers to pooled sample size; dollar values given in constant $2003
 
 For persons who remained continuously authorized between t1 and t2, NIS data show very 
little change in wages. Hourly wages at both t1 and were approximately $10.20. Small differences 
in wage change appeared for men and women, who experienced 2.2 and 3.0 percent change in 
wages, respectively. Furthermore, none of these differences is statistically significant (p<.05, 
two-tailed test). A possible explanation for this lack of change in wages is related to findings 
presented earlier that show this group had less U.S. experience than other groups in the analysis. 
These findings suggest the immigrant respondents from the NIS who remained continuously 
legal between t1 and t2 may not be an appropriate comparison group for those who transitioned 
  53 
their legal status.  
 I now use SIPP data to examine results for the other groups, e.g. those who remained 
continuously legal, continuously unauthorized, or U.S.-born Latino across the two time periods. 
Respondents who were continuously unauthorized experienced a statistically significant increase 
in hourly wages from t1 to t2, from $9.00 to $9.50 representing a 6.6 percent increase. When 
examining wage changes by gender, however, an important difference emerges. Although hourly 
wages for continuously unauthorized men increased significantly from $9.20 to $9.80, those for 
women did not. For men, this represents a 7 percent increase in average hourly wages from t1 to 
t2; this increase, while statistically significant, is much smaller in magnitude relative to the gains 
experienced by the legal status transitioners.   
 Continuously legal immigrants from the SIPP experience a statistically significant 
increase in wages between t1 to t2, but in contrast to the findings above for the continuously 
unauthorized group, these results appear to be driven by women. Average hourly wages for 
women who remained continuously authorized increased from $9.90 to $11.00 (or an 11 
percentage increase), but the difference for their male counterparts is not statistically significant. 
Note, however, that although continuously authorized women experience statistically significant 
increases in wages, the magnitude of this change is also substantially less than that experienced 
by NIS respondents who transitioned from unauthorized to authorized status.  
 Finally, the SIPP data also permit us to examine changes in wages for men and women 
who are U.S.-born Latinos. Both men and women experience statistically significant increases in 
wages from t1 to t2. For men, wages increased from $12.60 to $13.80 per hour, and for women 
wages increased from $10.80 to $11.90, representing a 10 percent increase for each group. The 
hourly wages for all U.S. born Latinos increased from $11.80 to $12.90. 
 Table 3.1 presents findings that offer some evidence for the turning point hypothesis. 
Both men and women who transitioned from unauthorized to authorized workers experienced 
statistically significant increases in average hourly wages betweet1 to t2. Furthermore, although 
some the other groups also posted statistically significant increases in average wages, their wage 
changes were much smaller than for those whose legal status shifted from unauthorized to 
authorized. Given that these transitioners are the only group to shift legal statuses in between the 
two observed periods, substantial growth in their wages but not in the wages of other groups is 
consistent with the turning point hypothesis, where those obtaining legal status subsequently 
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enhance their labor market position and experience improved working conditions. In the next 
section, I present findings from the multivariate analysis of hourly wages.  
Multivariate Results 
OLS Results 
Tables 3.2-3.6 provide the OLS regression results for models predicting the log of hourly 
wages at t1 and t2 for the total sample, including women and men, for each group in the analysis. 
There are three panels of results in each table: the pooled model (which includes observations at 
t1 and t2 for all the respondents), the t1 model (which includes only observations for t1), and the t2  
model (which includes only observations for t2 ). The gender-specific OLS regression model 
results are provided in the Appendix. As noted in Chapter 2, the OLS regression models provide 
the foundation for subsequent steps in my analysis, and as such the primary focus of the present 
analysis is not to examine changes in individual determinants over time. Instead, the main goal is 
to conduct an omnibus test of how the models perform at t1 compared to t2. While this discussion 
of the individual determinants of each model provides some insight into the effects of 
legalization on hourly wages, the key purpose of these models is to generate the needed 
information to conduct the Chow tests for structural change.   
Table 3.2 provides the OLS regression results predicting the log of hourly wages for the 
total sample of legal status transitioners. At t1, the only variable that significantly predicts the 
hourly wages for this group is years of education, which has a small positive effect.  Aside from 
education, no other variable is statistically significant, and the model has a relatively small 
adjusted R2 of .07.  After the transitioners have gained legal status at t2, however, the model 
performs more like a traditional human capital model predicting hourly wages. At t2, I find that 
those without English language ability earn significantly less than others and that the positive 
effect of education on earnings remains steady across time periods.  Further, the model at t2 
indicates that Mexicans earn significantly less than other immigrants, although this effect is not 
present in the pooled model. Overall, the adjusted R2 is much larger at t2, with a value of .26.   
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Table 3.2: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Hourly Wages, Legal Status 
Transitioners (Total Sample) 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico -0.06 0.060 -0.11* 0.040 -0.05 0.040
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.09 0.080 -0.080 0.060 -0.03 0.050
Demographics
Age -0.01 0.020 0.000 0.010 0.01 0.010
Age-Squared 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.00 0.000
Human Capital
Female (ref=male) -0.10 0.100 -0.130 0.120 -0.18* 0.080
Married (ref=not) 0.04 0.060 0.000 0.040 0.07+ 0.040
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.09 0.060 -0.08* 0.040 -0.08* 0.040
Years of Education 0.02** 0.010 0.02** 0.010 0.02** 0.010
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.00 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.01 0.010
No English (ref=other) -0.05 0.090 -0.16** 0.060 -0.13* 0.050
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.010 -0.04** 0.010 -0.03** 0.010
Industry (ref=other)
Agriculture -0.16 0.150 0.120 0.120 -0.05 0.100
Construction -0.01 0.090 0.19** 0.060 0.09+ 0.050
Service Sector -0.04 0.060 -0.14** 0.040 -0.12** 0.040
Constant 6.40 21.390 89.03** 15.690 53.52** 13.040
N 263 383 646
Adjusted R-Squared 0.07 0.26 0.17
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
 
Table 3.3 provides the OLS regression results predicting the log of hourly wages for the 
total sample of the continuously legal (NIS).  In contrast to the results for the transitioners, in 
Table 3.3 I find that the OLS regression model coefficients for the continuously legal are 
relatively stable across the two time periods.  This reflects the fact that, in contrast to the 
transitioners, the continuously legal do not experience a shift in legal status from t1 to t2 that 
changes how they interact with the labor market.  
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Table 3.3: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Hourly Wages, NIS Continuously 
Legal (Total Sample) 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico 0.26* 0.10 0.19** 0.07 0.21** 0.06
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.08 0.14 -0.060 0.09 0.00 0.08
Demographics
Age 0.03+ 0.02 0.020 0.01 0.03* 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.13 0.18 -0.170 0.14 -0.14 0.11
Married (ref=not) 0.12 0.08 0.090 0.05 0.10* 0.04
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.04 0.07 -0.080 0.05 -0.06 0.04
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.03** 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.03** 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.05 0.08 -0.060 0.06 -0.06 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market -0.06** 0.02 -0.08** 0.01 -0.07** 0.01
Industry (ref=other)
Agriculture -0.61** 0.22 -0.260 0.20 -0.46** 0.15
Construction -0.05 0.13 0.19* 0.08 0.10 0.07
Service Sector -0.13+ 0.08 -0.12* 0.05 -0.12** 0.04
Constant 123.80** 36.07 169.99** 23.89 150.76** 19.92
N 203 305 508
Adjusted R-Squared 0.27 0.41 0.36
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
 Table 3.4 provides the OLS regression results predicting the log of hourly wages for the 
total sample of continuously unauthorized immigrants.  Here, I find that the models at t1 and t2 
also function in similar ways, and this is reflected in the adjusted R2, which is at .09 at t1 and .11 
at t2.  Overall, the models suggest that women earn significantly less than men, English speakers 
earn more than non-English speakers, and wages increase with more experience in the U.S. labor 
market.  Interestingly, education does not have a significant effect on the wages of the 
continuously unauthorized workers.  The lack of any positive returns to education for 
unauthorized workers is indicative of their marginal labor market position, as their legal status 
limits their earning power.        
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Table 3.4: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Hourly Wages, Continuously 
Unauthorized (Total Sample) 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico 0.08 0.06 -0.040 0.05 0.02 0.04
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.07 0.10 0.020 0.09 0.04 0.07
Demographics
Age 0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.02 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.24+ 0.14 -0.61** 0.13 -0.43** 0.09
Married (ref=not) 0.07 0.05 0.060 0.04 0.07* 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.12* 0.05 -0.070 0.05 -0.10** 0.03
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.02 0.01 0.05** 0.01 0.03** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.12* 0.06 -0.09+ 0.05 -0.10** 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01** 0.00 -0.01+ 0.00 -0.01** 0.00
Industry (ref=other)
Agriculture -0.01 0.08 -0.080 0.07 -0.04 0.05
Construction 0.19** 0.06 0.050 0.05 0.12** 0.04
Service Sector 0.07 0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.03 0.04
Constant 28.63** 8.57 15.21+ 7.98 20.51** 5.83
N 449 438 887
Adjusted R-Squared 0.09 0.11 0.1
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
Table 3.5 provides the OLS regression results predicting the log of hourly wages for the 
total sample of the continuously legal (SIPP).  The results from t1 and t2 for this group also 
indicate that the OLS regression model explains a stable amount of variance in wages over time, 
as the adjusted R2 is .15 and .14 at t1 and t2, respectively.  In Table 3.5, I find that, among this 
sample of immigrants, women earn significantly less than men and that married workers tend to 
earn more than non-married workers. Unlike for the continuously unauthorized, however, for the 
continuously legal I find that education significantly increases hourly earnings. This suggests 
that these workers, due to their authorized status, have a more traditional labor market experience 
relative to the continuously unauthorized.    
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Table 3.5: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Hourly Wages, SIPP Continuously 
Legal (Total Sample) 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico -0.03 0.03 -0.05+ 0.03 -0.04+ 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.01 0.05 -0.08+ 0.05 -0.04 0.03
Demographics
Age 0.01 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.02** 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00+ 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.22** 0.08 -0.20** 0.08 -0.21** 0.05
Married (ref=not) 0.09** 0.03 0.06* 0.03 0.07** 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.02 0.03 0.000 0.03 -0.01 0.02
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.05 0.04 -0.050 0.04 -0.06+ 0.03
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01** 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 -0.01** 0.00
Industry (ref=other)
Agriculture -0.15** 0.05 -0.19** 0.05 -0.16** 0.04
Construction 0.13** 0.04 0.07+ 0.04 0.10** 0.03
Service Sector -0.09** 0.03 -0.12** 0.03 -0.10** 0.02
Constant 31.26** 3.86 26.44** 3.81 28.06** 2.69
N 1,786 1,790 3,576
Adjusted R-Squared 0.15 0.14 0.15
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
Table 3.6 provides the OLS regression results predicting the log of hourly wages for the 
total sample of the U.S.-born Latinos.  Once again, the OLS regression model is relatively stable 
across time periods, with a similar adjusted R2 at t1 and t2 (.24 and .21).  Holding other variables 
constant, women also tend to earn less than men among U.S.-born Latinos, while there is a 
positive and significant effect of education on hourly wages.  
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Table 3.6: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Hourly Wages, U.S.-born Latinos 
(Total Sample) 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Hispanic Origin (ref=other)
Mexico 0.00 0.02 0.020 0.02 0.01 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.04 0.06 0.030 0.06 0.04 0.04
Demographics
Age 0.04** 0.01 0.04** 0.01 0.04** 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.39** 0.11 -0.43** 0.12 -0.41** 0.08
Married (ref=not) 0.07** 0.02 0.07** 0.03 0.07** 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.00 0.02 0.020 0.03 0.01 0.02
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.06** 0.01 0.07** 0.01 0.07** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.02* 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.02** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.06 0.07 -0.010 0.07 -0.04 0.05
Entry into Labor Market -0.01* 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00 -0.01** 0.00
Industry (ref=other)
Agriculture -0.17* 0.07 -0.080 0.08 -0.13* 0.05
Construction 0.18** 0.05 0.12* 0.05 0.15** 0.03
Service Sector 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02
Constant 14.24** 5.46 10.21+ 5.66 10.92** 3.79
N 1,989 1,981 3,970
Adjusted R-Squared 0.24 0.21 0.23
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
Having examined the differences in the individual determinants of hourly wages over 
time, I now turn to Chow tests to examine any of the comparison groups experienced a 
statistically significant structural break in how their hourly wages are predicted. While 
examining the individual determinants provide some information about how the labor market 
trajectories of these groups unfold over time, the Chow test systematically tests for a change in 
how labor market outcomes are generated at t1 and t2.   
Chow Tests   
As a reminder, the Chow test is conducted for each sample and provides an omnibus test 
of coefficients of the OLS models at t1 and t2. Using pooled and unpooled versions of the models, 
the Chow test examines whether the data in those models are appropriate to be pooled across 
time periods. In the event that the null hypothesis of no change is rejected, the test offers 
evidence that there is a statically significant difference in how those models operate over time. In 
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other words, the test offers evidence that a structural break occurred. If it fails to reject the null 
hypothesis, the test provides evidence that the models operate in similar ways over time. In this 
context, the turning point hypothesis expects that respondents whose legal status shifts from 
unauthorized to authorized experience a structural break in how hourly wages are generated over 
time, such that the Chow test for this group will be significant. Conversely, the scarring 
hypothesis expects that transitioners’ prior experience with unauthorized status will prevent labor 
market mobility, leading to no structural break between t1 and t2.  
Table 3.7 provides the Chow test results for each group in the analysis. For the legal 
status transitioners, results indicate that, for the total and both gender-specific samples, the null 
hypothesis of no change in how wages are determined over time is rejected (p<.05, two-tailed 
test). The Chow test indicates that, collectively, the model parameters for these transitioners vary 
significantly from t1 to t2. On the other hand, Chow tests for the continuously unauthorized, 
continuously legal, and U.S.-born Hispanics are not significant, indicating that model parameters 
do not vary across time periods and that the models are not different from each other at t1 and t2.  
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Table 3.7: Chow Test for Structural Break in Hourly-Wage Generating Process, t1 to t2 
Samples
Evidence of 
Structural Break? F-Test (df) N
New Immigrant Survey
Legal Status Transitioners
Total Yes 5.17 (15, 616) 646
Men Yes 3.87 (13, 300) 326
Women Yes 3.03 (12, 300) 324
Continuously Legal
Total No 0.47 (15, 478) 508
Men No 0.86 (13, 287) 313
Women No 0.88 (12, 171) 195
Continuously Unauthorized
Total No 0.99 (15, 857) 887
Men No 0.81 (13, 607) 633
Women No 0.58 (13, 228) 254
Continuously Legal
Total No 0.64 (15, 3546) 3576
Men No 0.37 (13, 2054) 2080
Women No 0.72 (13, 1470) 1496
US-Born Hispanic
Total No 0.48 (15, 3940) 3970
Men No 0.50 (13, 2004) 2030
Women No 0.20 (13, 1914) 1940
Note: Hypotheses being tested are as follows: Ho: K1 = K2, Ha: K1 ≠ K2; evidence of 
a structural break is found when the null hypothesis of no difference across time 
periods is rejected; hypotheses are tested at p<0.05 (two-tailed test); test statistics are 
generated from Chow test of unpooled and pooled versions of models for each group
Survey of Income and Program Participation
 
Although some of these comparison groups experienced statistically significant increases 
in average hourly wages, this does not mean that a structural break has occurred. The wage gains 
seen by the continuously unauthorized men and continuously legal women samples, for instance, 
are not attributable to structural change in how hourly wages are generated over time, but instead 
they reflect an overall upward trend in wages.  
To sum, given that transitioners are the only group to experience a statistically significant 
structural change in how wages are predicted over time, this is strong evidence that gains in 
hourly wages are attributable to legalization rather than other outside factors. This finding 
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applies to both women and men, as both male and female transitioners experienced structural 
changes in how wages are generated over time.  
Simulation  
Having found evidence that legalization increases the wages of unauthorized immigrants, 
I now turn to a wage-simulation exercise to estimate what portion of the wage gain over time is 
attributable to legalization. Results provided in Table 3.8 were generated using the methodology 
laid out in Chapter 2, and I also provide a brief overview of the simulation analysis steps below.   
Following Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002), I use this mean substitution method to 
simulate the effects of legalization relative to the scenario of remaining unauthorized. I conduct 
the simulation for two groups: the legal status transitioners and the continuously unauthorized. 
For the transitioners, I first calculate the predicted mean hourly wage based on the sample’s 
means and returns for the independent variables at t1 and t2, respectively, which comprises the 
outcomes expected under the legalization scenario for this group. As an alternative scenario, I 
use mean-substitution to simulate the change in wages that transitioners would experience under 
the scenario that they did not gain authorized status and remained unauthorized. To simulate the 
scenario that the transitioner group remains unauthorized, the predicted mean at t2 is calculated 
using mean substitution, where the means for the transitioner group at t2 are applied to the returns 
for the transitioner group at t1, when that group was unauthorized.  
For the continuously unauthorized sample, I first calculate the predicted mean outcome 
based on the sample’s means and returns at t1 and t2, respectively, which produces the predicted 
mean hourly wage under the scenario that this group remains unauthorized from t1 to t2. Then, I 
conduct another mean-substitution exercise to simulate a scenario under which the continuously 
unauthorized immigrants receive legal status in-between t1 and t2, where predicted mean hourly 
wages at t2 is calculated by applying the sample means from the continuously unauthorized 
group at t2 to the model returns from the legal status transitioners at t2. This simulates the change 
in average hourly wages that might be expected under the scenario that the continuously 
unauthorized experienced the same kind of labor market experiences as transitioners over time.  
In Table 3.8, Column 1 provides the adjusted mean hourly wage that the transitioners and 
the continuously unauthorized are expected to earn at t1 when both of these samples were 
unauthorized; the adjusted means were calculated using the respective sample means and OLS 
regression coefficients at t1. Column 2 provides the projected mean wage in the scenario where 
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both groups receive legal status prior to t2. For the transitioners, this is calculated using the 
respective sample means and returns generated at t2; for the continuously unauthorized, their 
means are applied to the returns of the transitioners to simulate the growth in outcomes that 
might occur if the continuously unauthorized received legal status. Column 4 provides predicted 
values under the scenario where both groups do not receive legal status and remain unauthorized. 
For the continuously unauthorized, this is calculated using the sample means and returns at t2; for 
the transitioners, the sample’s own returns at t1 (when this sample was unauthorized) is applied to 
the means of the sample at t2, which simulates the expected wages if the transitioners had not 
gained legal status. Finally, column 6 provides the percent growth in hourly wages experienced 
under a legalization scenario net of the continued unauthorized status scenario, and approximates 
the projected payoff of legalization.  
Table 3.8: Simulated Hourly-Wage Growth Calculations from t1 to t2, Legal Status 
Transitioners and Continuously Unauthorized 
t1unauthorized t2legal
Percent Change,   
t1 unauth. to t2legal t2unauthorized
Percent Change,   
t1 unauth. to t2unauth.
Column (3) - 
Column (5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Legal Status Transitioners (NIS)
Total 7.3 9.3 28.1 7.4 2.2 25.9
Men 7.7 10.0 29.5 7.9 2.6 26.9
Women 6.9 8.6 25.5 7.1 2.9 22.6
Cont. Unauthorized (SIPP)
Total 8.2 10.8 32.2 8.7 6.6 25.6
Men 8.4 11.6 37.9 9.1 8.3 29.6
Women 7.6 9.9 30.1 7.8 2.4 27.7
Note: All t1 unauthorized values calculated using observed sample means and returns; for transitioners: t2 legal values derived 
using respective means and returns for t1 and t2, and t2 unauthorized values generated using means for transitioners at t2 and 
returns for transitioners at t1; for cont. unauthorized: t2legal  calculated using means for cont. unauthorized at t2 and returns 
for transitioners at t2, and t2 unauthorized generated using means for cont. unauthorized at t2 and returns for transitioners at t2.     
Remain UnauthorizedLegalization
Possible Scenarios Proejcted Payoff 
of Legalization
 
 The predicted average hourly wage for the legal status transitioners when they were 
unauthorized immigrants at t1 is $7.7 for men and $6.9 for women. Under the legalization 
scenario, the wages of the transitioner men are expected to increase to $9.3, which is a 28 percent 
increase. I find similar results for women, as wages under the legalization scenario increase to 
$8.6, or a 25.5 percent increase. Conversely, wages for both transitioner men and women are 
expected to remain relatively flat over time if the sample was to remain unauthorized; the percent 
change for men and women is 2.6 and 2.9 percent, respectively. Taken together, these two 
scenarios indicate that the amount of the change over time in wages that is directly attributable to 
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legalization (i.e., the change in wages that only occurred due to legalization) is 23 percent for 
women and 27 percent for men. 
 I find very similar results for the continuously unauthorized sample from the SIPP. The 
predicted average hourly wage for continuously unauthorized men at t1 is $8.4, and for women it 
is $7.6. Under the scenario where this sample experiences legalization in between t1 and t2 like 
the legal status transitioners, the wages of this sample are simulated to grow rapidly. For men, 
wages are simulated to rise to $11.6 (a 32 percent increase); for women, wages are simulated to 
rise to $9.9 (a 30 percent increase). Under the scenario where this sample remains unauthorized, 
the predicted average hourly wages of men and women increase only by 8 and 2 percent, 
respectively. Thus, the simulated percent increase in wages that is attributable to legalization for 
the continuously unauthorized samples ranges from 30 percent for men to 28 percent for women.  
 Collectively, results in Table 3.8 demonstrate that legalization pays off both in terms of 
more wages for those able to transition to authorized legal status and in terms of the penalty for 
those unable to do so and who remain unauthorized. With respect to the legalization scenario in 
the simulation, both legal status transitioners and the continuously unauthorized experience 
robust growth in hourly wages from t1 to t2. In contrast, in the scenario where respondents remain 
unauthorized, they are estimated to experience much slower or nonexistent wage growth. 
Therefore, because legalization increases the average wage of workers by 25 percent, 
legalization is an important turning point in the labor market trajectories of unauthorized Latin 
American immigrants.  
 Figure 3.1 provides an illustration of the findings from Table 3.8. It presents the predicted 
average hourly wage for legal status transitioners and the continuously unauthorized at t1 and t2 
under the alternative scenarios. The first scenario, represented by the green lines, is for a group 
of workers who remain unauthorized and do not receive legalization over time (column 4 in 
Table 3.8). Under this scenario, wages are simulated to grow at a sluggish pace for both the 
groups. Conversely, under the legalization scenario depicted by the blue lines, the workers 
legalize and transition from being unauthorized at t1 to being authorized at t2 (column 2 in Table 
3.8).  For immigrants that receive legalization, wages are simulated to grow robustly.  
Comparing the slope of the blue lines (which represent legalization) and the green lines (which 
represent remaining unauthorized) provides a visual depiction of the central role that legalization 
plays in improving the labor market position of unauthorized immigrants.  Together, they 
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highlight the fact that legalization provides an increase in the wages of previously unauthorized 
immigrants that would not be experienced otherwise.    
Figure 3.1: Simulated Hourly Wages at t1 and t2, Remaining Unauthorized vs. Legalization 
 
Summary 
 This chapter of the dissertation examines how the hourly wages of legal status 
transitioners were affected by legalization. In the context of a cumulative advantage framework, 
the evidence here suggests legalization is a turning point in the labor market trajectories of 
unauthorized immigrants, and that it affords immigrants the opportunity to better maximize 
earnings in the labor market. My findings indicate that, in the context of hourly wages, the 
disadvantage associated with unauthorized status is largely eliminated after legalization, lending 
little support for the scarring hypothesis.  
The descriptive analysis provided in Table 3.1 indicates that, overall, mean wages for 
legal status transitioners grew from $8.00 an hour to $10.20 dollars an hour from t1 to t2, and that 
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this difference is statistically significant. However, the transitioners do not exclusively 
experience increases in hourly wages over time, as other groups also experienced statistically 
significant wage growth. What is distinctive about the hourly wage trajectories of the 
transitioners, however, is that their wages grew at a much faster rate than the comparison groups 
(27 percent increase compared to 6 percent for the continuously unauthorized, for example).   
 Chow tests presented in Table 3.7 show that much of the change in wages over time for 
transitioners is attributable to legalization. Transitioners experience a statistically significant 
break in the wage-generating process between t1 to t2, while none of the comparison groups 
exhibited this structural break. Therefore, since the legal status transitioners are the only group to 
experience the treatment effect of legalization, this reveals that the labor market outcomes 
experienced by transitioners were dramatically different after legalization relative to when they 
were unauthorized.  
 The results presented in Table 3.8 provide further evidence that legalization serves as a 
catalyst for wage increases.   I use a mean-substitution method to simulate the wage trajectories 
of the legal status transitioners under two alternative scenarios: one where they do not receive 
legal status, and another where they do undergo the transition to authorized status.   
The simulation finds, under the scenario where the transitioners do not experience legalization 
and remain unauthorized, they experience a 2 percent increase in average hourly wages from t1 to 
t2. Under the scenario where the transitioners gain legal status, however, their average hourly 
wages increase by 28 percent across the two time periods, and this finding applies to both men 
and women. Overall, the results from the simulation indicate that there is a 25 percent increase in 
hourly wages that is directly attributable to legalization.   
 Therefore, consistent with previous research, I find that there is a substantial payoff of 
legalization. However, my findings differ from those of prior studies in two important ways. 
First, my estimate of the increase in wages due to legalization is 25 percent, which is at the high 
end of the range estimated by previous researchers using data from IRCA, which varied from 8 
to 17 percent (Rivera-Batiz 1999; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002). Second, I find that 
legalization boosts the wages of both women and men. This finding stands in contrast to previous 
research, which largely indicates that men are more likely than women to benefit from 
legalization (Powers, Seltzer and Shi 1998; Cobb-Clark and Kossoudji 1999). 
I speculate that both of these differences are attributable to the context in which 
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contemporary immigrants are now legalizing, which has changed considerably from that of the 
post-IRCA era on which the bulk of the previous legalization literature is based. First, in the 
years following IRCA, the wage penalty for unauthorized status among immigrant workers 
increased, and this penalty was especially strong for female workers (Phillips and Massey 1999; 
Donato et al. 2008); the reverse of that development implies that contemporary immigrants now 
have even more to gain from legalizing. Moreover, Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) and 
Rivera-Batiz (1999), studying the effects of the IRCA amnesty, concluded that their estimations 
of the benefit of legalization on wages were likely conservative, and that contemporary 
legalization would likely have a stronger effect due to these contextual shifts. Kossoudji and 
Cobb-Clark (2002:623), state that “the deterioration in the U.S. wages and working conditions of 
undocumented workers after IRCA implies that the gain to amnesty would be larger today than it 
was when legal status was granted under IRCA.” This indicates that, while higher than those of 
previous studies, my estimates likely more accurately reflect the penalty of unauthorized status 
and the payoff of legalization in the contemporary era of unauthorized immigration to the United 
States. 
 Second, the finding that the hourly wages of both women and men benefit from 
legalization in similar ways also reflects the changing environment for unauthorized immigrants. 
For instance, using data from the Mexican Migration Project, Donato and Sisk (2012) find 
evidence that unauthorized immigrants have increasingly been incorporated into the formal labor 
market, as they are now more likely to pay taxes and be paid by check rather than cash than in 
the past. While unauthorized immigrants still remain concentrated in the underground economy, 
their increasing presence in the formal labor market (a finding which applies for men and 
women) suggests that female unauthorized immigrants now possess stronger ties to formal 
employment, and thus are now better positioned to take advantage of legalization relative to 
female immigrants in the post-IRCA period.  
It is conceivable that some might find the 25 percent increase in wages observed here to 
be trivial: given the difficulties that unauthorized immigrants experience in the labor market, 
might we expect that legalization would lead to even larger gains in wages? However, it is 
important to keep in mind the economic context in which these immigrants are legalizing.  After 
transitioning to legal status, the transitioners no longer face the disadvantage of unauthorized 
status, but these immigrant workers continue to encounter the challenges of the low-wage sector 
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the U.S. economy.  After legalizing, the hourly wages of the legal status transitioners are 
comparable to those of the continuously legal (SIPP and NIS) groups, indicating that legalization 
allowed the transitioners to catch up with the outcomes of those groups.  Thus, this 25 percent 
increase in wages that is directly attributable to legalization represents a substantial increase in 
the earnings of workers that are concentrated in low-wage sectors, and is especially notable 
given the long-term trends of wage-stagnation for workers at the bottom end of the wage-
hierarchy (Gottschalk 1997; Buchinsky and Hunt 1999).  
 Having established that the hourly wages of unauthorized immigrants are increased by 
legalization, I now turn to the analysis of occupation-specific labor market outcomes to examine 
how legalization impacts the occupational standing of immigrants. While this chapter focuses on 
the hourly wages, the chapters that follow investigate how transitioning to legal status shapes the 
structural position of unauthorized immigrants in their local labor markets.   
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Chapter 4: Occupational-Wage Index 
 
 This analytic chapter investigates changes in the occupational-wage index (OWI) for the 
four types of groups discussed earlier: those who transition from unauthorized to authorized 
status, those who remain continuously unauthorized, those who remain continuously authorized, 
and U.S. born Latinos. As outlined in Chapter 2, I measure occupation-specific outcomes that 
use detailed NIS and SIPP occupational codes to attach characteristics to the occupations held by 
respondents in the surveys. I generate occupational characteristics using data from the Current 
Population Survey, and these outcomes are gender-, year-, and region- specific. The OWI is the 
median hourly wage of a given occupation, and thus represents the structural position of 
occupations in local labor markets.  
I begin by examining the average OWI of each group at t1 and t2, testing if mean 
differences are statistically significant across time. I then run a series of OLS regression models 
that predict the log of the OWI for each group, and use model fit statistics to assess whether each 
group experienced a structural break in how their occupational-wage index is generated over 
time. Finally, to examine how much of the OWI change is related to legalization, I then conduct 
a mean-substitution exercise that simulates the payoff of legalization for the occupational-wage 
index.  
Descriptive Results 
 Table 4.1 provides the average value of the occupational-wage index (OWI) at t1 and t2 
for each group in the analysis. Keep in mind that the OWI corresponds to the median hourly 
wage of the respondent’s occupation in 2003 constant dollars. For all respondents (including men 
and women) who transitioned their legal status, the average OWI increased from $9.80 to $11.10 
per hour, representing a 13 percent increase and a statistically significant difference between t1 to 
t2 (p<.05, two-tailed test). Substantively, this means that, on average, transitioners worked in an 
occupation with a median wage of $9.80 per hour at t1; by t2, the average transitioner worked in 
an occupation with a median wage of $11.1 per hour.  
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Table 4.1: Differences in Average Occupational-Wage Index, t1 and t2 
Sample t1 t2
Significant 
Difference?
Percent 
Change N
Legal Status Transitioners
Total 9.8 11.1 Yes 13.3 982
Men 11.3 12.5 Yes 10.6 509
Women 8.2 9.7 Yes 18.3 473
Continuously Legal
Total 11.3 11.6 No 2.7 708
Men 12.8 13.1 No 2.3 423
Women 9.1 9.3 No 2.2 285
Continuously Unauthorized 
Total 10.3 10.8 No 4.9 813
Men 10.7 11.5 No 7.5 573
Women 9.3 9.0 No -2.7 240
Continuously Legal
Total 11.4 12.1 Yes 6.1 3415
Men 12.3 13.0 Yes 5.7 1987
Women 10.2 10.8 Yes 5.9 1428
US-Born Latinos
Total 12.6 13.4 Yes 6.3 3791
Men 13.9 14.6 Yes 5.0 1938
Women 11.4 12.1 Yes 6.1 1853
New Immigrant Survey
Survey of Income and Program Participation
Note: “Significant difference” indicates statistically significant within-group difference from t1 to t2 (p<0.05, 
two-tailed test); "Percent Change" column provides within-group percent change in hourly wages across time 
periods; N refers to pooled sample size; dollar values given in constant $2003
 
Similar gains in OWI between t1 to t2 hold for the gender-specific samples of 
transitioners. Men’s average OWI increased from $11.30 to $12.50, a difference that is also 
statistically significant. For women, the average OWI also significantly increased, from $8.20 to 
$9.70, although their average OWI was lower than men’s at both t1 and t2. However, men 
experienced a smaller percentage change, an 11 percent increase, compared to women’s 18 
percent increase. Overall, the evidence suggests that transitioners experienced steady increases in 
their occupational standing and they were more likely to work in occupations with higher median 
wages following legalization.  
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 Much like the findings in Chapter 3, the continuously legal (NIS) group experienced very 
little growth over time, as the average occupational-wage index increased from $11.30 at t1 to 
$11.60 at t2. Similarly, although men and women experienced small percentage increases (2.3 
and 2.2 percent change, respectively), none of the differences for the NIS continuously legal 
respondents are statistically significant.  
 Moving to the results for the SIPP groups, I find that continuously unauthorized 
immigrants did not experience any statistically significant increases in OWI. Recall that in 
Chapter 2, results in Table 3.1 showed that average hourly wages of continuously unauthorized 
men increased significantly. However, Table 4.1 suggests that even with this increase in wages, 
the structural position of male workers remained the same. Therefore, despite a small increase in 
wages, this group was unable to become mobile and shift to an occupation with higher wages. 
This finding reflects the expectations I presented in Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2, whereby 
continuously unauthorized immigrants hold the lowest levels of cumulative advantage and, as a 
result, experience the most disadvantage in the labor market.  
 Unlike the continuously unauthorized group, continuously legal immigrants experienced 
a statistically significant increase in OWI from t1 to t2. The OWI of the total sample, for instance, 
increases from $11.40 at t1 to $12.10 at t2, representing a six percent increase. The average OWI 
of continuously legal women also increases, from $10.20 to $10.80, and for men it rose from 
$12.30 to $13.00. For both women and men, these differences are statistically significant. Even 
though the continuously legal (SIPP) experience statistically significant increases in OWI, the 
magnitude of the change is smaller than that experienced by transitioners.  
 Finally, both men and women from the U.S.-born Latino sample experience statistically 
significant increases in OWI from t1 to t2. The OWI for the total sample increases from $12.60 to 
$13.40, which represents a 6.3 percent increase. Men’s OWI increased from $13.90 to $14.60, 
representing a five percent increase; women’s increased from $11.40 to $12.10, or a six percent 
increase.  
 Therefore, Table 4.1 offers initial evidence in support of the turning point hypothesis for 
the transitioner group, as both male and female transitioners saw statistically significant 
increases in their average occupational-wage index between t1 to t2. While some comparison 
groups also experience statistically significant increases, those increases were rather modest 
relative to the transitioner group. Given that transitioners are the only group to shift legal statuses 
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between the two observed periods, their substantial OWI growth (which is not present for the 
other groups) is consistent with the turning point scenario, where transitioners who gain legal 
status enhance their labor market position. In the next section, I now turn to the multivariate 
analysis of the occupational-wage index.  
Multivariate Results 
OLS Results 
Tables 4.2-4.6 provide the OLS regression results for models predicting the log of the 
OWI at t1 and t2 for the complete sample (including both female and male respondents) for each 
group in the analysis. There are three panels of results in each of the table: the pooled model 
(which includes observations at t1 and t2 for all the respondents), the t1 model (which includes 
only observations for t1), and the t2 model (which includes only observations for t2).  The gender-
specific OLS regression results are provided in the Appendix. As described in Chapter 2, the 
OLS regression models provide the basis for the subsequent analysis steps. The emphasis of the 
analysis here is not to document changes in individual determinants over time, but to provide an 
omnibus test of how the models perform at t1 compared to t2. While this discussion of the 
individual determinants of each model provides some insight into the impact of legalization on 
occupational standing, the primary goal of these models is to generate the needed information to 
conduct the Chow tests for structural change.  
Table 4.2 provides the OLS regression results predicting the log of the occupational-wage 
index for the total sample of legal status transitioners. In the analysis in Chapter 3 for hourly 
wages, the substantive differences in the models at t1 and t2 for the transitioners were more 
readily apparent; the results for the OWI in table 4.2, however, are subtler. There are some 
differences in the significance level of individual coefficients over time, such as in the case of 
age and age-squared, the national origin indicator for Mexicans, and the direction of the 
coefficient for U.S. labor market experience, but the sign and significance of the education and 
gender coefficients remain stable over time. Overall, the adjusted R2 does not change drastically 
from t1 to t2, although it does increase from.19 to.23. Thus, without a statistical test to provide an 
omnibus test of how the coefficients function across models, the results in Table 4.2 are 
inconclusive in regards to how legalization impacts the OWI-generating process.   
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Table 4.2: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Occupational-Wage Index, Legal 
Status Transitioners (Total Sample) 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico -0.05 0.04 -0.07* 0.04 -0.04 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.00 0.06 -0.060 0.05 0.00 0.04
Demographics
Age 0.01 0.01 -0.03* 0.01 -0.00 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.23** 0.07 -0.30** 0.10 -0.29** 0.06
Married (ref=not) 0.05 0.05 0.06+ 0.04 0.08** 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.03 0.04 -0.030 0.04 0.00 0.03
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.02** 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.02** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.03 0.06 0.020 0.05 -0.03 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market 0.03** 0.01 -0.02* 0.01 0.01 0.01
Constant -58.27** 16.12 33.19* 13.19 -12.28 10.37
N 466 482 948
Adjusted R-Squared 0.19 0.23 0.19
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
Table 4.3 displays the OLS regression results predicting the log of the occupational-wage 
index for the total sample of the continuously legal (NIS). At both t1 and t2, there is a small, 
positive effect of education on the occupational-wage index, as well as a positive effect of U.S. 
labor market experience. There are several coefficients that are statistically significant at t2 that 
are not at t1: Women are only significantly lower on the OWI at t2, the negative and significant 
effect of living in a traditional immigrant state is only present at t2, and the negative effect of not 
speaking English is only visible at t2. Further, the adjusted R2 does increase from.20 to.27 from t1 
to t2. Thus, while there are some indications of the model functioning in different ways across 
time periods for this group of continuously legal immigrants, the results from the Chow test will 
provide further insight into the statistical significance of these differences.  
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Table 4.3: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Occupational-Wage Index, NIS 
Continuously Legal (Total Sample) 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico 0.04 0.06 0.070 0.06 0.06 0.04
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.01 0.09 -0.110 0.08 -0.06 0.06
Demographics
Age 0.02 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.01 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.18 0.11 -0.31** 0.12 -0.24** 0.08
Married (ref=not) 0.02 0.05 -0.010 0.04 0.01 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.02 0.05 -0.09* 0.05 -0.04 0.03
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.02** 0.01 0.01* 0.01 0.02** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.07 0.05 -0.13* 0.05 -0.10** 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market -0.03** 0.01 -0.04** 0.01 -0.03** 0.01
Constant 59.19** 21.36 83.15** 19.71 71.41** 14.33
N 323 359 682
Adjusted R-Squared 0.20 0.27 0.24
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
Table 4.4 provides the OLS regression results predicting the log of OWI for the total 
sample of continuously unauthorized immigrants. For the continuously unauthorized immigrant 
sample, there is very little difference in the individual determinants of the model across the two 
time periods. Women score lower on the occupational-wage index relative to men at both t1 and 
t2, education increases the OWI, and not speaking English has a negative effect on OWI. The 
adjusted R2 is.12 at t1 and.17 at t2.  
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Table 4.4: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Occupational-Wage Index, 
Continuously Unauthorized (Total Sample) 
v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico 0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.05 -0.02 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.05
Demographics
Age -0.00 0.01 0.03+ 0.01 0.01 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.32** 0.09 -0.33** 0.12 -0.33** 0.07
Married (ref=not) 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.02** 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.02** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01+ 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.10** 0.04 -0.17** 0.05 -0.13** 0.03
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Constant 6.28 5.72 -4.64 8.20 1.56 4.73
N 462 343 805
Adjusted R-Squared 0.12 0.17 0.15
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
Table 4.5 provides the OLS regression results predicting the log of the occupational-wage 
index for the total sample of the continuously legal (SIPP). Like the continuously unauthorized 
group, this sample of continuously legal immigrants from the SIPP also appears to have stable 
individual determinants across the models at t1 and t2.  The adjusted R2 is.19 in the models at both 
points in time, and the negative effect for women and positive effects for education and labor 
market experience are present across time periods.   
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Table 4.5: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Occupational-Wage Index, SIPP 
Continuously Legal (Total Sample) 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico -0.08** 0.02 -0.07** 0.02 -0.07** 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.09** 0.03 -0.10** 0.04 -0.09** 0.02
Demographics
Age 0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01* 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00* 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.38** 0.05 -0.29** 0.06 -0.34** 0.04
Married (ref=not) 0.04+ 0.02 0.010 0.02 0.02+ 0.01
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.03 0.02 0.000 0.02 0.02 0.02
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.02** 0.00 0.010 0.01 0.01** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.06+ 0.03 -0.040 0.03 -0.05* 0.02
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.01** 0.00
Constant 16.21** 2.85 10.65** 2.96 12.69** 2.04
N 1,808 1,513 3,321
Adjusted R-Squared 0.19 0.19 0.19
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
Table 4.6 provides the OLS regression results predicting the log of OWI for the total 
sample of the U.S.-born Latinos. For this group, the models at t1 and t2 also appear to function in 
relatively similar ways. The adjusted R2 is.21 at t1 and.20 at t2, and the individual determinants do 
not vary to a great extent across time periods.  
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Table 4.6: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Occupational-Wage Index, U.S.-born 
Latinos (Total Sample) 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Hispanic Origin (ref=other)
Mexico -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.01
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.10* 0.05 -0.11* 0.05 -0.11** 0.03
Demographics
Age 0.02** 0.01 0.01* 0.01 0.02** 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00** 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.25** 0.09 -0.17+ 0.10 -0.22** 0.07
Married (ref=not) 0.03 0.02 0.06** 0.02 0.04** 0.01
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.06** 0.00 0.06** 0.01 0.06** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.08 0.05 -0.06 0.06 -0.07+ 0.04
Entry into Labor Market -0.00 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant 5.30 4.42 10.99* 4.81 5.70+ 3.11
N 1,973 1,694 3,667
Adjusted R-Squared 0.21 0.20 0.21
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
The results above displaying the individual determinants provide some information about 
how the labor market trajectories of these groups evolve over time, but the Chow test 
systematically tests for a change in how labor market outcomes are generated at t1 and t2. Now 
that I have discussed the individual determinants of the occupational-wage index in the models at 
both time periods, the next section provides results from Chow tests that examine if any of the 
groups experienced a statistically significant structural break in how their OWI is generated from 
t1 to t2.  
Chow Tests   
Please refer to Chapter 2 for an in-depth explanation of the logic and methods behind the 
Chow test. As a reminder, in the context of this analysis, the turning point hypothesis expects 
that the transitioners experience a structural break in how their OWI is generated over time and 
that the Chow test for the transitioner group will be significant. Conversely, the scarring 
hypothesis expects that the transitioners’ prior experience with unauthorized status will continue 
to encounter barriers to mobility, leading to no significant structural break. 
  78 
Table 4.7: Chow Test for Structural Break in Occupational-Wage Index Generating 
Process, t1 to t2 
Samples
Evidence of 
Structural Break? F-Test (df) N
New Immigrant Survey
Legal Status Transitioners
Total Yes 4.75 (12, 924) 948
Men Yes 1.97 (10, 471) 491
Women Yes 4.18 (10, 443) 463
Continuously Legal
Total No 0.56 (12, 658) 682
Men No 0.94 (10, 390) 410
Women No 0.99 (10, 255) 275
Continuously Unauthorized
Total No 0.58 (12, 886) 908
Men No 0.42 (10, 628) 646
Women No 0.41 (10 244) 262
Continuously Legal
Total No 0.27 (12 3518) 3540
Men No 0.47 (10, 2087) 2105
Women No 0.92 (10, 1507) 1525
US-Born Hispanic
Total No 0.34 (12, 3914) 3936
Men No 0.41 (10, 1991) 2009
Women No 0.84 (10, 1909) 1927
Note: Hypotheses being tested are as follows: Ho: K1 = K2, Ha: K1 ≠ K2; evidence of 
a structural break is found when the null hypothesis of no difference across time 
periods is rejected; hypotheses are tested at p<0.05 (two-tailed test); test statistics are 
generated from Chow test of unpooled and pooled versions of models for each group
Survey of Income and Program Participation
 
Table 4.7 provides results from the Chow tests for each group in the analysis. For the 
transitioners, results indicate that, for the total and gender-specific samples, the null hypothesis 
of no change in how wages are determined over time is rejected (p<.05, two-tailed test). Stated 
differently, the Chow test indicates that, collectively, model parameters for transitioners vary 
significantly from t1 to t2. On the other hand, the Chow tests for the continuously unauthorized, 
the two continuously legal groups, and U.S.-born Hispanics are not significant. Thus, model 
parameters for these groups do not vary across time, suggesting that the models are, from a 
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statistical standpoint, indistinguishable at t1 and t2. As in Chapter 3, statistically significant 
increases in mean OWI for a particular group do not necessarily mean that a structural break has 
occurred. For instance, both the SIPP female and male continuously legal samples experienced 
significant increases in mean OWI between t1 and t2, but their Chow test results are not 
significant, indicating no structural break but general occupational mobility. In the case of 
transitioners, however, statistically significant Chow test results provide evidence that 
legalization dramatically changes how that group’s labor market position is generated. As seen in 
Table 4.1, this change in the OWI-generating process led to substantial gains in OWI that were 
not experienced by other groups. Thus, Table 4.7 provides additional evidence for the turning 
point hypothesis.  
Furthermore, given that the treatment group of legal status transitioners is the only one to 
experience a statistically significant structural change in how the OWI is generated over time, 
this is strong evidence that gains in occupational standing are attributable to legalization rather 
than other exogenous factors. Finally, it is important to note that this finding applies to both 
women and men, as both groups appear to benefit from legalization.   
Simulation  
Thus far, the results in this chapter indicate that the shift from unauthorized to authorized 
status results in gains in occupational standing for legal status transitioners.  I now turn to a 
simulation exercise that estimates to what extent legalization increases the average occupational-
wage index.  Results provided in Table 4.8 were generated using the methodology laid out in 
Chapter 2, and I also provide a brief overview of the simulation analysis steps below.   
Following Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002), I use this mean substitution method to 
approximate the consequences of legalization relative to the scenario of remaining unauthorized. 
I conduct the simulation for two samples: the legal status transitioners and the continuously 
unauthorized. For the transitioners, I first calculate the predicted mean occupational-wage index 
based on the sample’s means and returns for the independent variables at t1 and t2, respectively, 
which comprises the outcomes expected under the legalization scenario for this group. As an 
alternative scenario, I use mean-substitution to simulate the change in OWI that transitioners 
would experience under the scenario that they did not gain authorized status and remained 
unauthorized. To simulate the scenario that the transitioner group remains unauthorized, the 
predicted mean at t2 is calculated using mean substitution, where the means for the transitioner 
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group at t2 are applied to the returns for the transitioner group at t1, when that group was 
unauthorized.  
For the continuously unauthorized sample, I first calculate the predicted mean outcome 
based on the sample’s means and returns at t1 and t2, respectively, which produces the predicted 
mean OWI under the scenario that this group remains unauthorized from t1 to t2. Then, I conduct 
another mean-substitution exercise to simulate a scenario under which the continuously 
unauthorized immigrants receive legal status between t1 and t2, where I calculate the predicted 
mean OWI at t2 by applying the sample means from the continuously unauthorized group at t2 to 
the model returns from the legal status transitioners at t2. This simulates the expected change in 
occupational standing under the scenario that the continuously unauthorized experienced 
legalization in the same way as the legal status transitioners.    
In Table 4.8, Column 1 provides the adjusted mean outcome for transitioners and the 
continuously unauthorized using their respective sample means and returns generated from an 
OLS regression at t1 when both groups were unauthorized. Column 2 presents the projected mean 
OWI in the scenario where both groups receive legal status prior to t2. For transitioners, I 
calculate this using the respective sample means and returns generated at t2; for the continuously 
unauthorized, their means are applied to returns of transitioners to simulate growth in outcomes 
that might occur if the continuously unauthorized received legal status. Column 4 provides 
predicted OWI values under the scenario where both groups do not receive legal status and 
remain unauthorized. For the continuously unauthorized, this is simply calculated using the 
group means and returns at t2; for transitioners, the groups own returns at t1 (when they were 
unauthorized) is applied to the means of the sample at t2, which simulates the expected average 
OWI if the transitioners had not gained authorized status. Finally, column 6 provides the percent 
growth in OWI experienced under the legalization scenario net of the continued unauthorized 
status scenario, and approximates the projected payoff of legalization for the occupational 
standing of immigrants.  
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Table 4.8: Simulated Occupational-Wage Index Growth Calculations from t1 to t2, Legal 
Status Transitioners and Continuously Unauthorized 
t1unauthorized t2legal
Percent Change,   
t1 unauth. to t2legal t2unauthorized
Percent Change,   
t1 unauth. to t2unauth.
Column (3) - 
Column (5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Legal Status Transitioners (NIS)
Total 9.0 10.3 14.5 9.0 0.0 14.5
Men 10.5 11.7 12.0 10.7 1.9 10.1
Women 7.6 9.0 18.2 7.6 -0.3 18.5
Cont. Unauthorized (SIPP)
Total 9.8 10.7 8.9 10.0 1.9 6.9
Men 10.2 11.5 11.9 10.6 3.7 8.2
Women 8.9 8.5 -4.4 8.7 -1.9 -2.5
Note: All t1 unauthorized values calculated using observed sample means and returns; for transitioners: t2 legal values derived 
using respective means and returns for t1 and t2, and t2 unauthorized values generated using means for transitioners at t2 and 
returns for transitioners at t1; for cont. unauthorized: t2legal  calculated using means for cont. unauthorized at t2 and returns 
for transitioners at t2, and t2 unauthorized generated using means for cont. unauthorized at t2 and returns for transitioners at t2.     
Possible Scenarios Proejcted Payoff 
of LegalizationLegalization Remain Unauthorized
 
Table 4.8 shows the predicted average OWI for transitioners when they were 
unauthorized immigrants at t1 is $10.50 for men and $7.60 for women. Under the legalization 
scenario, the OWI for transitioner men is expected to increase to $11.70, or a 14.5 percent 
increase. I find similar results for women; their wages under the legalization scenario increase to 
$9.0, or an 18 percent increase. On the other hand, the occupational standing for the total 
transitioner group (including both men and women) would be expected to stagnate if this group 
remains unauthorized; the percent change for men and women is 1.9 and -0.3 percent, 
respectively. Taken together, the evidence indicates that the amount of the change in the OWI 
that is directly attributable to legalization (i.e., the change in OWI that only occurs due to 
legalization) is 18.5 percent for women and 10 percent for men. 
 I find similar results for the continuously unauthorized defined from the SIPP data. The 
predicted average OWI for continuously unauthorized men at t1 is $10.2, and for women it is 
$8.90. Under the scenario where this group regularizes their legal status between t1 and t2 like the 
transitioners, the simulated occupational standing of continuously unauthorized men experiences 
considerable growth. Their OWI rises to $10.70, which would represent a 10 percent increase 
between t1 to t2. The opposite is true for continuously unauthorized women, however; their OWI 
would decrease by four percent. Under the scenario where this sample remains unauthorized, the 
predicted average OWI of men and women changes by 3.7 and -1.9 percent, respectively.  
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For the continuously unauthorized, the simulations results are not as clear. While the 
simulation for the legal status transitioners strongly indicates that the legalization scenario 
substantially boosts the occupational standing of male and female respondents, results for the 
continuously unauthorized appear to be gendered. For continuously unauthorized men, the 
results indicate that legalization produces an eight percent increase in the average median wage 
of the respondent’s occupation. For continuously unauthorized women in the SIPP, however, the 
results indicate a negative effect of legalization. Recall from the descriptive results presented in 
Table 4.8 that the average OWI value fell from $9.30 to $9.00 for continuously unauthorized 
women, which likely contributes to the lack of a legalization payoff for women in the simulation. 
Further, this may also reflect the larger trend of occupational downgrading experienced by Latin 
American immigrant women in the labor market.   
 On balance, results in Table 4.8 further demonstrate the payoff of legalization and the 
penalty for remaining unauthorized. Under the legalization scenario, both men and women from 
the transitioner group experience strong growth in the occupational-wage index from t1 to t2. 
Under the scenario where these groups remain unauthorized, however, they all experience 
stagnant growth in occupational standing. Given that legalization directly increases the OWI of 
these workers by eight to 18 percent, this simulation supports the hypothesis that legalization is 
an important turning point in the labor market trajectories of unauthorized Latin American 
immigrants with respect to the median hourly wages of their occupations.  
 Figure 4.1 illustrates OWI-growth simulation in Table 4 4.8. Figure 4.1 presents the 
predicated average occupational-wage index for transitioners and continuously unauthorized at t1 
and t2 under the two scenarios. In the first scenario, represented by the green line, the group of 
workers remains unauthorized and does not receive legalization between the two time periods. 
Under this scenario, the simulation estimates that the occupational mobility trajectories of the 
workers will remain stagnant. On the other hand, in the alternative scenario where the groups 
legalize and transition from being unauthorized at t1 to being authorized at t2, they are expected to 
experience much steeper increases in average OWI. Comparing the slope of the blue lines (which 
represent the legalization scenario) and the green lines (which represent the remaining 
unauthorized scenario) provides insight into how legalization can act as a mechanism of mobility 
for unauthorized immigrant workers.  Together, this simulation makes clear that legalization 
provides an increase in the occupational standing of unauthorized immigrants that is directly 
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attributable to gaining legal status.  
Figure 4.1: Simulated Occupational-Wage Index at t1 and t2, Remaining Unauthorized vs. 
Legalization 
 
Summary 
 This chapter of the dissertation examines an occupation-specific variable – the median 
hourly wages in the respondent’s occupation – to investigate how legalization affects 
immigrants’ occupational standing. From the cumulative advantage perspective, there is 
evidence that legalization operates as a turning point in the labor market trajectories of 
unauthorized immigrants, allowing immigrants to seek out occupations with higher median 
wages. This finding, combined with findings about hourly wages in Chapter 3, provide strong 
evidence that legalization marks a monumental event in the life course of immigrants.  
The descriptive analysis provided in Table 4.1 indicates that, overall, the occupational-
wage index of the legal status transitioners grew significantly from $9.8 to $11.1 an hour 
between t1 to t2. The transitioners are not, however, the only group to experience increases in 
$8 
$9 
$10 
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Note: Values presented here produced using the simulation provided in 
Table 4.8 
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OWI over time; U.S.-born Latinos and continuously legal respondents also experienced 
statistically significant OWI growth. In contrast, what is notable about the OWI trajectories of 
transitioners is that their average OWI grew at a much faster rate compared to other groups. For 
instance, the total sample of transitioners experienced a 13 percent change from t1 to t2, relative to 
the six percent change experienced by those who remained continuously legal.  
 The Chow tests for a structural break (presented in Table 4.7) provide additional evidence 
that the increase in occupational standing for the transitioners is rooted in the process of 
legalization. Results indicate that transitioners experience a statistically significant break in how 
their OWI-generating process operated between t1 to t2, while none of the comparison groups 
exhibited this structural break. These findings reveal that the labor market experiences of the 
transitioners were dramatically different after legalization.  
 Using a mean-substitution method to estimate the change in OWI that is directly 
attributable to legalization, the simulation results in Table 4.8 make clear that the occupational 
mobility of the transitioners is directly tied to the shift to authorized status. The simulation finds 
that the transition to legal status provides a 15 percent increase in the OWI of previously 
unauthorized immigrants.  However, the simulation estimates that the transitioners experience no 
occupational mobility under the scenario where they remain unauthorized and do not receive 
legal status. 
 In interpreting results from this chapter, it is important to revisit the theoretical and 
methodological logic behind the OWI. Stratification researchers argue that, rather than 
representing nominal categories, occupations are deeply imbued with meaning and provide a rich 
way in which to investigate the “geography of social structure” (Sørensen 2000:1526). Further, 
stratification researchers argue that employing a disaggregated class map to analyze social 
stratification allows researchers to better capture the ways in which mobility is molded by 
movement between deeply institutionalized occupational boundaries rather than between large 
classes (Grusky and Weeden 2001; Weeden and Grusky 2005). This body of literature provides a 
theoretical framework for researchers to look beyond wages as a measure of stratification in the 
labor market, and to connect to the broader social and economic context using occupational 
schemes. Thus, by attaching the structural characteristics of occupations to respondents in the 
NIS and the SIPP, I extend the prior studies on legalization to examine how the transition to legal 
status influences the occupational positions of immigrants.  
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 Apart from earning more at their jobs after legalization, immigrants that transition from 
unauthorized to authorized status also improve their relative position in the local occupational 
hierarchy. While the 25 percent boost in hourly wages is a critically important aspect of 
legalization, findings from this chapter hint at how, from the perspective of cumulative 
advantage, legalization allows transitioners to take advantage of long-term benefits of 
legalization. If legalization only led to wage increases but no concomitant increase in 
occupational standing, then the benefits accrued from obtaining legal status might be limited 
only to the initial boost immediately after legalization. However, given that legalization is 
associated with both wage increases and upward occupational mobility, this suggests that the 
transition to authorized status will continue to pay dividends going forward.  
 It is instructive to return to the findings from Table 4.1 here. While the continuously 
unauthorized did not experience any statistically significant growth in their occupational-wage 
index, continuously legal immigrants did. In other words, continuously unauthorized immigrants 
remained in jobs with lo median wages throughout the period under study, but continuously legal 
immigrants improved their occupational standing over time. In addition, findings here for legal 
immigrants are consistent with previous research that documents how legal immigrants increase 
their occupational standing as they gain U.S. experience (Akresh 2006; Lubotsky 2007; Akresh 
2008).  
If this same trend continues over the long term, then the disparity in OWI between the 
continuously legal and the continuously unauthorized groups observed here will widen over time 
and the benefits of legal status will accumulate. Moreover, this may operate through the ability to 
move up the ladder of the occupational hierarchy in a way that the unauthorized – due to their 
status – are unable to do. The transitioners, by experiencing the turning point of legalization, 
have, in effect, switched tracks and are now able to achieve that same kind of upward 
occupational mobility. Thus, while the continuously unauthorized will remain on the bottom 
rungs of the occupational hierarchy, the continuously legal and the transitioners are afforded the 
opportunity to achieve occupational mobility and enhance their labor market position over time.  
By thinking beyond individual wages and considering a more structural measure of 
occupational standing, this chapter provides evidence that legalization is strongly associated with 
upward mobility. In the following chapter, I continue examining occupation-specific outcomes 
and how they are tied to the process of legalization. In particular, I investigate how transitioning 
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from unauthorized to legal status may attenuate other markers of disadvantage in the occupations 
held by transitioners.  
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Chapter 5: Occupation-Specific Characteristics and Patterns of Occupational Mobility 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 provide strong evidence that legalization is a turning point in the labor 
market trajectories of unauthorized immigrants, as the hourly wages and occupational-wage 
index increase as a result of the transition to authorized status. Yet, stratification scholars stress 
that wages are not the only indicator of how an occupation is positioned in the occupational 
hierarchy. As Kalleberg (2011:5) writes, occupations are “made up of bundles of rewards, and 
the multidimensionality of job quality is reflected in definitions that recognize the diverse 
aspects of what constitutes a ‘good’ job.” While direct economic compensation is one aspect of a 
job’s attributes, other characteristics like fringe benefits, job security, and opportunities for 
advancement are also important features of an occupation.  
In this chapter, I leverage the insights of the stratification literature on occupations and 
occupational mobility to examine how the specific characteristics of occupations held by 
immigrants are impacted by legalization. Chapters 3 and 4 of the dissertation focus specifically 
on shifts in the economic compensation of jobs by transitioners between t1 and t2.  In this chapter, 
I build on the analytic strategy used prior chapters to examine a wide variety of occupation-
specific indicators.   
An emerging body of literature examines the role of occupations in the labor market 
outcomes of immigrants.  Bean, Leach, and Lowell (2004) use data from the 1990 and 2000 
censuses and find that immigrants experience upward mobility over the life course, moving from 
occupations at the bottom of the income distribution to jobs near the middle.  Catanzarite 
(2002:330) uses census data from 1980 and 1990 for the Los Angeles metropolitan area to 
explore the effects of occupational segregation on Latino immigrant employment outcomes, 
concluding that employment in brown-collar occupations, or jobs with an overrepresentation of 
Latino workers, contributes to the earnings erosion of Latino immigrants and U.S.-born Latinos.  
On the other hand, Mouw and Chavez (2012) analyze data from the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation and find that, while Latino immigrants working in occupational linguistic 
niches earn lower wages than other immigrants, they experience a similar rate of wage growth 
over time.  
Much less is known, however, about the occupational mobility trajectories of legal and 
unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. labor market, even though unauthorized workers comprise 
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more than five percent of the total workforce (Passel and Cohn 2009).  In two related analyses, 
Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (1996; 2000) examine Latino immigrants using the Legalized 
Population Survey, a sample of unauthorized immigrant workers that gained legal status through 
the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act. They find that although unauthorized immigrants 
often change jobs, these changes are characterized by “churning,” or moving between a limited 
number of jobs traditionally held by immigrants (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 1996:919). This, the 
researchers argue, reflects the constraints of unauthorized status on occupational mobility.  
This chapter draws from studies that have developed occupation-specific variables by 
supplementing survey data with other data sources to capture the structural characteristics of 
respondents’ occupations. Examples of this method include: 1) Grodsky and Pager (2001), who 
use the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) in conjunction with data from the 2000 Census 
to examine occupational factors that contribute to the black-white wage gap; 2) Mouw and 
Chavez (2012), who supplement SIPP data using the O*NET database (an updated version of the 
DOT) and 2000-06 American Community Survey to produce education, skill, and language 
characteristics of occupations in a study of immigrant wage trajectories; and 3) Orrenius and 
Zavodny (2009), who use data from the American Community Survey and the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics on work-related injuries and fatalities to examine if immigrants work in riskier jobs 
than U.S.-born workers.  
The analytic strategy in this chapter is an abridged version of what I used in prior 
chapters.  It is abridged because I do not conduct the mean-substitution simulation exercise for 
the dependent variables examined here.  In the first step, I examine the job attributes of each 
group at t1 and t2, testing if the difference in means is statistically significant across time periods. 
Then, I run OLS regression models predicting the log of each dependent variable for each group.  
As noted earlier (see methods section in Chapter 2), the OLS regression models provide the 
foundation for the Chow tests, and the model fit statistics from these OLS regressions are then 
used to assess whether the legal status transitioners experienced a structural break in how the 
occupation-specific characteristics are generated over time. Because of the large number of OLS 
regression models required to generate the Chow tests for each group and each dependent 
variable, I do not discuss the results from the models in the text. The results from the OLS 
regression models that comprise the basis for the Chow tests in this chapter are provided in the 
Appendix.    
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To continue investigating how the transition from unauthorized to authorized status 
affects labor market outcomes beyond hourly wages, I now turn to a detailed analysis of 
occupational standing.   
Dependent Variables 
 I examine eight distinct dependent variables in this chapter. Each dependent variable is 
organized into one of three job clusters: niches, economic security, and benefits. As outlined in 
Chapter 2, the occupation-specific outcomes use the detailed occupational codes provided in the 
NIS and SIPP to attach characteristics to respondents’ occupations in those surveys. 
Characteristics of these occupations are produced using the Current Population Survey, and the 
outcomes are gender-, year-, and region- specific. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the 
variables. Unlike the outcome variable in Chapter 4, where the value represented the median 
hourly wage in a specific occupation, the values of the variables in this chapter represent the 
percent of workers in a specific occupation with that characteristic; as a result, the values for 
each of the variables examined in the present chapter have possible values ranging from 0 to 100. 
Also, it is important to note that, with the exception of the gender measure, all of the dependent 
variables in this chapter are coded such that an increase in the value of the indicator is associated 
with an improvement in occupational standing.  
Table 5.1: Overview of Dependent Variables by Occupation-Specific Characteristic Cluster 
Cluster
Benefits
Pension
Health Insurance
Union
Niches
Gender
Ethnic
Skill
Economic Security
Working Poor
Food Stamps
Description
Female
Not Latin American immigrants
High school graduates or above
In households without food stamp recipients
Included in an employer-provided pension or retirement plan 
Covered by employer-sponsored health insurance
Covered by or members of a union
Percent of workers in an occupation that are:
In households earning 150 percent or more of the poverty line
 
 
Benefits 
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 The benefits cluster provides information on the kinds of fringe benefits offered by 
specific occupations. These variables represent the percent of workers that are: in an employer 
provided pension or retirement plan, covered by employer-sponsored health insurance plan, or 
covered by or belong to a union. These types of benefits, Kalleberg (2011:6) notes, “are an 
important form of job reward in the United States due to the employer-centered model…that 
underlies much of the distribution of health insurance, retirement pensions, and other economic 
benefits.” Occupations that are higher on the occupational hierarchy are expected to offer more 
fringe benefits like the ones examined here, whereas undesirable jobs are expected to have low 
levels of workers with benefits. Thus, these indicators provide insight into the kinds of benefits 
that workers receive that are outside direct compensation but still comprise important elements 
of occupations.  
Niches 
 The second cluster of occupation-specific characteristics describe the demographic 
composition of the occupations held by respondents. In particular, I am interested in the extent to 
which legalization provides unauthorized immigrants with opportunities to move into 
occupations outside of their respective gender, ethnic, or skill niches. To do this, I examine three 
demographic characteristics of occupations: the percent of workers in those occupations that are 
female, the percent that are not Latin American immigrants, and the percent that have a high 
school degree or more.  
Employment niches often develop as a result of blocked opportunities in the labor 
market; as members of a minority group encounter discrimination or lack of access to resources 
that restricts employment prospects in the broader economy, niches are environments where 
social capital can help to secure jobs through referrals from co-ethnics and information passed 
through social networks (Logan and Alba 1999; Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2001) In the 
case of immigrants, in particular, employment niches provide a place for workers to gain a 
foothold in the local economy upon arrival in the United States (Nee, Sanders, and Sernau 1994).  
However, it is uncertain if participation in an employment niche is positive for the long-
term prospects of workers. Model (1993) argues that while niches do provide access to 
employment opportunities, niches in the post-industrial context are predominantly located in 
low-skill industries that relegate workers to low wages with little hope of upward mobility. This 
is supported by evidence that occupational prestige and wages tend to be lower in industries with 
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high concentrations of Latinos, Asians, and blacks (Wilson 2003). Moreover, the employment 
niches of Mexican immigrants tend to be concentrated in occupations that are physically 
demanding and have adverse working conditions (Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2001). While 
the niche may provide initial help in gaining employment, working in a niche can also reduce the 
likelihood of future advancement. Thus, the extent to which legalized immigrants are able to 
move out of skill, gender, and ethnic niches may reflect improvements in their labor market 
position over time.  
Economic Security   
 The economic security cluster represents the financial vulnerability of workers in 
particular occupations beyond the direct economic compensation earned at their job. The 
working poor variable represents the percent of workers in an occupation that belong to 
households classified as earning 150 percent or above of the poverty line, while the food stamps 
variable is the percent of workers in an occupation that belong to households where no 
household member received benefits from the Supplement Nutrition Assistant Program, referred 
to informally as food stamps. A report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2011) indicates that 
poverty levels vary widely by industrial sector; for instance, only 2 percent of managers or 
professionals are classified as being in poverty, whereas poverty rates in industries such as 
agriculture, construction, and the service sector (where immigrants heavily concentrated) range 
from 10-17 percent. I use a broadened measure of the poverty rate (including those earning up to 
150 percent of the official poverty rate) in order to provide a more comprehensive measure of 
those that experience economic vulnerability even while participating in the labor force (Brady 
2003). Similarly, the food stamps measure provides an additional indicator of the economic well-
being of workers in specific occupations.  
Results 
 Unlike the previous analytic chapters, in this chapter all of the results for each dependent 
variable are discussed together; further, I do not conduct simulation exercises for the dependent 
variables in this chapter, given that the variables are not measured in a metric like dollars that are 
easy to conceptualize in terms of percent-change. I do, however, examine the differences in 
means over time for each variable and conduct a Chow test for structural change across time 
periods for each sample in the analysis. In what follows, I present the results for the analysis in 
this chapter by cluster. 
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Benefits  
Union Coverage 
 Table 5.2 provides the results for the union coverage indicator; for this measure, greater 
values indicate occupations with a higher prevalence of unionization. There is no evidence that, 
following legalization, the transitioners are more likely to work in occupations with higher levels 
of unionization. Although the means at t1 and t2 for this variable are not significantly different, 
the level of unionization in the transitioners’ occupations actually declines from 3.1 to 2.7 
percent. The results for the Chow tests reflect the descriptive results, as there is no evidence to 
suggest that this outcome-generating process is significantly different across time periods for the 
legal status transitioners.  
The results for the comparison groups are similar to those of the legal status transitioners.  
Overall, the level of unionization is relatively low (around 3 percent) in the occupations of all of 
the comparison groups, and none of the groups exhibit any evidence of structural change over 
time. This likely reflects the dwindling supply of jobs with union coverage in the United States 
(Kalleberg et al. 2000), as well as the barriers to entry into those unionized occupations that exist 
for immigrants and U.S.-born Latinos.   
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Table 5.2: Results for Union Composition of Occupations, t1 and t2 
Sample t1 t2
Significant 
Difference? F-test (df)
Evidence of 
Structural Break? N
NIS
Legal Status Transitioners
Total 3.1 2.7 No 0.98 (12, 922) No 980
Men 3.6 3.3 No 0.61 (10, 472) No 510
Women 2.5 2.1 No 1.57 (10, 442) No 470
Continuously Legal
Total 2.9 3.0 No 0.37 (12, 683) No 736
Men 3.5 3.6 No 0.51 (10, 408) No 443
Women 2.1 2.2 No 0.15 (10, 262) No 293
SIPP
Continuously Unauthorized 
Total 2.6 2.5 No 0.21 (12, 884) No 963
Men 2.8 2.5 No 0.20 (10, 626) No 669
Women 2.1 2.5 No 0.39 (10, 242) No 294
Continuously Legal
Total 3.2 3.2 No 0.89 (12, 3521) No 3953
Men 3.5 3.4 No 0.76 (10, 2089) No 2229
Women 2.7 3.0 No 0.56 (10, 1506) No 1724
U.S.-Born Latinos
Total 3.2 3.3 No 0.97 (12, 3914) No 4381
Men 3.5 3.7 No 0.99 (10, 1991) No 2222
Women 2.9 2.8 No 0.57 (10, 1907) No 2159
Difference in Means Test (t-test) Chow Test for Structural Break
Note: Means are the average percent of workers in the sample's occupations that are covered or members of a union;  “Significant difference” 
indicates statistically significant within-group difference from t1  to t2  (p<0.05, two-tailed test); "Yes^" indicates significant difference at p<.10 level 
(two-tailed test); "Percent Change" column provides within-group percent change in the dependent variable across time periods; N refers to pooled 
sample size; evidence of a structural break is found when the null hypothesis of no difference across time periods is rejected; hypotheses are tested at 
p<0.05 (two-tailed test); test statistics are generated from Chow test of unpooled and pooled versions of models for each group
 
Pension or Retirement Plan 
 Table 5.3 provides the results for the variable measuring the pension coverage of workers 
across occupations.  On this variable, higher values indicate occupations with a higher 
percentage of workers with retirement or pension benefits.  In this case, the results indicate that 
the occupations held by legal status transitioners were more likely to include a pension or 
retirement plan after the transition from unauthorized to authorized status. For instance, the mean 
percent of workers with pensions or retirement plans in the occupations of the transitioners at t1 
is 28 percent, but that increases to 32 percent at t2. Further, this increase is statistically significant 
(p<.05, two-tailed test). The increase for men is only marginally significant (p<.10, two-tailed 
test), but the increase from 26 to 30 percent for women is significant at the conventional level 
(p<.05, two-tailed test). For the total sample and the female sample, the Chow tests for structural 
breaks are statistically significant at the .05 level, indicating that the outcome-generating process 
is substantially different across time periods. The Chow test for the male transitioner sample, 
however, is not statistically significant.  
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Table 5.3: Results for Pension Benefit Composition of Occupations, t1 and t2 
Sample t1 t2
Significant 
Difference? F-test (df)
Evidence of 
Structural Break? N
NIS
Legal Status Transitioners
Total 28.1 31.5 Yes 2.16 (12, 922) Yes 980
Men 30.1 33.2 Yes^ 1.15 (10, 472) No 510
Women 25.8 29.6 Yes 2.46 (10, 442) Yes 470
Continuously Legal
Total 31.8 33.7 No 0.45 (12, 683) No 736
Men 34.2 36.1 No 0.36 (10, 408) No 443
Women 28.1 30.2 No 0.88 (10, 262) No 293
SIPP
Continuously Unauthorized 
Total 25.7 25.2 No 0.31 (12, 884) No 963
Men 25.3 25.4 No 0.32 (10, 626) No 669
Women 26.6 24.6 No 0.46 (10, 242) No 294
Continuously Legal
Total 33.9 33.5 No 0.33 (12, 3521) No 3953
Men 34.3 33.3 No 0.62 (10, 2089) No 2229
Women 33.4 33.6 No 0.36 (10, 1506) No 1724
U.S.-Born Latinos
Total 40.8 40.7 No 1.01 (12, 3914) No 4381
Men 41.6 40.3 No 1.37 (10, 1991) No 2222
Women 40.0 41.1 No 0.79 (10, 1907) No 2159
Difference in Means Test (t-test) Chow Test for Structural Break
Note: Means are the average percent of workers in the sample's occupations that are included in an employer-provided pension or retirement plan; 
“Significant difference” indicates statistically significant within-group difference from t1  to t2 (p<0.05, two-tailed test); "Yes^" indicates significant 
difference at p<.10 level (two-tailed test); "Percent Change" column provides within-group percent change in the dependent variable across time 
periods; N refers to pooled sample size; evidence of a structural break is found when the null hypothesis of no difference across time periods is 
rejected; hypotheses are tested at p<0.05 (two-tailed test); test statistics are generated from Chow test of unpooled and pooled versions of models for 
each group
 
In contrast, there is no evidence that any of the comparison groups experienced any 
increase in occupational standing in regards to the pension coverage of their occupations.   For 
the continuously unauthorized, around 25 percent of workers in their occupations are covered by 
a pension or retirement plan; this value is 33 percent for the continuously legal immigrants from 
the SIPP and 40 percent for the U.S.-born. None of the Chow tests are statistically significant for 
the comparison groups, and this reflects the general lack of change in the groups’ respective 
means over time.   
Employer Health Insurance 
 Table 5.4 displays the results for the employer health insurance variable, and higher 
values on this measure indicate occupations with a higher prevalence of employer-sponsored 
health insurance benefits. For the total transitioner sample, the average value increased from 53 
percent to 62 percent, and there are comparable increases for men and women when analyzed 
separately. All three of the transitioner samples experienced statistically significant increases in 
the level of access to employer-sponsored health insurance within their occupations. The total 
sample and the male sample for the continuously legal (NIS) also experienced statistically 
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significant increases, although the magnitude of that change over time is much smaller relative to 
the legal status transitioners. The mean for the continuously legal (NIS) increased from 59 to 63 
percent and increased from 59 to 64 percent for the male-only sample, but none of the other 
groups experience statistically significant changes in this measure over time.  
Table 5.4: Results for Employer Health Insurance Composition of Occupations, t1 and t2 
Sample t1 t2
Significant 
Difference? F-test (df)
Evidence of 
Structural Break? N
NIS
Legal Status Transitioners
Total 52.8 61.5 Yes 10.91 (12, 922) Yes 980
Men 50.8 61.6 Yes 7.60 (10, 472) Yes 510
Women 54.9 61.3 Yes 5.98 (10, 442) Yes 470
Continuously Legal
Total 59.3 62.8 Yes 1.65 (12, 683) Yes^ 736
Men 59.3 64.1 Yes 1.60 (10, 408) No 443
Women 59.3 60.8 No 0.89 (10, 262) No 293
SIPP
Continuously Unauthorized 
Total 52.6 52.5 No 1.09 (12, 884) No 963
Men 50.1 51.0 No 1.20 (10, 626) No 669
Women 58.0 56.0 No 0.34 (10, 242) No 294
Continuously Legal
Total 61.9 62.0 No 0.48 (12, 3521) No 3953
Men 60.2 60.1 No 0.56 (10, 2089) No 2229
Women 64.0 64.7 No 0.78 (10, 1506) No 1724
U.S.-Born Latinos
Total 68.8 69.1 No 1.57 (12, 3914) Yes^ 4381
Men 67.0 67.0 No 0.46 (10, 1991) No 2222
Women 70.6 71.3 No 2.34 (10, 1907) Yes 2159
Difference in Means Test (t-test) Chow Test for Structural Break
Note: Means are the average percent of workers in the sample's occupations that are covered by employer-sponsored health insurance; “Significant 
difference” indicates statistically significant within-group difference from t1 to t2  (p<0.05, two-tailed test); "Yes^" indicates significant difference at 
p<.10 level (two-tailed test); "Percent Change" column provides within-group percent change in the dependent variable across time periods; N refers 
to pooled sample size; evidence of a structural break is found when the null hypothesis of no difference across time periods is rejected; hypotheses 
are tested at p<0.05 (two-tailed test); test statistics are generated from Chow test of unpooled and pooled versions of models for each group
 
In regards to the Chow tests for structural breaks, the results indicate that the large gains 
experienced by the legal status transitioners on this measure are attributable to legalization. All 
three of the legal status transitioner groups experienced statistically significant structural breaks 
in how this measure is generated over time, and these results are significant at the conventional 
level (p<0.05, two-tailed test). Although the total samples for the continuously legal (NIS) and 
the U.S.-born Latinos show significant Chow tests, these tests are only significant at a marginal 
level (p<0.10, two-tailed test). The only comparison group to exhibit evidence of a structural 
break at the conventional level (p<0.05, two-tailed test) is the U.S.-born Latino female sample, 
and, while the Chow test is significant, this group did not experience any significant increase in 
the mean of this variable over time. Overall, given the substantial gains experienced by each of 
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the legal status transitioner groups on this indicator and the statistically significant Chow tests, 
the results in Table 5.4 reveal that, as a result of legalization, the occupations held by the 
transitioners at t2 had more workers with access to employer-sponsored health insurance.  
Niches 
Ethnic  
Table 5.5 provides results for the average percent of workers in a respondent’s 
occupation that are not Latin American immigrants.  This measure provides insight into the 
extent to which an occupation is a Latin American immigrant employment niche, and lower 
values indicate a greater concentration of immigrant workers. The results reveal that the ethnic 
composition of the occupations held by the transitioners remain consistent over time.  The 
average value for the transitioners is 73.9 and 74.1 percent at t1 and t2, respectively, and that 
difference in means is not statistically significant. Further, the Chow tests for structural change 
over time for the legal status transitioners are also not statistically significant.    
Table 5.5: Results for Ethnic Composition of Occupations, t1 and t2 
Sample t1 t2
Significant 
Difference? F-test (df)
Evidence of 
Structural Break? N
NIS
Legal Status Transitioners
Total 73.9 74.1 No 1.22 (12, 922) No 980
Men 72.0 73.8 No 0.61 (10, 472) No 510
Women 75.9 74.3 No 4.64 (10, 442) Yes 470
Continuously Legal
Total 75.1 76.3 No 0.48 (12, 683) No 736
Men 75.4 77.2 No 0.49 (10, 408) No 443
Women 74.7 75.1 No 0.38 (10, 262) No 293
SIPP
Continuously Unauthorized 
Total 64.9 65.0 No 0.61 (12, 884) No 963
Men 63.4 64.4 No 0.53 (10, 626) No 669
Women 68.2 66.2 No 0.28 (10, 242) No 294
Continuously Legal
Total 73.8 72.7 No 0.37 (12, 3521) No 3953
Men 71.7 71.1 No 0.43 (10, 2089) No 2229
Women 76.5 75.0 No 0.37 (10, 1506) No 1724
U.S.-Born Latinos
Total 84.2 83.6 No 1.92 (12, 3914) Yes 4381
Men 80.7 79.8 No 1.50 (10, 1991) No 2222
Women 87.8 87.7 No 2.75 (10, 1907) Yes 2159
A. Difference in Means Test (t-test) B. Chow Test for Structural Break
Note: Means are the average percent of workers in the sample's occupations that are not Latin American immigrants; “Significant difference” 
indicates statistically significant within-group difference from t1  to t2  (p<0.05, two-tailed test); "Yes^" indicates significant difference at p<.10 level 
(two-tailed test); "Percent Change" column provides within-group percent change in the dependent variable across time periods; N refers to pooled 
sample size; evidence of a structural break is found when the null hypothesis of no difference across time periods is rejected; hypotheses are tested at 
p<0.05 (two-tailed test); test statistics are generated from Chow test of unpooled and pooled versions of models for each group
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The results for the comparison groups are similar to those of the transitioners, as no group 
experiences a statistically significant change in the ethnic composition of their occupation from t1 
to t2. The mean value on this indicator is 75 percent for the continuously legal, 65 percent for the 
continuously unauthorized, and 85 percent for the U.S.-born Latinos. Correspondingly, no 
comparison group shows any evidence of experiencing a structural break in how this outcome is 
generated across time periods. Keeping in mind the positions of these groups in the wage-
hierarchy, this variable shows clear stratification between these groups; the continuously 
unauthorized tend to work in occupations with higher concentrations of Latin American 
immigrants, whereas there is a smaller presence of Latin American immigrants in the 
occupations held by the U.S.-born Latinos.  
Gender 
Table 5.6 provides results for the average percent female in the occupations of each 
group. No group in the analysis experienced a statistically significant change in the average 
percent female of their occupations over time. Female legal status transitioners worked in 
occupations that were 65.7 percent female at t1 and 63.7 percent female at t2, but this difference 
is not statistically significant. However, the Chow test results for the female legal status 
transitioner sample indicates a marginally statistically significant result (p<0.10, two-tailed test). 
This suggests that while the gender composition of the female transitioners’ occupations may 
have remained the same with legalization, the process through which this outcome is generated 
has undergone a significant change. This is tentative evidence that while female transitioners 
have not yet been able to achieve mobility into jobs with less gender segregation, this may be a 
possibility at some point in the future due to changing nature of how this outcome is generated 
for that group.  
Moreover, as the results displayed in Table 5.6 indicate, there are large differences in the 
average percent female between the male and female samples within each group, which brings 
the gendered nature of the occupations held by these workers to the fore. At t2, roughly 37 
percentage points separate the male and female legal status transitioner samples on this measure; 
an average of 27 percent of workers in the occupations of the male transitioners are females, 
compared to 64 percent of the workers in the female transitioners’ occupations. Although it 
varies from group to group, the within-group gap between men and women in regards to the 
average gender composition of their occupations is 35 to 40 percent, and indicates that, 
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regardless of status or nativity, these women and men work in occupations that tend to be 
gendered. This finding provides some insight into the gender disparity in immigrant earnings 
found in previous research (Hall et al. 2010; Donato and Sisk 2012), as it suggests that the 
segregation of immigrant women into female-dominated occupations may limit their chances at 
occupational mobility.   
Table 5.6: Results for Gender Composition of Occupations, t1 and t2 
Sample t1 t2
Significant 
Difference? F-test (df)
Evidence of 
Structural Break? N
NIS
Legal Status Transitioners
Total 46.5 44.5 No 0.97 (12, 922) No 980
Men 28.5 26.9 No 0.53 (10, 472) No 510
Women 65.7 63.7 No 1.68 (10, 442) Yes^ 470
Continuously Legal
Total 43.1 41.0 No 0.98 (12, 683) No 736
Men 33.0 28.8 No 0.99 (10, 408) No 443
Women 58.6 59.5 No 0.88 (10, 262) No 293
SIPP
Continuously Unauthorized 
Total 33.1 31.5 No 0.62 (12, 884) No 963
Men 20.8 19.8 No 0.86 (10, 626) No 669
Women 60.1 59.5 No 0.41 (10, 242) No 294
Continuously Legal
Total 42.1 41.2 No 0.95 (12, 3521) No 3953
Men 25.2 24.8 No 0.57 (10, 2089) No 2229
Women 62.5 63.9 No 0.51 (10, 1506) No 1724
U.S.-Born Latinos
Total 50.0 49.2 No 0.44 (12, 3914) No 4381
Men 32.6 31.8 No 0.54 (10, 1991) No 2222
Women 67.6 67.7 No 0.21 (10, 1907) No 2159
A. Difference in Means Test (t-test) B. Chow Test for Structural Break
Note: Means are the average percent of workers in the sample's occupations that are female; “Significant difference” indicates statistically significant 
within-group difference from t1  to t2  (p<0.05, two-tailed test); "Yes^" indicates significant difference at p<.10 level (two-tailed test); "Percent 
Change" column provides within-group percent change in the dependent variable across time periods; N refers to pooled sample size; evidence of a 
structural break is found when the null hypothesis of no difference across time periods is rejected; hypotheses are tested at p<0.05 (two-tailed test); 
test statistics are generated from Chow test of unpooled and pooled versions of models for each group
 
Skill 
Table 5.7 provides results for the skill composition variable, which takes into account the 
percent of workers in an occupation with a high school degree or above; on this variable, higher 
values indicate more educated occupations. The results point to signs of upward mobility for the 
legal status transitioners that are not experienced by the other comparison groups. For the total 
sample of the legal status transitioners, the average percent of workers with educational 
credentials increases from 71.4 percent at t1 to 74.7 percent at t2, and this is statistically 
significant.  On the other hand, the continuously unauthorized have mean values of 64.5 and 65.5 
at t1 and t2, respectively, and this difference is not statistically significant.   Among the 
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comparison groups, the female-only sample of U.S.-born Latinos is the only group to experience 
a statistically significant increase in this indicator over time (from 85.2 to 87.5).  
Table 5.7: Results for Skill Composition of Occupations, t1 and t2 
Sample t1 t2
Significant 
Difference? F-test (df)
Evidence of 
Structural Break? N
NIS
Legal Status Transitioners
Total 71.4 74.7 Yes 2.46 (12, 922) Yes 980
Men 70.2 75.3 Yes 1.62 (10, 472) Yes^ 510
Women 72.1 74.0 No 1.78 (10, 442) Yes^ 470
Continuously Legal
Total 75.5 76.4 No 0.56 (12, 683) No 736
Men 77.0 78.2 No 0.27 (10, 408) No 443
Women 72.7 73.7 No 0.52 (10, 262) No 293
SIPP
Continuously Unauthorized 
Total 64.5 65.5 No 0.93 (12, 884) No 963
Men 61.9 64.3 No 1.13 (10, 626) No 669
Women 68.5 67.7 No 0.53 (10, 242) No 294
Continuously Legal
Total 73.1 73.2 No 0.98 (12, 3521) No 3953
Men 71.1 71.4 No 1.08 (10, 2089) No 2229
Women 74.7 75.6 No 1.03 (10, 1506) No 1724
U.S.-Born Latinos
Total 82.6 83.4 No 0.75 (12, 3914) No 4381
Men 80.0 79.6 No 1.25 (10, 1991) No 2222
Women 85.2 87.5 Yes 2.02 (10, 1907) Yes 2159
A. Difference in Means Test (t-test) B. Chow Test for Structural Break
Note: Means are the average percent of workers in the sample's occupations that are high school graduates or above; “Significant difference” 
indicates statistically significant within-group difference from t1 to t2  (p<0.05, two-tailed test); "Yes^" indicates significant difference at p<.10 level 
(two-tailed test); "Percent Change" column provides within-group percent change in the dependent variable across time periods; N refers to pooled 
sample size; evidence of a structural break is found when the null hypothesis of no difference across time periods is rejected; hypotheses are tested at 
p<0.05 (two-tailed test); test statistics are generated from Chow test of unpooled and pooled versions of models for each group
 
Additionally, for the total sample of the legal status transitioners, the Chow tests provide 
evidence of a statistically significant structural break in how this outcome is generated across 
time periods. Among the comparison groups, none of the foreign-born samples exhibit this same 
kind of structural change over time. Thus, the results in Table 5.7 reveal that the average skill 
composition of the legal status transitioners’ occupations increased significantly over time, and 
that this is largely attributable to legalization rather than changes experienced by the labor 
market overall.   
Economic Security 
Working Poor 
Table 5.8 displays results for the percent of workers in the respondents’ occupations that 
reside in households earning 150 percent or above of the poverty line, and provides insight into 
the economic well-being of workers in specific occupations. For this variable, higher values 
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indicate occupations with fewer economically vulnerable workers. There is evidence that the 
legal status transitioners are moving into occupations with less economic insecurity over time, 
with the mean percentage of workers in the transitioners’ occupations that are classified as non-
working poor increasing 4 percentage points across the two time periods. Further, this difference 
in means across time for the legal status transitioners is statistically significant.  The mean values 
for the continuously legal (SIPP) and U.S.-born Latino groups do increase significantly, but the 
continuously legal (NIS) and continuously unauthorized groups do not experience any 
statistically significant changes in this measure over time, with the mean value for the 
continuously unauthorized remaining close to 74 percent at both t1 and t2.  
For the legal status transitioners, the Chow tests for structural change for the total and 
gender-specific samples are all statistically significant, providing further evidence of a shift in 
occupational characteristics of these workers. While the U.S.-born Latino samples (and U.S.-
born Latino women, in particular) also show similar signs, there is no evidence of a statistically 
significant Chow test for any of the foreign-born comparison groups. Collectively, the results in 
Table 5.8 indicate that, as a result of legal status, the transitioners were shifting into occupations 
where, on average, there were fewer workers classified as working poor.  
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Table 5.8: Results for Working Poor Composition of Occupations, t1 and t2 
Sample t1 t2
Significant 
Difference? F-test (df)
Evidence of 
Structural Break? N
NIS
Legal Status Transitioners
Total 74.4 78.4 Yes 2.46 (12, 922) Yes 980
Men 75.7 81.0 Yes 1.62 (10, 472) Yes^ 510
Women 72.8 75.5 Yes^ 1.97 (10, 442) Yes 470
Continuously Legal
Total 79.5 80.5 No 0.87 (12, 683) No 736
Men 83.3 84.5 No 0.99 (10, 408) No 443
Women 73.8 74.6 No 0.88 (10, 262) No 293
SIPP
Continuously Unauthorized 
Total 74.0 74.9 No 0.48 (12, 884) No 963
Men 75.4 76.3 No 0.94 (10, 626) No 669
Women 70.9 71.6 No 0.11 (10, 242) No 294
Continuously Legal
Total 78.4 79.4 Yes 0.75 (12, 3521) No 3953
Men 79.7 80.3 No 0.51 (10, 2089) No 2229
Women 76.8 78.2 Yes^ 0.95 (10, 1506) No 1724
U.S.-Born Latinos
Total 82.7 84.3 Yes 1.58 (12, 3914) Yes^ 4381
Men 83.7 84.7 No 0.71 (10, 1991) No 2222
Women 81.6 84.1 Yes 2.29 (10, 1907) Yes 2159
Note: Means are the average percent of workers in the sample's occupations that are in households earning 150 percent or more of the poverty line; 
“Significant difference” indicates statistically significant within-group difference from t1  to t2 (p<0.05, two-tailed test); "Yes^" indicates significant 
difference at p<.10 level (two-tailed test); "Percent Change" column provides within-group percent change in the dependent variable across time 
periods; N refers to pooled sample size; evidence of a structural break is found when the null hypothesis of no difference across time periods is 
rejected; hypotheses are tested at p<0.05 (two-tailed test); test statistics are generated from Chow test of unpooled and pooled versions of models for 
each group
Difference in Means Test (t-test) Chow Test for Structural Break
 
Food Stamps 
 Table 5.9 provides results from another indicator of occupational standing, which is the 
share of workers residing in households that do not receive food stamp benefits. For this 
variable, larger values indicate occupations with fewer workers receiving food stamps. This 
measure provides additional evidence that the transitioners, after legalizing, work in occupations 
with fewer economically insecure workers relative to when they were unauthorized. Legal status 
transitioners have mean values of 93 and 95 percent at t1 and t2, respectively, which is a 
statistically significant increase.  On the other hand, the average value for the continuously 
unauthorized remains at 94 percent at both t1 and t2.  
The continuously legal (SIPP) and U.S. born Latino groups also worked in occupations 
with fewer food stamp recipients over time; however, aside from the female-only continuously 
legal sample, only the legal status transitioners exhibit evidence of a statistically significant 
structural break based on the Chow test results. Both the difference in means tests and the Chow 
tests for the legal status transitioner samples are statistically significant on this measure, 
providing additional evidence that legalization shapes the occupational standing of the legal 
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status transitioners in important ways.  
Table 5.9: Results for Food Stamp Composition of Occupations, t1 and t2 
Sample t1 t2
Significant 
Difference? F-test (df)
Evidence of 
Structural Break? N
NIS
Legal Status Transitioners
Total 93.0 95.0 Yes 5.98 (12, 922) Yes 980
Men 94.2 96.4 Yes 4.81 (10, 472) Yes 510
Women 91.6 93.5 Yes 3.59 (10, 442) Yes 470
Continuously Legal
Total 95.1 95.1 No 0.75 (12, 683) No 736
Men 97.2 97.1 No 0.99 (10, 408) No 443
Women 91.8 92.2 No 0.92(10, 262) No 293
SIPP
Continuously Unauthorized 
Total 93.8 94.2 No 0.35 (12, 884) No 963
Men 94.6 94.7 No 0.37 (10, 626) No 669
Women 92.1 93.0 No 0.14 (10, 242) No 294
Continuously Legal
Total 94.4 95.1 Yes 1.09 (12, 3521) No 3953
Men 95.4 95.9 Yes^ 1.17 (10, 2089) No 2229
Women 93.3 94.1 Yes 2.86 (10, 1506) Yes 1724
U.S.-Born Latinos
Total 95.2 96.0 Yes 0.95 (12, 3914) No 4381
Men 96.2 96.9 Yes 0.86 (10, 1991) No 2222
Women 94.2 95.1 Yes 0.85 (10, 1907) No 2159
Difference in Means Test (t-test) Chow Test for Structural Break
Note: Means are the average percent of workers in the sample's occupations that reside in households that do not receive food stamps; “Significant 
difference” indicates statistically significant within-group difference from t1 to t2 (p<0.05, two-tailed test); "Yes^" indicates significant difference at 
p<.10 level (two-tailed test); "Percent Change" column provides within-group percent change in the dependent variable across time periods; N refers 
to pooled sample size; evidence of a structural break is found when the null hypothesis of no difference across time periods is rejected; hypotheses 
are tested at p<0.05 (two-tailed test); test statistics are generated from Chow test of unpooled and pooled versions of models for each group
 
 Patterns of Occupations Mobility 
Before concluding this chapter, I now provide some context into the mobility patterns of 
the legal status transitioners over time. While the results in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 point to the fact 
that legalization improves the labor market outcomes of immigrants in a variety of ways, the 
question remains as to how the legal status transitioners are achieving this increase in wages and 
occupational standing. One option is that the legal status transitioners are employed in the same 
job at t1 and t2, but are demanding higher wages at t2 due to their newly gained legal status. 
Another option is that, upon gaining legal status, the legal status transitioners are changing 
occupations to something higher up the occupational ladder. I define a respondent as having 
changed occupations if they report different detailed occupational codes as their occupation at t1 
and t2; otherwise, the respondent is classified as having remained in their respective occupation.  
Figure 5.1 displays two sets of results that examine the movement of workers across 
occupations over time.  The first, represented by the green bars, is simply the share of workers in 
each group that changed occupations from t1 to t2. On a descriptive level, Figure 5.1 indicates 
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that far more of the legal status transitioners changed occupations from t1 to t2 relative to the 
other comparison groups. Among the transitioners, 62 percent of the group changed occupations 
from t1 to t2, compared to roughly 40 percent of the workers in the comparison groups. This 
suggests that moving to a new occupation after gaining legal status (and having the flexibility to 
seek out new occupations) may be fueling the gains experienced by the transitioners in the labor 
market.  
Figure 5.1: Percent of Workers that Changed Occupations and Index of Dissimilarity of 
Occupational Distribution, t1 to t2 
 
The second set of results in Figure 5.1, represented by the blue bars, is the index of 
dissimilarity of the occupational distribution for each group across time. The index of 
dissimilarity is a measure of difference that indicates the degree to which a population’s 
characteristics are distributed differently over time (Sakoda 1981), and has been used in prior 
research to examine occupational segregation (Jacobs 2001). To produce this measure for each 
group, I compared the group’s distribution across all occupations at t1 to the group’s 
occupational distribution at t2. The resulting value is interpreted as the percent of workers in that 
group that would have to change occupations so that the occupational distributions of the group 
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at t1 and t2 would be equal. In this case, larger values indicate more shifting between 
occupational categories over time for that group, and smaller values indicate that the group’s 
workers were more likely to remain in their occupations across the two time periods.   
According to the results in Figure 5.1, 28 percent of the legal status transitioners had to 
change occupations between time periods to match the occupational distribution at t2. By 
comparison, this value is 20 percent for the continuously legal (NIS), 19 percent for the 
continuously unauthorized, and 12-13 percent for the continuously legal (SIPP) and U.S. born 
Latinos. This provides additional evidence that, relative to the comparison groups, the legal 
status transitioners were more likely to change occupations from t1 to t2.  
In Figure 5.2, I focus specifically on the outcomes of the legal status transitioners.  If, as 
Figure 5.1 indicates, legalization provided the transitioners with opportunities to move between 
jobs, then these results imply that the act of changing occupations is deeply linked to the 
mobility processes of previously unauthorized immigrants. Figure 5.2 provides some insight into 
the importance of changing occupations for the legal status transitioners. The bars in Figure 5.2 
show the change in average hourly wages and occupational-wage index for workers that 
remained in the same occupation from t1 to t2 (blue bars) and those that changed occupations 
from t1 to t2 (green bars). The purpose of this figure is to examine how the labor market outcomes 
of the legal status transitioners were shaped by the decision of whether or not to change 
occupations after gaining legal status.   
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Figure 5.2: Change in Average Hourly Wages and Occupational-Wage Index from t1 to t2, 
Legal Status Transitioners 
 
 
Figure 5.2 indicates that average hourly wages increased $1.4 among legal status 
transitioners that remained in the same occupation from t1 to t2, and this change in mean wages is 
statistically significant.  For transitioners that changed occupations after legalization, mean 
hourly wages increased by $2.7, and this difference is also statistically significant. This indicates 
that, regardless of whether or not they changed occupations, legal status transitioners increased 
their hourly wages after gaining legal status. However, even if the workers who remained in the 
same occupation after legalization were able to demand higher wages, those who sought out new 
occupations were more successful in achieving upward occupational mobility. Legal status 
transitioners that stayed in the same occupation over time did not experience a statistically 
significant change in occupational-wage index, while those that shifted occupations experienced 
a statistically significant $1.7 increase in average occupational-wage index over time.   
 Figure 5.2 indicates that the legal status transitioners that changed occupations between t1 
and t2 benefited the most from legalization, as these workers experienced significant increases in 
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both hourly wages and occupational standing. This implies that occupations play a central role in 
the process of improving labor market outcomes and that changing occupations is a key 
mechanism for mobility for legalized workers.   
Summary 
As Kalleberg (2011:2) states, “jobs are the main way by which individuals are linked to 
the economy and are slotted into places within the system of social stratification.” In this chapter, 
I examine various characteristics of occupations to provide a multidimensional portrait of how 
legalization shapes the position of workers in the occupational hierarchy. The results indicate 
that the labor market consequences of legalization reach well beyond the wages of immigrant 
workers, as it also promotes improvements in the overall properties of these occupations.  
At the same time, the findings in this chapter indicate that some attributes of the 
occupations held by transitioners remain the same over time. For instance, transitioners largely 
remain in occupations densely populated by Latin American immigrants over time, suggesting 
that, even when legalization leads to upward mobility, immigrants remain in jobs traditionally 
filled by other immigrants. Similar findings emerged for indicators measuring the gender 
composition and unionization of occupations.  
However, legalization also provides access to occupations with higher levels of skill, 
more economic security, and more employer benefits. This suggests that the benefits of 
legalization for labor market outcomes are not limited to economic compensation, and that the 
overall labor market experience of these immigrants is improved as a direct result of legalization. 
By only examining wages and excluding the role of occupations, past research on legalization 
has provided an overly narrow view of how legalization is an asset for unauthorized immigrant 
workers. Thus, this chapter provides additional evidence that legalization serves as a turning 
point for the labor market trajectories of immigrants.  
 Further, the analysis in this chapter suggests that occupations (and changes between 
occupations) are central to the mobility trajectories of legalized immigrant workers. While 
Figure 5.1 indicates that the continuously unauthorized are no less likely than the other 
comparison groups to change occupations from t1 to t2 (around 40 percent), there is no evidence 
to suggest that these changes in occupations contributed to upward mobility for the continuously 
unauthorized. In fact, the occupational attributes of the continuously unauthorized remained the 
same over time. This finding likely reflects the “churning” process (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 
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1996:919), e.g. mobility between a limited set of jobs traditionally held by immigrants that does 
not improve occupational standing.  
 On the other hand, nearly two-thirds of transitioners changed occupations from t1 to t2, 
and Figure 5.2 indicates that those shifts were likely moves related to opportunities for upward 
occupational mobility. While those that remained in the same occupation did experience an 
increase in average wages, they did not experience any concomitant increase in occupational 
standing. Thus, remaining in the same occupation after legalizing may have improved wages, but 
it did greatly enhance the relative position of those workers in the labor market. For those that 
did change occupations, legalization appears to have had the dual benefit of both higher average 
wages and a higher occupational-wage index. Therefore, for unauthorized workers who shift to 
authorized status, one of the primary labor market benefits of legalization is the opportunity to 
change occupations and obtain a job with not only higher wages but also enhanced occupational 
standing.  
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Chapter 6: Discussion, Implications for Policy, and Conclusion 
 
In a time of rising inequality and economic polarization, understanding how 
socioeconomic disparities are attenuated or reinforced over the life course is a critical element of 
sociological inquiry (DiPrete and Eirich 2006; Hout and DiPrete 2006). With immigration 
projected to drive future U.S. population growth (Passel and Cohn 2008; Pitkin and Meyers 
2011), investigating how immigrants navigate the U.S. labor market – and the role that legal 
status plays – is critically important to understanding the nation’s future prospects (Bean et al. 
2004; Massey 2007).  
The eight million immigrant workers who lack legal status are significantly 
disadvantaged relative to legal immigrants in the labor market (Hall et al. 2010; Donato and Sisk 
2012). Less clear is whether a legalization program will close the gap between these two groups.  
Although earnings of unauthorized immigrants who legalized through the 1986 Immigration 
Reform and Control Act increased (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002), studies of recently 
legalized immigrants suggest that the benefits of legalization have deteriorated (Lofstrom et al. 
2013). I address this debate in my dissertation by investigating the effects of legalization on the 
hourly wages and occupational standing of unauthorized Latin American immigrants. Adopting a 
cumulative advantage perspective, I hypothesize that legalized immigrants either undergo 
subsequent disadvantage because of previous unauthorized status (scarring) or experience 
mobility after they transition to legality (a turning point). To evaluate these competing 
hypotheses, I analyze panel data from the 2003 New Immigrant Survey (NIS) and the 2001 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and use a quasi-experimental research 
design to examine shifts in labor market outcomes of one treatment group (unauthorized 
immigrants that gain authorized status) and three comparison groups (those who remain 
continuously unauthorized, continuously legal, and U.S.-born Latinos).  
My findings reveal that legalization is a turning point in the labor market trajectories of 
immigrants.  For unauthorized immigrants, gaining legal status is the life course equivalent of a 
train hitting a railroad switch, as it dramatically alters labor market trajectories and allows 
previously unauthorized immigrants to catch-up with the labor market outcomes of authorized 
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diminished economic opportunities for Latino immigrants, legalization remains a robust 
mechanism of socioeconomic mobility.  
Summary of Findings 
Figures 6.1-6.4 provide visual depictions of results from Chapters 3-5 in order to 
summarize the findings from the dissertation.  In the figures, the points represent the mean value 
of the outcome for the respective group, and the results presented here are for the total sample of 
each group (including both men and women).  White-filled markers indicate that the within-
group difference in means is statistically significant (p<.05, two-tailed test), while the colored 
markers indicate no significant difference.   
Figure 6.1 provides results for hourly wages in Panel A and the occupational-wage index 
(OWI) in Panel B.  As Panel A shows, the average hourly wages of the transitioner group 
increased from $8.00 to over $10.00 per hour, and this difference is statistically significant. 
Other groups that experienced statistically significant increases in wages include the 
continuously unauthorized, continuously legal (SIPP), and U.S.-born Latino groups; for instance, 
the average hourly wages of the continuously unauthorized workers increased from $9.00 to 
$9.50.  The hourly wages of the continuously legal (NIS) group did not experience a significant 
change, as the wages for that group remained at $10.20 per hour from t1 to t2.  However, even 
though the legal status transitioners were not the only group to experience a statistically 
significant increase in average hourly wages over time, the Chow tests for structural change 
generated in Chapter 3 indicate that transitioner group is the only group in the analysis to 
undergo a significant shift in the wage-generating process across time periods.  Moreover, the 
simulation exercise in Chapter 3 estimates that the transitioners experienced a 25 percent 
increase in hourly wages that is directly attributable to gaining legal status.   
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Figure 6.1: Average Hourly Wage and Occupational-Wage Index at t1 and t2 
 
In Panel B, the figure shows that the average occupational-wage index (the median 
hourly wage in respondent’s occupation) of the transitioner group grew from $9.80 to over 
$11.10, and this difference is statistically significant. The continuously legal (SIPP) and U.S.-
born Latino groups also saw their occupational-wage index increase significantly over time, as 
the OWI for the continuously legal (SIPP) group went from $11.40 to $12.10.  On the other 
hand, the OWI of the continuously legal (NIS) and continuously unauthorized group did not 
change; for instance, the occupational-wage index of the continuously unauthorized group 
changed from $10.30 to $10.80 from t1 to t2, and this difference is not statistically significant.   
Much like the results for hourly wages, however, even as the legal status transitioners were not 
the only group to experience a statistically significant increase in OWI over time, the Chow tests 
produced in Chapter 4 provide evidence that only the transitioner group underwent a significant 
shift in the OWI-generating process across time periods.  Further, the simulation results in 
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Chapter 4 estimate that legalization led to a 15 percent increase in OWI that would not have 
occurred otherwise.   
Chapter 5 examines how a variety of occupation-specific indicators change from t1 to t2, 
and job attributes are categorized into three clusters: niches, economic security, and benefits. 
Figures 6.2-6.4 provide an overview of the results from that analysis. With respect to the gender, 
ethnic, and skill composition of occupations held by transitioners over time (shown in Figure 
6.2), the only variable that provides evidence of statistically significant change over time is the 
skill indicator. On average, transitioners are in occupations with higher shares of workers with a 
high school degree or above following legalization, as the mean value of this variable for the 
legal status transitioners increases from 71 percent to 75 percent.  However, the gender and 
ethnic composition variables remain the same over time.  This lack of change over time is 
particularly interesting in regards to the ethnic composition variable, as it indicates that, even as 
they achieve some upward occupational mobility after legalization, the transitioners remain in 
occupations with high concentrations of Latin American immigrants.  
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Figure 6.2: Average Occupation-Specific Outcome at t1 and t2, Niches 
 
 
None of the comparison groups experienced statistically significant differences in the 
means of these variables over time.  The results for the comparison groups, however, provide 
insight into the barriers that the continuously unauthorized immigrants face in the labor market. 
For instance, the occupations of the continuously unauthorized are far more likely to be low-skill 
(Panel A) or Latin American immigrant employment niches (Panel C), and it is likely that these 
niche occupations do not provide access to mobility opportunities (Model 1993).  Thus, this is 
one way in which cumulative advantage may work as a mechanism of reducing the economic 
prospects of unauthorized immigrants. 
Figure 6.3 provides results for the economic security indicators.  The results in this figure 
indicate that, after legalization, the occupations of transitioners tend to have fewer workers that 
are economically vulnerable. For example, the average percent non-working poor of workers in 
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the occupations held by the transitioners at t1 was 74 percent, but by t2 this had increased to 78 
percent; this increase is statistically significant.  This indicates that, over time, the transitioners 
were moving into occupations with fewer workers that are classified as working poor (earning 
150 percent or below of the poverty line).  While some of the comparison groups did experience 
improvement in their outcomes from t1 to t2, the transitioners are the only foreign-born group to 
experience a statistically significant change in how these two measures of economic well-being 
are generated over time.     
Figure 6.3: Average Occupation-Specific Outcome at t1 and t2, Economic Security 
 
 
Figure 6.4 provides results for the indicators measuring the level of benefits offered by 
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variable across the two periods (Panel B); at t1, their mean value on this indicator was 28 percent, 
and this increased to 32 percent by t2. In regards to the unionization level of occupations, 
however, there is no evidence of any change over time for any group.  Overall, this indicates that 
although transitioners were not more likely to enter into occupations with more union coverage 
following legalization, they did move into occupations with employer-provided benefits like 
pensions, retirement benefits, and health insurance.  These improvements in occupation standing 
reflect a shift out of the most precarious jobs and upward movement into occupations with a 
greater likelihood of offering benefits outside of direct economic compensation (Kalleberg 
2011).   
Figure 6.3: Average Occupation-Specific Outcome at t1 and t2, Benefits 
 
 
 On balance, then, this analysis makes clear that the labor market position of the legal 
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opportunity to play catch-up, as they are able to transition out of jobs at the bottom end of the 
labor market and into jobs that pay higher wages, provide more benefits, and have more educated 
workforces.  
Limitations  
There are several limitations to this analysis. While the multiple comparison groups 
method allows researchers to eliminate exogenous explanations for why the treatment group 
experiences changes over time, it does not reduce the likelihood that there are endogenous 
characteristics that partially account for these results. Even though the demographics of the NIS 
transitioner group resemble immigrant samples from the SIPP, it is possible that the unmeasured 
effects related to extended social, family, and employer networks contribute to the findings. 
Furthermore, small NIS sample sizes require that I analyze immigrants from Latin America 
collectively, rather than disaggregate by national origin.  The latter, especially for the Mexican 
case, would be preferred but unfortunately the data do not support this type of analysis. 
Another limitation is that data for a true experimental design to examine this topic are not 
possible. As Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) note, the most accurate and efficient way to 
examine the effect of legalization on labor market outcomes would be to randomly assign legal 
status to unauthorized U.S. immigrants. Although such data are not feasible, my dissertation’s 
innovative inclusion of multiple comparison groups by legal status is a major advancement in the 
study of legalization and labor market outcomes.  
Contributions of the Dissertation 
 One primary innovation of this dissertation is its methodological approach. Generally, 
previous research on legalization is divided into two methodological approaches: 1) studies that 
use the Legalized Population Survey and a U.S.-born Latino comparison sample (Kossoudji and 
Cobb-Clark 2002; Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak 2011); and 2) studies that use nationally 
representative data with no legal status indicators to estimate the effects of legalization on 
immigrants likely to be the target population for legalization (Pan 2012; Orrenius et al. 2012).  
Both approaches have their limitations.  The second approach does not allow researchers to 
observe legal status, whereas the first method is limited in its comparison of the outcomes of 
legalized immigrants to U.S.-born respondents, who face none of the barriers associated with 
legal status.   
 I take advantage of recent developments in estimating immigrants’ legal status in the 
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SIPP and produce control groups of varying legal statuses, which I then compare to the labor 
market experiences of respondents who transition from unauthorized to authorized status in the 
NIS.  My dissertation is the first study to investigate the effects of legalization using these 
comparison groups, and this approach represents a major improvement over previous analyses. 
This analysis, then, is uniquely positioned to estimate the effects of legalization relative to an 
alternative scenario where the legalized immigrants remain unauthorized.  In effect, it provides a 
direct and appropriate counterfactual scenario compared to prior studies that only rely on 
comparison groups of U.S.-born workers.  
 This research also makes an important contribution by bringing legalization into a social 
stratification lens. Sociological scholarship has been slow to integrate the study of migration and 
stratification, even as legal status has emerged as a nexus of inequality among immigrants 
(Massey 2007). In this dissertation I explore how contemporary U.S. immigration is distinctly 
interconnected with processes of stratification through legal status, placing a mechanism of 
mobility that is only associated with immigrants (legalization) into the broader literature about 
cumulative advantage. The results here illustrate that immigration scholars can no longer ignore 
the role of traditional stratification mechanisms in the lives of immigrants, and that stratification 
scholars must take into account the crucial role of legal status when considering the social and 
economic outcomes of foreign-born population. As a result, this dissertation provides an example 
of the important contributions that can be made by integrating the study of migration and 
stratification. 
 Relatedly, much of this dissertation focuses on the structural characteristics of the 
occupations held by respondents over time, a perspective informed by the stratification literature.  
Migration scholarship about labor market disparities between unauthorized and legal immigrants 
is dominated by analyses of hourly wages, even as stratification researchers have documented the 
crucial role of occupations in determining class position (Weeden and Grusky 2005; Mouw and 
Kalleberg 2010). In particular, this focus highlights how legalization improves the structural 
labor market position of immigrants in ways that may be missed if researchers only examined 
hourly wages.  As Weeden and Grusky (2012:145) note, the inherently social nature of 
occupations mean that they also represent an “omnibus measure of life conditions.”  
Lastly, these findings have direct policy implications. Past attempts at immigration 
reform have brought to the surface the complex political, demographic, and economic forces that 
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powerfully shape the debate about unauthorized immigration (Tichenor 2002). Western 
democracies are inclined towards expansive immigration policies (Massey 1999), but as the 
number of undocumented immigrants has grown, the United States has responded by enhancing 
its immigration enforcement mechanisms (Massey et al. 2003).   The consequence of that 
increased enforcement, however, is a compromised incorporation process for many immigrants 
and a decline in the quality of life for the foreign-born (Massey 2007).  
  For instance, Rodriguez and Hagan (2004) document the pervasive fear and anxiety 
surrounding deportation felt by immigrant families following the passage of the 1996 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, where a routine traffic stop can now end 
in deportation; in the cases that those fears are realized, deportation can cause dramatic family 
trauma when social ties are disrupted (Hagan, Castro, and Rodriguez 2009).  Deeb-Sossa and 
Mendez (2008) detail how the enhanced salience of legal status means that even clinics and 
nurses offices often ask for social security numbers, making it difficult for undocumented 
families to seek medical care; at the same time, Hagan, Capps, and Kabiri (2003) show how the 
fear of deportation keeps immigrants from claiming benefits like medical care for which they are 
eligible. Researchers have also examined the unique challenges that unauthorized children and 
youth face throughout childhood and in the transition to adulthood (Gonzales 2011; Dreby 2012).    
Further, the presence of a large population of unauthorized immigrants has perpetuated 
stereotypes of Latinos as foreign-born and unauthorized, which has deepened the social 
exclusion experienced by this population (Telles and Ortiz 2009).  Jiménez (2008) documents 
how attributes such as ethnicity, skin color, and Spanish surname emerged as cues for nativity 
and legal status in immigrant receiving communities in Kansas and California. Moreover, Pérez 
(2010) shows that implicit biases towards Latino immigrants are powerful predictors of 
opposition to both legal and unauthorized immigration, suggesting that negative attitudes 
towards Latino immigrants, fueled by the contemporary immigration system, are also responsible 
for perpetuating the current system.   Thus, it is imperative that the federal government pass an 
immigration reform bill that systematically addresses unauthorized immigration and provides the 
country with a clear sense of the role that immigration will play in the future of the United 
States.  
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Implications for Policy 
A defining characteristic of the contemporary immigration period is the prominent role of 
unauthorized immigration. Although the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 was 
designed and implemented with the idea of halting unauthorized immigration, the decades after 
IRCA saw precipitous growth in the unauthorized immigrant population in the United States. 
Estimates indicate that there were around two million unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. in 
1980 (Warren and Passel 1987), but by 2010 that number had swelled nearly 12 million (Hoefer 
et al. 2011).  
With this growth, unauthorized immigrants and their families have become intertwined 
with the nation’s social and economic fabric (Passel and Cohn 2009). There are 8.3 million 
unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. labor force, comprising 5.4 percent of the country’s 
workforce. No longer living only traditional immigrant states like California or Texas, 
substantial numbers of unauthorized immigrants now live in new-destination states like Georgia, 
North Carolina, and Virginia. Further, unauthorized immigrants have settled in the U.S. in great 
numbers, as nearly half of unauthorized immigrant households consist of a couple with children, 
and 73 percent of the children of unauthorized immigrants are U.S.-born citizens. As a result, 
there are now 4 million natural-born, U.S. citizen children with unauthorized immigrant parents, 
and the children of unauthorized immigrants overall comprise nearly 7 percent of all 
schoolchildren (Passel and Cohn 2009).  Thus, the unauthorized immigrant population is 
increasingly tied to life in the United States.  
However, the disadvantage of unauthorized status reduces the socioeconomic 
opportunities for immigrants (Massey 2011). Unauthorized immigrants experience many barriers 
to mobility in the labor market, and these labor market struggles are reflected in the economic 
profile of unauthorized immigrants. According to an analysis by the Pew Research Center 
(Passel and Cohn 2009), the median household income of unauthorized immigrants is $36,000, 
well short of the median household income for the U.S.-born and for legal immigrants. Further, 
21 percent of unauthorized immigrants are below the poverty level, relative to 13 and 10 percent 
of legal immigrants and the U.S. born, respectively. The risk of poverty for the children of 
unauthorized immigrants is even sharper, as a third of all children of unauthorized immigrants 
(U.S.-born and foreign-born) are below the poverty line. Therefore, the disadvantage of 
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unauthorized status is not limited to the immigrants themselves, but also has concrete 
consequences for the children of unauthorized immigrants.  
The Obama administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, 
which provides access to deportation relief and work authorization for young unauthorized 
immigrants, has provided temporary legal status to over 400,000 immigrants since the program 
began in August of 2012, with another 130,000 applications awaiting processing (Singer and 
Svajlenka 2013). To qualify for DACA, applicants must have arrived in the U.S. prior to age 16 
and lived continuously in the U.S. since 2007, be between the ages of 15-31, have earned a high 
school diploma or GED or be enrolled in school, and not have been convicted of a felony or 
serious misdemeanor. According to an estimate by researchers at the Migration Policy Institute 
(Batalova et al. 2013), there are roughly one million immigrants presently residing in the U.S. 
that meet the DACA application criteria, meaning that half a million DACA-eligible youths have 
yet apply for the program (Batalova et al. 2013). Given the demographics of the unauthorized 
population overall, it is no surprise that the DACA applicant pool is largely from Latin America. 
A report by the Brookings Institute (Singer and Svajlenka 2013) finds that 75 percent of the 
applicants are from Mexico, with Central America, South America, and the Caribbean 
comprising another 18 percent. Further, media reports indicate that temporary legal status has 
allowed some of these immigrants to move from the informal to the formal economy (Semple 
2013).  
The deferred action program described above, however, only applies to a fraction of the 
11 to 12 million unauthorized immigrants presently in the U.S. As the U.S. House of 
Representatives considers a comprehensive immigration reform bill (already passed by the U.S. 
Senate in 2013) that provides a path to citizenship for the unauthorized population, this research 
finds that legalization is a tool with which lawmakers can reduce the economic insecurity 
experienced by many unauthorized immigrants and their families.  
However, even under the unlikely scenario that the comprehensive immigration reform 
bill passed by the Senate is adopted by the House of Representatives and signed into law by 
President Obama, the issue of unauthorized status – and the disadvantage associated with the 
status – will persist. First, initial estimates indicate that unauthorized immigrant inflows, which 
slowed to zero during the Great Recession, are increasing once more (Passel et al. 2013); if 
unauthorized immigration returns to pre-recession levels, then the unauthorized immigrant 
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population will persist even if most inclusive of the proposed reforms are passed. Moreover, the 
Social Security Administration (2013) estimates that, of the existing 11-12 million unauthorized 
immigrants presently in the U.S., up to 30 percent of that population would not qualify for legal 
status through the bill passed by the Senate; this is mostly as a result of the requirements for legal 
status, which include having resided in the U.S. since 2012, paying a $500 fine, paying back 
taxes, and passing a criminal background check. Lastly, the Congressional Budget Office (2013) 
estimates that, even with massive increases in immigration enforcement included in the bill, the 
legislation passed by the Senate would only reduce the net inflow of unauthorized by a third to a 
half over the next ten years. Thus, it is clear that unauthorized immigration will remain as a 
policy issue for the foreseeable future, and is an issue deserving of the continued attention of 
both migration and stratification researchers.  
Policy Recommendation #1: Path to Legal Status 
 The key to the success of any comprehensive immigration reform bill is to first address 
the issue of undocumented immigration. In policy context where local, state, and federal budgets 
are stretched thin and funding for social programs is limited, the legalization of unauthorized 
immigrants represents a way to combat the economic insecurity experienced by many immigrant 
families without expanding the role of government. The findings from this dissertation suggest 
that wide-scale legalization could help to provide ladders of opportunity out of poverty for 
immigrant families. Although the unauthorized population is largely low-skilled (Passel and 
Cohn 2009), the gains experienced by the immigrants that gained legal status in this analysis 
suggests that unauthorized status does constrain the earning power of immigrants with low levels 
of education.  
Thus, by providing a route to legal status for unauthorized immigrants, policy makers can not 
only place the United States on a path towards a more effective and responsive immigration 
system, but also take steps toward expanding the economic opportunities available to immigrant 
workers. Legalization is not a panacea, as these workers will still face barriers in the form of low 
levels of education, but this research provides evidence that significant economic gains could be 
made by unauthorized immigrants and their families if given the opportunity to transition from 
unauthorized to legal status. Legalization of a vast majority of the current unauthorized 
immigrant population (especially minors and those brought to the U.S. as children) is critical if 
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the measures in this legislation are to have significant long term effects in managing immigration 
flows.  
Policy Recommendation #2: Expand Visa Access  
Once the existing unauthorized population is regularized, it is also important to take steps 
to ensure that it does not increase once more as it did following IRCA. The rapid growth of the 
unauthorized population in the 1990s and 2000s – even after the amnesty provisions of IRCA 
and the increased enforcement measures throughout those two decades – indicates that the 
demand for labor, particularly the kinds of labor carried out by unauthorized workers, far 
outweighs visa availability (Massey et al. 2003). This is particularly true in the case of 
unauthorized Latin American workers, who make up a majority of the unauthorized population. 
At this point, so few visas are allocated to Mexico and other major sending countries from Latin 
America that the only migration choice available to many is to make an unauthorized trip 
(Massey and Riosmena 2010). Moreover, given the long history of circular migration between 
Mexico and the U.S. that has been interrupted by border enforcement efforts, there is reason to 
believe that many undocumented workers would accept temporary visas that allow them to work 
in the U.S. but return to their country of origin after a period of time.  
In order to move the United States towards an immigration system that facilitates legal 
immigration and limits the flow of unauthorized migrants, it is clear that systematic changes are 
needed. Given the vital importance of immigrant labor in the U.S. labor market, a primary 
concern of U.S. immigration policy should be to ensure that employers have access to immigrant 
workers with varying levels of skill and human capital; this includes both low and high-skill 
workers, both of which are crucial for the United States to maintain its economic 
competitiveness in the global marketplace. Thus, immigration policy should efficiently allow for 
the entrance of foreign-born workers into the U.S. labor market.  
 However, international migration is not solely a product of economic forces, as research 
on social networks and macro economic forces indicates (Massey et al. 1987; Sassen 1988). 
Further, immigration to the United States from Latin America (and Mexico, in particular) is 
rooted in deep historical processes that have been present for hundreds of years (Wilson 2010), 
and the United States’ government and employers have played an active role in soliciting 
immigrant labor, such as in the case of the Bracero program (Gonzalez 2006; Massey et al. 
1987). U.S. immigration policy must also reflect the global and historical reality that migration 
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flows and ties are here to stay, and that the U.S. has the responsibility to account for its role in 
the creation and maintenance of these flows. For instance, the estimated 5.5 million children in 
the U.S. (73 percent of which are U.S.-born) with at least one unauthorized immigrant parent 
demonstrate the deep ties between the United States and the unauthorized immigrant population 
(Passel and Cohn 2009). By acknowledging its role in producing and maintaining that 
population, the United States can works towards adopting a more positive tone about 
unauthorized immigration and seek out more constructive paths to reduce the inequality that 
unauthorized status creates.  
To accomplish this, immigration reform legislation should include dramatic increases in 
the number of legal avenues for migration. Similarly to Massey et al. (2003), I advocate for a 
temporary visa system, where workers can apply directly to the U.S. for a temporary, two-year 
visa that is not tied to any specific employer. This visa is renewable up to two times, and if the 
immigrant has demonstrated a record of employment and passes a background check, they can 
apply for legal permanent residency at the end of the final temporary period. Also following 
Massey et al., I suggest that Mexico and Central America’s allotment of legal permanent 
residency visas be increased to match the rates of other countries in the region in an attempt to 
relieve the pressure to migrate without authorization that the present dearth of visas creates. The 
same should be done for other countries that send large amounts of undocumented workers to the 
U.S. Thus, by implementing a large-scale legalization program and increasing the availability of 
visas to migrant-sending countries, the U.S. can begin to reduce the unauthorized population and 
move the country forward into a new era of immigration.  
Conclusion 
This research demonstrates the kinds of theoretical and empirical insights that are gained 
when integrating the study of international migration and social stratification. Researchers in 
these two fields will grow increasingly interdependent: the future demographic, social, and 
economic fabric of the United States will be woven in large part by immigrants and their 
offspring, and as a result the study of migration and stratification will continue to overlap in a 
variety of sociologically important ways. Future research should look for ways to exploit the 
synergy between these two fields, exploring how theoretical constructs from stratification can 
inform empirical investigations focused on migration and vice versa. In an era when the 
boundaries of socioeconomic status are growing increasingly more rigid, sociological research 
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on the social, economic, and health outcomes of immigrants grows increasingly important as a 
way to understand the nature of social stratification in the United States.  
Bringing the insights of the social stratification literature to bear on the labor market 
experiences of contemporary immigrants, this dissertation provides insight into the far-reaching 
implications of the transition from unauthorized to legal status for the labor market outcomes of 
immigrants. While social science research has identified many factors that shape inequality, the 
bifurcation of the immigrant population by legal status is unique in that it applies only to a small 
subset of the population but has such dramatic and persistent consequences for those who are 
outside the legal immigration system. In this way, the authorized/unauthorized dichotomy is a 
prime example of the kind of structural divide that produces “durable inequality” (Tilly 1998:6). 
For Latin American immigrants, the barriers to economic advancement that are facilitated and 
perpetuated by the failures of the contemporary immigration system have steep costs, and, if left 
untouched, it is highly conceivable that a considerable number of Latin American immigrants 
will join the ranks of “new urban underclass,” (Massey 2007:157).  
However, the analysis presented here suggests that there is another pathway for the 
United States and its immigrant population. Unauthorized immigrants are not forever scarred by 
their experience with illegality, but can “catch-up” with the continuously legal when given the 
opportunity through the turning point of legalization. Going forward, the U.S. should take 
concrete policy steps to reduce stratification in the immigrant population by creating and 
maintaining avenues for legal migration.  
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APPENDIX 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico -0.06 0.080 -0.090 0.070 -0.01 0.050
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.08 0.100 0.020 0.100 0.04 0.070
Demographics
Age 0.01 0.020 0.000 0.020 0.02 0.010
Age-Squared -0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.00 0.000
Married (ref=not) 0.10 0.090 0.060 0.070 0.13* 0.050
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.09 0.070 -0.070 0.060 -0.09+ 0.050
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.02** 0.010 0.02** 0.010 0.02** 0.010
No English (ref=other) -0.02 0.110 -0.20* 0.090 -0.15* 0.070
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.010 -0.05** 0.010 -0.02** 0.010
Industry (ref=other)
Agriculture 0.07 0.160 -0.020 0.200 -0.06 0.130
Construction 0.04 0.080 0.16* 0.070 0.07 0.060
Service Sector 0.06 0.070 -0.26** 0.070 -0.15** 0.050
Constant 5.48 26.410 96.21** 24.160 50.94** 18.360
N 132 194 326
Adjusted R-Squared 0.06 0.24 0.16
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 3.A: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Hourly Wages, Legal 
Status Transitioners (Men)
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico -0.10 0.110 -0.14* 0.060 -0.10+ 0.060
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.11 0.130 -0.18* 0.080 -0.12 0.080
Demographics
Age -0.01 0.020 0.000 0.020 0.01 0.010
Age-Squared 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.00 0.000
Married (ref=not) 0.02 0.100 -0.060 0.050 0.01 0.050
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.08 0.100 -0.080 0.060 -0.07 0.050
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.01 0.010 0.03** 0.010 0.02** 0.010
No English (ref=other) 0.01 0.140 -0.110 0.080 -0.07 0.070
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.020 -0.04** 0.010 -0.02* 0.010
Industry (ref=other)
Agriculture -0.15 0.240 0.230 0.150 0.05 0.140
Service Sector -0.14 0.090 -0.05 0.050 -0.11* 0.050
Constant 8.22 35.620 77.35** 20.730 46.45* 19.240
N 135 189 324
Adjusted R-Squared 0.01 0.25 0.11
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 3.B: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Hourly Wages, Legal 
Status Transitioners (Women)
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico 0.28+ 0.140 0.18+ 0.100 0.23** 0.080
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.11 0.200 -0.040 0.130 0.02 0.110
Demographics
Age 0.04+ 0.030 0.020 0.020 0.04* 0.010
Age-Squared -0.00+ 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.00* 0.000
Married (ref=not) 0.22+ 0.120 0.090 0.080 0.15* 0.060
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.02 0.100 -0.090 0.080 -0.02 0.060
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.02+ 0.010 0.03** 0.010 0.02** 0.010
No English (ref=other) 0.00 0.120 -0.070 0.080 -0.04 0.070
Entry into US Labor Market -0.06* 0.020 -0.10** 0.020 -0.08** 0.010
Industry (ref=other)
Agriculture -0.63* 0.250 -0.300 0.250 -0.50** 0.170
Construction -0.10 0.150 0.16+ 0.090 0.08 0.080
Service Sector -0.24* 0.120 -0.18* 0.080 -0.19** 0.060
Constant 121.17* 49.210 191.83** 31.240 164.64** 26.500
N 131 182 313
Adjusted R-Squared 0.26 0.42 0.36
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 3.C: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Hourly Wages, NIS 
Continuously Legal (Men)
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico 0.20 0.130 0.23* 0.100 0.22** 0.080
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.15 0.180 -0.050 0.140 0.03 0.110
Demographics
Age -0.04 0.030 0.000 0.020 -0.01 0.020
Age-Squared 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.000
Married (ref=not) 0.00 0.100 0.070 0.080 0.03 0.060
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.17+ 0.100 -0.090 0.080 -0.12* 0.060
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.03* 0.010 0.03** 0.010 0.03** 0.010
No English (ref=other) -0.18 0.110 -0.060 0.090 -0.12+ 0.070
Entry into US Labor Market -0.05* 0.030 -0.06** 0.020 -0.06** 0.020
Industry (ref=other)
Agriculture -0.140 0.380 -0.09 0.370
Service Sector 0.02 0.090 -0.06 0.080 -0.02 0.060
Constant 103.50* 50.740 126.71** 39.470 117.49** 30.510
N 72 123 195
Adjusted R-Squared 0.28 0.24 0.27
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 3.D: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Hourly Wages, NIS 
Continuously Legal (Women)
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico 0.12 0.07 0.010 0.06 0.08 0.05
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.07 0.11 -0.040 0.10 0.02 0.07
Demographics
Age 0.02 0.02 0.030 0.02 0.02+ 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.12* 0.06 0.09+ 0.05 0.11** 0.04
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.14* 0.06 -0.08+ 0.05 -0.11** 0.04
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.07 0.06 0.010 0.06 -0.03 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01* 0.00 -0.010 0.00 -0.01* 0.00
Industry (ref=other)
Agriculture -0.02 0.08 -0.100 0.07 -0.06 0.05
Construction 0.16** 0.06 0.010 0.05 0.09* 0.04
Service Sector 0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.07 0.02 0.05
Constant 26.22** 9.74 12.07 8.99 17.73** 6.58
N 321 312 633
Adjusted R-Squared 0.08 0.04 0.08
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 3.E OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Hourly Wages, 
Continuously Unauthorized (Men)
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
 
 
 
  142 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico 0.02 0.11 -0.19* 0.10 -0.09 0.07
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.12 0.20 0.230 0.19 0.15 0.14
Demographics
Age 0.02 0.03 -0.010 0.03 0.01 0.02
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.01 0.09 0.000 0.08 -0.00 0.06
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.04 0.12 0.020 0.10 -0.01 0.08
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.03* 0.01 0.05** 0.01 0.04** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.22+ 0.12 -0.25* 0.10 -0.23** 0.08
Entry into US Labor Market -0.02+ 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.01* 0.01
Industry (ref=other)
Agriculture -0.04 0.36 -0.100 0.26 -0.07 0.21
Construction 0.80** 0.29 0.82** 0.26 0.83** 0.19
Service Sector 0.10 0.10 -0.01 0.09 0.03 0.06
Constant 31.81+ 17.79 25.58 15.720 25.84* 11.67
N 128 126 254
Adjusted R-Squared 0.08 0.25 0.18
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 3.F OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Hourly Wages, 
Continuously Unauthorized (Women)
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico 0.00 0.04 -0.010 0.04 -0.00 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.03 0.07 -0.060 0.06 -0.01 0.05
Demographics
Age 0.02 0.01 0.04** 0.01 0.03** 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.07+ 0.04 0.040 0.04 0.05* 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.00 0.04 0.010 0.03 0.01 0.03
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.03** 0.01 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.01 0.06 -0.060 0.05 -0.04 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market -0.02** 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 -0.01** 0.00
Industry (ref=other)
Agriculture -0.16* 0.06 -0.17** 0.06 -0.16** 0.04
Construction 0.12** 0.04 0.07+ 0.04 0.10** 0.03
Service Sector -0.13* 0.05 -0.11* 0.05 -0.12** 0.03
Constant 34.46** 5.46 24.55** 5.04 29.07** 3.68
N 1,034 1,046 2,080
Adjusted R-Squared 0.14 0.15 0.15
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 3.G: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Hourly Wages, SIPP 
Continuously Legal (Men)
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico -0.06 0.04 -0.09* 0.04 -0.07* 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.03 0.06 -0.110 0.07 -0.07 0.05
Demographics
Age 0.00 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.10** 0.04 0.060 0.04 0.08** 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.04 0.04 -0.010 0.04 -0.03 0.03
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.03** 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.03** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.09+ 0.06 -0.040 0.06 -0.07 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01** 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 -0.01** 0.00
Industry (ref=other)
Agriculture -0.13 0.09 -0.25* 0.12 -0.18* 0.07
Construction 0.28+ 0.15 0.210 0.20 0.25* 0.12
Service Sector -0.06 0.04 -0.12** 0.05 -0.09** 0.03
Constant 27.86** 5.39 28.75** 5.870 27.09** 3.95
N 752 744 1,496
Adjusted R-Squared 0.14 0.11 0.13
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 3.H: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Hourly Wages, SIPP 
Continuously Legal (Women)
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Hispanic Origin (ref=other)
Mexico -0.03 0.03 0.010 0.03 -0.01 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.04 0.07 -0.020 0.08 0.01 0.05
Demographics
Age 0.05** 0.01 0.05** 0.01 0.05** 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.07* 0.03 0.07* 0.03 0.07** 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.02 0.03 0.040 0.03 0.03 0.02
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.06** 0.01 0.07** 0.01 0.07** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.06 0.09 0.060 0.09 0.00 0.06
Entry into Labor Market -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Industry (ref=other)
Agriculture -0.10 0.08 0.000 0.09 -0.05 0.06
Construction 0.20** 0.05 0.13** 0.05 0.16** 0.03
Service Sector -0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.03
Constant 8.31 9.19 9.16 9.58 7.73 6.23
N 1,017 1,013 2,030
Adjusted R-Squared 0.27 0.21 0.24
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 3.I: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Hourly Wages, U.S.-born 
Latinos (Men)
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Hispanic Origin (ref=other)
Mexico 0.04 0.03 0.040 0.04 0.04 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.05 0.09 0.070 0.09 0.06 0.06
Demographics
Age 0.03** 0.01 0.04** 0.01 0.04** 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.05 0.04 0.07+ 0.04 0.06* 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.01 0.04 0.010 0.04 -0.00 0.03
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.08** 0.01 0.09** 0.01 0.08** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.07 0.10 -0.110 0.10 -0.09 0.07
Entry into Labor Market -0.01+ 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.01* 0.00
Industry (ref=other)
Agriculture -0.48** 0.17 -0.44* 0.18 -0.46** 0.12
Construction 0.09 0.15 0.060 0.14 0.08 0.10
Service Sector 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04
Constant 14.00* 7.10 9.88 7.370 10.50* 4.97
N 972 968 1,940
Adjusted R-Squared 0.19 0.18 0.19
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 3.J: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Hourly Wages, U.S.-born 
Latinos (Women)
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico -0.09 0.06 -0.040 0.05 -0.05 0.04
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.00 0.08 0.020 0.07 0.03 0.05
Demographics
Age 0.03* 0.02 -0.010 0.02 0.02* 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00* 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00* 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.01 0.06 0.11* 0.05 0.08* 0.04
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.04 0.06 -0.050 0.05 -0.01 0.04
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.02** 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.02** 0.00
No English (ref=other) 0.09 0.08 0.030 0.07 0.05 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market 0.02 0.01 -0.010 0.01 0.00 0.01
Constant -30.34 20.84 30.30+ 17.79 1.03 13.47
N 243 248 491
Adjusted R-Squared 0.11 0.11 0.11
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 4.A: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Occupational-Wage Index, 
Legal Status Transitioners, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
  
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico 0.02 0.070 -0.11+ 0.060 -0.02 0.050
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.02 0.100 -0.16+ 0.080 -0.03 0.070
Demographics
Age -0.02 0.020 -0.04* 0.020 -0.02 0.010
Age-Squared 0.00 0.000 0.00* 0.000 0.00 0.000
Married (ref=not) 0.09 0.070 0.010 0.050 0.08+ 0.040
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.04 0.070 -0.010 0.050 0.02 0.040
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.01 0.010 0.03** 0.010 0.02** 0.010
No English (ref=other) -0.13 0.090 0.020 0.080 -0.07 0.060
Entry into US Labor Market 0.04** 0.010 -0.010 0.010 0.01+ 0.010
Constant -83.58** 24.860 26.41 20.020 -26.90+ 16.090
N 229 234 463
Adjusted R-Squared 0.07 0.14 0.08
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 4.B: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Occupational-Wage Index, 
Legal Status Transitioners, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico 0.15 0.10 0.100 0.08 0.13* 0.06
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.00 0.12 -0.20+ 0.11 -0.11 0.08
Demographics
Age 0.04* 0.02 0.010 0.02 0.02* 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00* 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.02 0.07 -0.050 0.06 -0.03 0.05
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.04 0.07 -0.060 0.07 -0.01 0.05
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.02** 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.02** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.07 0.08 -0.15* 0.07 -0.11* 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market -0.04* 0.01 -0.06** 0.01 -0.05** 0.01
Constant 74.46* 29.31 116.65** 26.22 95.76** 19.44
N 194 216 410
Adjusted R-Squared 0.14 0.21 0.17
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 4.C: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Occupational-Wage Index, 
NIS Continuously Legal, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico -0.04 0.09 0.050 0.07 0.01 0.05
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.01 0.12 -0.020 0.11 0.00 0.08
Demographics
Age 0.00 0.02 0.000 0.02 0.00 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.04 0.07 0.020 0.06 0.03 0.04
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.03 0.06 -0.12* 0.06 -0.08+ 0.04
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.01** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.04 0.07 -0.060 0.07 -0.05 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market -0.02 0.02 -0.010 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Constant 33.35 34.66 28.58 28.90 31.82 21.80
N 132 143 275
Adjusted R-Squared 0.02 0.10 0.09
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 4.D: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Occupational-Wage Index, 
NIS Continuously Legal, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico 0.02 0.05 -0.030 0.08 -0.00 0.04
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.08 0.07 0.050 0.11 0.07 0.06
Demographics
Age 0.01 0.01 0.04+ 0.02 0.02+ 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.07* 0.04 0.020 0.06 0.05+ 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.02 0.04 0.080 0.05 0.03 0.03
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.02** 0.00 0.03** 0.01 0.02** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.06 0.04 -0.16* 0.07 -0.10** 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market 0.00 0.00 0.010 0.01 0.00 0.00
Constant 1.05 6.38 -14.06 10.94 -4.80 5.76
N 329 243 572
Adjusted R-Squared 0.04 0.08 0.07
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 4.E: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Occupational-Wage Index, 
Continuously Unauthorized (Men)
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico 0.03 0.07 -0.110 0.07 -0.04 0.05
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.06 0.13 -0.040 0.14 0.01 0.10
Demographics
Age -0.01 0.02 0.010 0.02 -0.00 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.01 0.06 -0.040 0.06 -0.02 0.04
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.00 0.08 -0.110 0.07 -0.05 0.05
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.03** 0.01 0.04** 0.01 0.03** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.19* 0.08 -0.18* 0.07 -0.19** 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.01 0.00
Constant 18.22 12.30 11.61 11.240 14.36+ 8.30
N 133 100 233
Adjusted R-Squared 0.10 0.27 0.18
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 4.F: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Occupational-Wage Index, 
Continuously Unauthorized (Women)
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico -0.07* 0.03 -0.06+ 0.03 -0.06** 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.09+ 0.05 -0.13* 0.05 -0.10** 0.04
Demographics
Age 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.02** 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00 -0.00* 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.03 0.03 0.010 0.03 0.02 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.02 0.03 0.000 0.03 0.01 0.02
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.11* 0.04 -0.010 0.04 -0.06* 0.03
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01** 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Constant 15.08** 3.99 9.23* 4.11 11.59** 2.84
N 1,048 884 1,932
Adjusted R-Squared 0.12 0.14 0.13
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 4.G: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Occupational-Wage Index, 
SIPP Continuously Legal (Men)
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
National Origin (ref=other)
Mexico -0.08** 0.03 -0.09** 0.03 -0.08** 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.10* 0.05 -0.080 0.05 -0.09* 0.03
Demographics
Age -0.00 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.03 0.03 0.000 0.03 0.02 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.04 0.03 0.000 0.03 0.02 0.02
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.04** 0.00 0.03** 0.00 0.04** 0.00
No English (ref=other) 0.02 0.04 -0.070 0.05 -0.02 0.03
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01** 0.00 -0.01* 0.00 -0.01** 0.00
Constant 18.07** 4.01 12.29** 4.23 14.10** 2.89
N 760 629 1,389
Adjusted R-Squared 0.20 0.18 0.19
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 4.H: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Occupational-Wage Index, 
SIPP Continuously Legal (Women)
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Hispanic Origin (ref=other)
Mexico -0.05+ 0.03 -0.010 0.03 -0.03 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.14* 0.07 -0.16* 0.07 -0.15** 0.05
Demographics
Age 0.02** 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.02** 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00* 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00* 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.03 0.03 0.09** 0.03 0.06* 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.00 0.03 -0.030 0.03 -0.01 0.02
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.06** 0.01 0.07** 0.01 0.06** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.03 0.08 -0.040 0.09 -0.04 0.06
Entry into Labor Market -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant 4.83 8.32 4.10 9.40 2.23 5.79
N 1,020 868 1,888
Adjusted R-Squared 0.17 0.16 0.17
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 4.6 OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Occupational-Wage Index, 
U.S.-Born Latinos (Men)
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Hispanic Origin (ref=other)
Mexico 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.07 0.06 -0.05 0.07 -0.06 0.05
Demographics
Age 0.03** 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.02** 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02
Human Capital
Years of Education 0.06** 0.01 0.06** 0.01 0.06** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.13+ 0.07 -0.08 0.07 -0.11* 0.05
Entry into Labor Market -0.00 0.00 -0.01* 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant 3.08 5.10 12.58* 5.37 5.23 3.59
N 983 835 1,818
Adjusted R-Squared 0.19 0.18 0.19
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Table 4.J OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Occupational-Wage Index, 
U.S.-Born Latinos (Women)
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.18+ 0.09 -0.040 0.08 -0.08 0.06
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.02 0.14 0.000 0.12 0.03 0.09
Age -0.01 0.02 -0.06* 0.02 -0.02 0.02
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.15 0.15 -0.140 0.21 -0.20 0.12
Married (ref=not) -0.02 0.10 0.070 0.08 0.06 0.06
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.13 0.09 -0.110 0.08 -0.12* 0.06
Years of Education 0.05** 0.01 0.06** 0.01 0.05** 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.00 0.01 0.010 0.02 0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.27* 0.13 -0.050 0.11 -0.18* 0.08
Entry into US Labor Market 0.05** 0.02 -0.03* 0.01 0.01 0.01
Constant -95.25** 33.95 66.19* 28.54 -15.14 21.75
N 467 479 946
Adjusted R-Squared 0.10 0.11 0.1
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.A1: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Pension Benefit 
Composition, Legal Status Transitioner (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.27* 0.13 -0.030 0.12 -0.13 0.09
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.07 0.19 -0.010 0.17 -0.01 0.12
Age 0.03 0.04 -0.020 0.04 0.03 0.02
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.05 0.15 0.100 0.12 0.12 0.09
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.01 0.13 -0.090 0.11 -0.05 0.08
Years of Education 0.03* 0.01 0.05** 0.01 0.04** 0.01
No English (ref=other) 0.16 0.18 -0.050 0.16 0.04 0.12
Entry into US Labor Market 0.03 0.02 -0.020 0.02 0.01 0.02
Constant -66.04 47.80 39.11 42.97 -17.44 31.36
N 244 248 492
Adjusted R-Squared 0.05 0.05 0.05
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.A2: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Pension Benefit 
Composition, Legal Status Transitioner, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.05 0.13 -0.040 0.11 0.02 0.09
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.15 0.19 0.040 0.16 0.14 0.13
Age -0.06* 0.03 -0.09** 0.03 -0.06** 0.02
Age-Squared 0.00* 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.01 0.13 0.040 0.10 0.04 0.08
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.32* 0.13 -0.140 0.11 -0.22** 0.08
Years of Education 0.06** 0.01 0.06** 0.01 0.06** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.69** 0.17 -0.030 0.15 -0.38** 0.11
Entry into US Labor Market 0.04+ 0.02 -0.05* 0.02 -0.00 0.02
Constant -81.48+ 46.62 90.33* 39.27 4.78 30.22
N 229 231 460
Adjusted R-Squared 0.23 0.14 0.18
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.A3: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Pension Benefit 
Composition, Legal Status Transitioner, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.07 0.15 0.110 0.12 0.10 0.10
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.17 0.21 0.080 0.18 0.14 0.14
Age 0.03 0.03 0.020 0.03 0.03 0.02
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.07 0.27 -0.260 0.27 -0.16 0.19
Married (ref=not) 0.14 0.11 0.040 0.10 0.10 0.07
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.21* 0.11 -0.27** 0.10 -0.22** 0.07
Years of Education 0.03+ 0.02 0.020 0.01 0.02* 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.01 0.02 0.010 0.02 0.00 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.11 0.13 -0.100 0.11 -0.10 0.08
Entry into US Labor Market -0.02 0.02 -0.05* 0.02 -0.03+ 0.02
Constant 42.92 49.21 89.40* 43.38 61.43+ 32.36
N 349 358 707
Adjusted R-Squared 0.04 0.06 0.06
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.A4: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Pension Benefit 
Composition, NIS Continuously Legal (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.21 0.20 0.140 0.19 0.18 0.14
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.07 0.27 -0.140 0.25 -0.10 0.18
Age 0.07* 0.04 0.030 0.03 0.06* 0.02
Age-Squared -0.00+ 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.28+ 0.15 0.070 0.14 0.18+ 0.10
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.16 0.14 -0.170 0.15 -0.14 0.10
Years of Education 0.01 0.02 0.010 0.02 0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.10 0.17 -0.160 0.16 -0.13 0.11
Entry into US Labor Market -0.05 0.03 -0.05+ 0.03 -0.05* 0.02
Constant 92.95 62.42 106.83+ 59.38 92.81* 42.38
N 212 216 428
Adjusted R-Squared 0.07 0.04 0.07
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.A5: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Pension Benefit 
Composition, NIS Continuously Legal, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.06 0.21 0.140 0.16 0.11 0.13
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.53+ 0.31 0.360 0.25 0.47* 0.20
Age -0.04 0.05 0.000 0.04 -0.02 0.03
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.01 0.17 0.030 0.13 0.01 0.10
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.34* 0.15 -0.36** 0.12 -0.32** 0.10
Years of Education 0.03+ 0.02 0.04* 0.01 0.03** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.11 0.19 0.000 0.15 -0.06 0.12
Entry into US Labor Market 0.04 0.04 -0.020 0.03 0.01 0.03
Constant -77.70 80.63 43.76 62.99 -18.10 50.16
N 140 142 282
Adjusted R-Squared 0.03 0.09 0.08
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.A6: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Pension Benefit 
Composition, NIS Continuously Legal, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.20 0.13 0.090 0.12 0.15+ 0.09
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.36+ 0.21 0.280 0.19 0.32* 0.14
Age 0.03 0.03 0.010 0.03 0.02 0.02
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.25 0.30 -0.64* 0.26 -0.44* 0.20
Married (ref=not) 0.05 0.10 0.000 0.09 0.02 0.07
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.26* 0.11 -0.18+ 0.10 -0.22** 0.07
Years of Education 0.03+ 0.02 0.03* 0.02 0.03** 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.04 0.03 0.06* 0.03 0.05* 0.02
No English (ref=other) -0.30* 0.12 -0.160 0.11 -0.23** 0.08
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Constant 10.03 18.98 25.07 17.69 17.00 12.87
N 462 446 908
Adjusted R-Squared 0.04 0.05 0.05
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.A7: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Predicting Log of Pension 
Benefit Composition,  Continuously Unauthorized (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.12 0.17 0.040 0.15 0.08 0.11
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.38 0.26 0.340 0.23 0.36* 0.17
Age 0.06 0.04 0.050 0.04 0.06* 0.03
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.11 0.13 -0.080 0.11 0.01 0.09
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.26* 0.13 -0.120 0.11 -0.18* 0.09
Years of Education 0.03 0.02 0.03+ 0.02 0.03* 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.19 0.15 -0.160 0.13 -0.18+ 0.10
Entry into US Labor Market 0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.01
Constant -16.88 22.99 -0.74 21.17 -9.20 15.48
N 329 317 646
Adjusted R-Squared 0.02 0.01 0.03
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.A8: OLS Regression Results Predicting Predicting Log of Pension 
Benefit Composition,  Continuously Unauthorized, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.40* 0.20 0.170 0.20 0.27+ 0.14
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.26 0.36 0.010 0.37 0.11 0.25
Age -0.02 0.05 -0.020 0.05 -0.02 0.04
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.01 0.16 0.180 0.16 0.09 0.11
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.25 0.21 -0.36+ 0.21 -0.31* 0.15
Years of Education 0.07** 0.02 0.10** 0.02 0.08** 0.02
No English (ref=other) -0.54* 0.21 -0.190 0.21 -0.36* 0.15
Entry into US Labor Market -0.04* 0.02 -0.04* 0.02 -0.04** 0.01
Constant 78.64* 32.98 76.07* 32.35 78.39** 22.73
N 133 129 262
Adjusted R-Squared 0.12 0.14 0.15
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.A9: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Pension Benefit 
Composition,  Continuously Unauthorized, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.13** 0.05 -0.17** 0.05 -0.15** 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.27** 0.08 -0.27** 0.07 -0.27** 0.05
Age 0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.38** 0.12 -0.23+ 0.12 -0.31** 0.08
Married (ref=not) 0.04 0.04 0.070 0.04 0.06+ 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.18** 0.05 -0.21** 0.04 -0.19** 0.03
Years of Education 0.05** 0.01 0.06** 0.01 0.05** 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.02* 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.02** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.13* 0.07 -0.11+ 0.06 -0.12** 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01** 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 -0.01** 0.00
Constant 17.59** 6.31 14.30* 6.15 16.32** 4.37
N 1,813 1,822 3,635
Adjusted R-Squared 0.11 0.12 0.12
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.A10: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Pension Benefit 
Composition, SIPP Continuously Legal (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.15* 0.06 -0.19** 0.06 -0.17** 0.04
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.20* 0.10 -0.24* 0.10 -0.22** 0.07
Age 0.02 0.02 0.010 0.02 0.01 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.07 0.06 0.070 0.06 0.07+ 0.04
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.20** 0.06 -0.19** 0.06 -0.19** 0.04
Years of Education 0.05** 0.01 0.06** 0.01 0.05** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.25** 0.08 -0.080 0.08 -0.16** 0.06
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01 0.00 -0.010 0.00 -0.01* 0.00
Constant 9.80 7.95 11.43 8.31 11.80* 5.70
N 1,048 1,061 2,109
Adjusted R-Squared 0.11 0.11 0.12
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.A11: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Pension Benefit 
Composition, SIPP Continuously Legal, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.09 0.08 -0.13+ 0.07 -0.11* 0.05
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.36** 0.12 -0.31** 0.11 -0.33** 0.08
Age -0.01 0.02 -0.010 0.02 -0.01 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.02 0.07 0.030 0.06 0.01 0.05
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.15* 0.08 -0.23** 0.07 -0.19** 0.05
Years of Education 0.08** 0.01 0.07** 0.01 0.07** 0.01
No English (ref=other) 0.02 0.11 -0.130 0.10 -0.05 0.07
Entry into US Labor Market -0.02** 0.01 -0.01* 0.00 -0.01** 0.00
Constant 29.01** 10.16 18.41* 9.15 22.85** 6.77
N 765 761 1,526
Adjusted R-Squared 0.12 0.14 0.13
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.A12: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Pension Benefit 
Composition, SIPP Continuously Legal, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.01 0.04 0.020 0.04 0.01 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.26** 0.09 -0.20* 0.09 -0.23** 0.06
Age 0.02* 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.02** 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00* 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.28+ 0.17 0.070 0.18 -0.11 0.12
Married (ref=not) 0.03 0.04 0.050 0.04 0.04 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.12** 0.04 -0.08* 0.04 -0.10** 0.03
Years of Education 0.07** 0.01 0.08** 0.01 0.07** 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.02 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.24* 0.10 -0.120 0.10 -0.18* 0.07
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01 0.00 -0.01* 0.00 -0.01** 0.00
Constant 7.79 8.50 19.16* 8.78 16.50** 5.90
N 1,974 1,978 3,952
Adjusted R-Squared 0.09 0.07 0.08
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.A13: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Pension Benefit 
Composition, U.S.-Born Latinos (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.13* 0.05 -0.060 0.06 -0.10* 0.04
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.12 0.12 -0.32* 0.13 -0.22* 0.09
Age 0.01 0.01 0.03+ 0.02 0.02 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.07 0.06 0.080 0.06 0.07+ 0.04
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.11* 0.05 -0.070 0.06 -0.09* 0.04
Years of Education 0.07** 0.01 0.08** 0.01 0.07** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.18 0.14 -0.100 0.15 -0.14 0.10
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.01+ 0.01
Constant 2.08 15.17 9.15 16.30 15.74 10.49
N 1,020 1,018 2,038
Adjusted R-Squared 0.09 0.08 0.08
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.A14: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Pension Benefit 
Composition, U.S.-Born Latinos, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.12* 0.05 0.10+ 0.05 0.11** 0.04
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.42** 0.13 -0.070 0.13 -0.25** 0.09
Age 0.04** 0.01 0.02+ 0.01 0.03** 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.01 0.05 -0.010 0.05 -0.01 0.04
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.12* 0.05 -0.080 0.05 -0.10* 0.04
Years of Education 0.09** 0.01 0.08** 0.01 0.09** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.35* 0.14 -0.100 0.14 -0.23* 0.10
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.01 -0.01+ 0.01 -0.01+ 0.00
Constant 3.75 10.41 17.42+ 10.20 10.02 7.11
N 985 972 1,957
Adjusted R-Squared 0.12 0.08 0.1
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.A15: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Pension Benefit 
Composition, U.S.-Born Latinos, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.14* 0.06 -0.10** 0.04 -0.08* 0.04
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.13 0.09 -0.040 0.06 -0.02 0.06
Age -0.01 0.02 -0.03** 0.01 -0.00 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) 0.11 0.10 0.120 0.10 0.06 0.08
Married (ref=not) 0.00 0.06 0.040 0.04 0.08* 0.04
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.09 0.06 -0.12** 0.04 -0.11** 0.04
Years of Education 0.02* 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.02** 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.00 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.00 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.02 0.08 0.010 0.05 -0.04 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market 0.10** 0.01 -0.02* 0.01 0.04** 0.01
Constant -196.01** 22.42 36.00* 14.18 -75.30** 13.63
N 467 479 946
Adjusted R-Squared 0.20 0.13 0.11
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.B1: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Employer Health 
Insurance Composition, Legal Status Transitioners (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.21* 0.09 -0.13* 0.05 -0.12* 0.06
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.20 0.13 -0.060 0.08 -0.06 0.08
Age -0.02 0.02 -0.020 0.02 0.01 0.02
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.08 0.10 0.070 0.05 0.15** 0.06
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.01 0.09 -0.09+ 0.05 -0.06 0.05
Years of Education 0.02 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.02** 0.01
No English (ref=other) 0.17 0.13 0.000 0.07 0.05 0.08
Entry into US Labor Market 0.10** 0.02 -0.010 0.01 0.05** 0.01
Constant -198.77** 33.35 11.89 19.49 -91.30** 20.03
N 244 248 492
Adjusted R-Squared 0.2 0.12 0.12
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.B2: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Employer Health 
Insurance Composition, Legal Status Transitioners, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.03 0.08 -0.070 0.06 -0.03 0.05
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.01 0.12 0.010 0.09 0.05 0.08
Age -0.02 0.02 -0.04** 0.02 -0.02 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.02 0.08 0.010 0.06 0.03 0.05
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.22** 0.08 -0.17** 0.06 -0.19** 0.05
Years of Education 0.01 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.02** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.22* 0.11 0.010 0.08 -0.13+ 0.07
Entry into US Labor Market 0.08** 0.01 -0.03** 0.01 0.02** 0.01
Constant -168.34** 29.79 62.16** 21.23 -49.34** 18.65
N 229 231 460
Adjusted R-Squared 0.2 0.14 0.11
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.B3: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Employer Health 
Insurance Composition, Legal Status Transitioners, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.09 0.09 0.040 0.08 0.07 0.06
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.13 0.13 -0.020 0.12 0.08 0.09
Age -0.00 0.02 -0.010 0.02 -0.00 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.01 0.18 -0.020 0.17 -0.02 0.12
Married (ref=not) -0.01 0.07 0.000 0.06 0.01 0.05
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.07 0.07 -0.19** 0.06 -0.11* 0.05
Years of Education 0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01+ 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.00 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.00 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.19* 0.08 -0.16* 0.07 -0.18** 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market 0.05** 0.02 -0.03* 0.01 0.01 0.01
Constant -96.30** 31.66 59.48* 28.20 -22.41 21.13
N 349 358 707
Adjusted R-Squared 0.03 0.06 0.03
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.B4: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Employer Health 
Insurance Composition, NIS Continuously Legal (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.05 0.12 0.010 0.11 0.04 0.08
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.12 0.15 -0.110 0.14 0.02 0.11
Age 0.00 0.02 0.000 0.02 0.01 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.05 0.08 0.100 0.08 0.09 0.06
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.02 0.08 -0.110 0.09 -0.02 0.06
Years of Education 0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.19+ 0.10 -0.16+ 0.09 -0.18** 0.07
Entry into US Labor Market 0.05** 0.02 -0.03+ 0.02 0.01 0.01
Constant -99.77** 35.56 59.71+ 34.19 -23.52 24.63
N 212 216 428
Adjusted R-Squared 0.03 0.06 0.04
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.B5: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Employer Health 
Insurance Composition, NIS Continuously Legal, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.15 0.16 0.140 0.13 0.14 0.10
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.15 0.24 0.080 0.20 0.14 0.16
Age -0.02 0.04 -0.030 0.03 -0.02 0.02
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.08 0.13 -0.120 0.10 -0.09 0.08
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.20+ 0.12 -0.29** 0.10 -0.23** 0.08
Years of Education 0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.21 0.15 -0.200 0.12 -0.20* 0.10
Entry into US Labor Market 0.05+ 0.03 -0.020 0.03 0.02 0.02
Constant -105.72+ 63.64 32.95 51.29 -40.46 40.06
N 140 142 282
Adjusted R-Squared 0.01 0.06 0.05
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.B6: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Employer Health 
Insurance Composition, NIS Continuously Legal, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.08 0.08 -0.060 0.07 0.01 0.05
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.15 0.13 -0.040 0.12 0.06 0.09
Age 0.02 0.02 -0.04* 0.02 -0.01 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) 0.10 0.18 0.020 0.17 0.06 0.12
Married (ref=not) 0.00 0.06 0.060 0.06 0.03 0.04
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.16* 0.07 -0.040 0.06 -0.10* 0.05
Years of Education 0.02+ 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.03** 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.01 0.02 0.010 0.02 0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.25** 0.07 -0.100 0.07 -0.17** 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01 0.01 -0.01* 0.01 -0.01* 0.00
Constant 12.56 11.54 24.26* 11.05 17.66* 7.96
N 462 446 908
Adjusted R-Squared 0.07 0.06 0.06
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.B7: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Employer Health 
Insurance Composition, Continuously Unauthorized (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
  163 
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.07 0.11 -0.090 0.10 -0.01 0.07
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.14 0.17 -0.060 0.15 0.03 0.11
Age 0.04+ 0.03 -0.040 0.03 0.01 0.02
Age-Squared -0.00+ 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.02 0.08 0.090 0.08 0.05 0.06
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.16+ 0.08 0.010 0.08 -0.07 0.06
Years of Education 0.02 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.03** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.18+ 0.09 -0.070 0.09 -0.12+ 0.06
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.00 0.00
Constant 3.27 14.65 15.92 14.01 8.44 10.10
N 329 317 646
Adjusted R-Squared 0.03 0.02 0.02
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.B8: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Employer Health 
Insurance Composition, Continuously Unauthorized, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.12 0.10 0.000 0.11 0.06 0.07
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.16 0.19 -0.030 0.20 0.06 0.13
Age -0.02 0.03 -0.050 0.03 -0.03+ 0.02
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00+ 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.04 0.08 0.000 0.08 -0.02 0.06
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.13 0.11 -0.20+ 0.11 -0.17* 0.08
Years of Education 0.03* 0.01 0.04** 0.01 0.04** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.37** 0.11 -0.20+ 0.11 -0.28** 0.08
Entry into US Labor Market -0.02* 0.01 -0.02* 0.01 -0.02** 0.01
Constant 34.54* 17.23 41.24* 17.28 38.26** 11.97
N 133 129 262
Adjusted R-Squared 0.12 0.13 0.15
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.B9: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Employer Health 
Insurance Composition, Continuously Unauthorized, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.08** 0.03 -0.11** 0.03 -0.10** 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.16** 0.05 -0.18** 0.04 -0.17** 0.03
Age 0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) 0.02 0.07 0.030 0.07 0.03 0.05
Married (ref=not) -0.02 0.03 0.04+ 0.02 0.01 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.12** 0.03 -0.10** 0.03 -0.11** 0.02
Years of Education 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.00 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.09* 0.04 -0.11** 0.04 -0.10** 0.03
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00* 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Constant 8.80* 3.84 8.46* 3.55 8.41** 2.59
N 1,813 1,822 3,635
Adjusted R-Squared 0.09 0.11 0.1
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.B10: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Employer Health 
Insurance Composition, SIPP Continuously Legal (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.09* 0.04 -0.14** 0.04 -0.12** 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.11 0.07 -0.19** 0.06 -0.15** 0.05
Age 0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01+ 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.04 0.04 0.040 0.04 -0.00 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.14** 0.04 -0.10** 0.04 -0.12** 0.03
Years of Education 0.03** 0.01 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.18** 0.06 -0.090 0.05 -0.13** 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00+ 0.00 -0.01* 0.00 -0.01** 0.00
Constant 8.80 5.49 10.50* 5.27 9.49* 3.77
N 1,048 1,061 2,109
Adjusted R-Squared 0.09 0.09 0.09
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.B11: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Employer Health 
Insurance Composition, SIPP Continuously Legal, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.06 0.04 -0.08* 0.03 -0.07** 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.23** 0.06 -0.17** 0.05 -0.20** 0.04
Age -0.00 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.02 0.04 0.040 0.03 0.01 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.10** 0.04 -0.12** 0.03 -0.11** 0.03
Years of Education 0.03** 0.01 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00
No English (ref=other) 0.02 0.05 -0.14** 0.05 -0.06 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01* 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Constant 10.80* 5.21 6.57 4.50 8.22* 3.41
N 765 761 1,526
Adjusted R-Squared 0.1 0.14 0.12
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.B12: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Employer Health 
Insurance Composition, SIPP Continuously Legal, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.02 0.02 -0.05* 0.02 -0.04** 0.01
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.11* 0.05 -0.070 0.05 -0.09** 0.03
Age 0.01+ 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.01 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00 -0.00* 0.00
Female (ref=male) 0.10 0.09 0.18+ 0.10 0.14* 0.07
Married (ref=not) 0.02 0.02 0.010 0.02 0.01 0.01
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.09** 0.02 -0.05* 0.02 -0.07** 0.02
Years of Education 0.04** 0.00 0.04** 0.01 0.04** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.00 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.11* 0.05 -0.11+ 0.06 -0.11** 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market 0.00 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 -0.00* 0.00
Constant -6.19 4.31 15.42** 4.96 6.40* 3.17
N 1,974 1,978 3,952
Adjusted R-Squared 0.10 0.07 0.09
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.B13: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Employer Health 
Insurance Composition, U.S.-Born Latinos (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
  166 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.07* 0.03 -0.08* 0.03 -0.07** 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.12 0.07 -0.12+ 0.07 -0.12* 0.05
Age 0.00 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.03 0.03 0.050 0.03 0.04+ 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.09** 0.03 -0.05+ 0.03 -0.07** 0.02
Years of Education 0.04** 0.01 0.04** 0.01 0.04** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.14+ 0.08 -0.16+ 0.08 -0.15** 0.06
Entry into US Labor Market 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant -3.54 8.89 4.37 8.76 2.73 5.87
N 1,020 1,018 2,038
Adjusted R-Squared 0.08 0.09 0.09
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.B14: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Employer Health 
Insurance Composition, U.S.-Born Latinos, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.02 0.02 -0.020 0.03 -0.00 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.11* 0.05 0.000 0.08 -0.05 0.05
Age 0.02** 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.02** 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00** 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.01 0.02 -0.030 0.03 -0.01 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.10** 0.02 -0.050 0.03 -0.07** 0.02
Years of Education 0.04** 0.00 0.04** 0.01 0.04** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.10+ 0.06 -0.040 0.08 -0.07 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market 0.00+ 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00
Constant -8.90* 4.27 16.92** 6.09 5.41 3.64
N 985 972 1,957
Adjusted R-Squared 0.13 0.05 0.07
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.B15: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Employer Health 
Insurance Composition, U.S.-Born Latinos, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.01 0.10 -0.18+ 0.09 -0.08 0.07
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.04 0.15 -0.020 0.13 -0.03 0.10
Age -0.01 0.03 -0.040 0.03 -0.02 0.02
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.29+ 0.17 -0.330 0.24 -0.30* 0.13
Married (ref=not) 0.18+ 0.11 0.030 0.09 0.08 0.07
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.01 0.10 0.23** 0.09 0.12+ 0.07
Years of Education -0.00 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.01 0.01 0.010 0.02 0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.40** 0.14 -0.27* 0.13 -0.33** 0.09
Entry into US Labor Market 0.02 0.02 0.000 0.02 0.01 0.01
Constant -42.54 37.52 3.19 33.20 -25.66 24.41
N 467 479 946
Adjusted R-Squared 0.02 0.04 0.03
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.C1: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Union Composition, Legal 
Status Transitioners (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.16 0.15 -0.200 0.14 -0.17+ 0.10
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.55* 0.22 -0.060 0.20 -0.30* 0.15
Age -0.02 0.04 -0.050 0.05 -0.02 0.03
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.15 0.17 0.020 0.14 0.05 0.11
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.04 0.15 0.27* 0.13 0.16 0.10
Years of Education 0.01 0.02 0.000 0.02 0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.17 0.21 -0.38+ 0.20 -0.28+ 0.14
Entry into US Labor Market 0.01 0.03 0.010 0.03 0.01 0.02
Constant -20.18 55.46 -15.74 51.74 -24.24 36.89
N 244 248 492
Adjusted R-Squared 0.01 0.02 0.01
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.C2: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Union Composition, Legal 
Status Transitioners, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.18 0.14 -0.150 0.13 0.01 0.09
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.49* 0.20 0.030 0.18 0.25+ 0.14
Age -0.01 0.03 -0.040 0.03 -0.02 0.02
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.25+ 0.14 0.050 0.12 0.13 0.09
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.08 0.14 0.180 0.12 0.07 0.09
Years of Education 0.01 0.02 0.020 0.01 0.02 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.68** 0.18 -0.180 0.17 -0.42** 0.12
Entry into US Labor Market 0.01 0.03 -0.010 0.02 0.00 0.02
Constant -22.57 50.18 24.10 43.86 -7.11 32.68
N 229 231 460
Adjusted R-Squared 0.07 0.01 0.03
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.C3: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Union Composition, Legal 
Status Transitioners, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
  
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.02 0.15 -0.070 0.15 -0.04 0.10
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.10 0.21 -0.040 0.21 0.03 0.15
Age 0.03 0.03 0.030 0.03 0.03 0.02
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.51+ 0.28 -0.360 0.31 -0.43* 0.21
Married (ref=not) -0.14 0.11 -0.090 0.11 -0.11 0.08
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.24* 0.11 0.050 0.12 0.15* 0.08
Years of Education -0.04** 0.02 -0.020 0.02 -0.03** 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.03 0.02 0.010 0.02 0.02 0.02
No English (ref=other) -0.19 0.13 -0.26* 0.13 -0.22* 0.09
Entry into US Labor Market 0.01 0.03 0.04+ 0.03 0.03 0.02
Constant -20.72 50.07 -88.79+ 50.88 -55.95 35.18
N 349 358 707
Adjusted R-Squared 0.02 0.01 0.03
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.C4: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Union Composition, NIS 
Continuously Legal (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.14 0.22 -0.160 0.21 -0.14 0.15
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.06 0.28 -0.260 0.28 -0.09 0.20
Age 0.06+ 0.04 0.08+ 0.04 0.07* 0.03
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00 -0.00* 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.13 0.16 -0.060 0.16 -0.08 0.11
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.29+ 0.15 -0.050 0.17 0.14 0.11
Years of Education -0.03+ 0.02 -0.03+ 0.02 -0.03* 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.08 0.18 -0.220 0.17 -0.15 0.12
Entry into US Labor Market 0.00 0.03 0.040 0.03 0.02 0.02
Constant -10.54 65.82 -79.82 66.14 -45.22 45.95
N 212 216 428
Adjusted R-Squared 0.02 0.01 0.03
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.C5: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Union Composition, NIS 
Continuously Legal, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.20 0.21 0.110 0.21 0.15 0.14
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.08 0.31 0.260 0.32 0.16 0.22
Age -0.00 0.05 -0.040 0.05 -0.02 0.03
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.26 0.16 -0.160 0.17 -0.21+ 0.11
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.12 0.15 0.150 0.16 0.12 0.11
Years of Education -0.01 0.02 -0.010 0.02 -0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.34+ 0.19 -0.260 0.20 -0.30* 0.13
Entry into US Labor Market 0.03 0.04 0.060 0.04 0.05+ 0.03
Constant -64.43 80.19 -131.03 82.62 -96.61+ 56.13
N 140 142 282
Adjusted R-Squared -0.01 -0.01 0.02
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.C6: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Union Composition, NIS 
Continuously Legal, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.01 0.12 0.040 0.11 0.02 0.08
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.10 0.19 0.230 0.18 0.16 0.13
Age 0.01 0.03 0.010 0.03 0.01 0.02
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.65* 0.27 -0.350 0.25 -0.50** 0.18
Married (ref=not) -0.06 0.09 -0.070 0.08 -0.06 0.06
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.21* 0.10 0.110 0.09 0.16* 0.07
Years of Education 0.00 0.02 0.02+ 0.01 0.01 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.05+ 0.03 0.020 0.02 0.03+ 0.02
No English (ref=other) -0.07 0.11 -0.130 0.10 -0.10 0.07
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.01+ 0.01
Constant 10.35 16.85 20.51 16.40 14.96 11.64
N 462 446 908
Adjusted R-Squared 0.01 0.02 0.03
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.C7: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Union Composition, 
Continuously Unauthorized (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.02 0.15 0.150 0.14 0.08 0.10
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.19 0.23 0.220 0.21 0.20 0.16
Age 0.01 0.04 0.010 0.04 0.01 0.02
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.05 0.12 -0.020 0.10 -0.03 0.08
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.19 0.12 0.110 0.10 0.15+ 0.08
Years of Education -0.00 0.02 0.020 0.01 0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.11 0.13 -0.140 0.12 -0.12 0.09
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.00 0.01
Constant -1.27 20.58 3.40 19.33 0.29 13.96
N 329 317 646
Adjusted R-Squared 0.01 0.01 0.00
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.C8: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Union Composition, 
Continuously Unauthorized, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.02 0.18 -0.160 0.19 -0.07 0.13
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.11 0.32 0.430 0.36 0.14 0.23
Age 0.02 0.04 0.020 0.05 0.02 0.03
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.02 0.14 -0.050 0.15 -0.02 0.10
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.24 0.19 0.080 0.20 0.17 0.14
Years of Education 0.06** 0.02 0.05* 0.02 0.05** 0.01
No English (ref=other) 0.04 0.19 -0.100 0.20 -0.04 0.14
Entry into US Labor Market -0.02+ 0.01 -0.03* 0.02 -0.03** 0.01
Constant 44.52 29.27 64.95* 31.04 52.11* 20.94
N 133 129 262
Adjusted R-Squared 0.08 0.09 0.1
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.C9: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Union Composition, 
Continuously Unauthorized, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.06 0.05 0.000 0.05 0.03 0.04
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.05 0.08 0.050 0.08 0.05 0.06
Age 0.02+ 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.02* 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00+ 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.48** 0.13 -0.43** 0.13 -0.46** 0.09
Married (ref=not) -0.05 0.05 -0.020 0.05 -0.03 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.10* 0.05 0.12* 0.05 0.11** 0.04
Years of Education 0.00 0.01 0.01+ 0.01 0.01 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.03* 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.03** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.12 0.07 -0.030 0.07 -0.07 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Constant 0.44 6.91 -11.39 6.93 -4.94 4.86
N 1,813 1,822 3,635
Adjusted R-Squared 0.02 0.02 0.02
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.C10: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Union Composition, 
SIPP Continuously Legal (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.06 0.07 0.040 0.07 0.04 0.05
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.16 0.12 0.070 0.12 0.11 0.08
Age 0.04* 0.02 0.030 0.02 0.04** 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00* 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00* 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.06 0.07 -0.080 0.07 -0.07 0.05
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.03 0.07 0.100 0.07 0.07 0.05
Years of Education -0.00 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.00 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.24* 0.10 -0.140 0.10 -0.18** 0.07
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.00 0.010 0.00 0.00 0.00
Constant -3.32 9.52 -17.97+ 9.61 -9.17 6.70
N 1,048 1,061 2,109
Adjusted R-Squared 0.01 0.0 0.01
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.C11: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Union Composition, 
SIPP Continuously Legal, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.05 0.08 -0.050 0.08 0.00 0.05
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.08 0.12 0.030 0.12 -0.02 0.08
Age -0.00 0.02 -0.010 0.02 -0.00 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.04 0.07 0.040 0.07 0.00 0.05
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.20** 0.08 0.14+ 0.08 0.17** 0.05
Years of Education 0.03** 0.01 0.05** 0.01 0.04** 0.01
No English (ref=other) 0.03 0.11 0.100 0.11 0.06 0.08
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant 5.23 10.05 -4.32 10.03 -0.09 7.04
N 765 761 1,526
Adjusted R-Squared 0.02 0.03 0.03
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.C12: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Union Composition, 
SIPP Continuously Legal, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.19** 0.05 -0.21** 0.05 -0.20** 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.07 0.11 0.090 0.11 0.01 0.08
Age -0.00 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.78** 0.22 -0.54* 0.22 -0.66** 0.15
Married (ref=not) -0.01 0.05 -0.070 0.05 -0.04 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.02 0.05 -0.010 0.05 -0.01 0.03
Years of Education -0.02 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.05** 0.02 0.03+ 0.02 0.04** 0.01
No English (ref=other) 0.01 0.13 -0.24+ 0.13 -0.12 0.09
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01 0.01 -0.01+ 0.01 -0.01* 0.00
Constant 10.99 10.67 15.37 10.56 14.00+ 7.25
N 1,974 1,978 3,952
Adjusted R-Squared 0.02 0.02 0.02
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.C13: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Union Composition, U.S.-
Born Latinos (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.21** 0.07 -0.15* 0.07 -0.18** 0.05
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.06 0.16 0.110 0.16 0.03 0.11
Age -0.01 0.02 -0.020 0.02 -0.01 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.01 0.07 -0.080 0.07 -0.04 0.05
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.04 0.07 0.050 0.07 0.04 0.05
Years of Education -0.02+ 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.05 0.18 -0.270 0.18 -0.16 0.13
Entry into US Labor Market -0.02+ 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.02* 0.01
Constant 33.80+ 19.42 24.27 19.45 27.60* 12.95
N 1,020 1,018 2,038
Adjusted R-Squared 0.02 0.01 0.01
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.C14: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Union Composition, U.S.-
Born Latinos, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.18** 0.06 -0.27** 0.06 -0.22** 0.04
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.08 0.16 0.070 0.16 -0.01 0.11
Age -0.00 0.02 -0.020 0.02 -0.01 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.03 0.06 -0.050 0.06 -0.04 0.04
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.05 0.07 -0.070 0.07 -0.06 0.05
Years of Education 0.04** 0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.04** 0.01
No English (ref=other) 0.08 0.18 -0.190 0.17 -0.05 0.12
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.01 0.00
Constant -1.88 12.83 13.23 12.54 7.06 8.74
N 985 972 1,957
Adjusted R-Squared 0.02 0.03 0.02
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.C15: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Union Composition, U.S.-
Born Latinos, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.28* 0.12 -0.35** 0.11 -0.32** 0.08
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.09 0.17 -0.27+ 0.16 -0.10 0.12
Age -0.06+ 0.03 -0.020 0.03 -0.04+ 0.02
Age-Squared 0.00* 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00* 0.00
Female (ref=male) 1.29** 0.19 2.01** 0.29 1.52** 0.16
Married (ref=not) -0.05 0.12 -0.33** 0.11 -0.20* 0.08
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.20+ 0.12 -0.18+ 0.11 -0.17* 0.08
Years of Education -0.00 0.02 0.05** 0.02 0.02 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.00 0.02 -0.06* 0.02 -0.02 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.52** 0.16 -0.36* 0.15 -0.43** 0.11
Entry into US Labor Market 0.04* 0.02 0.05* 0.02 0.05** 0.01
Constant -85.50* 42.58 -102.81* 40.26 -98.12** 28.59
N 467 479 946
Adjusted R-Squared 0.31 0.35 0.33
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.D1: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Gender Composition, 
Legal Status Transitioners (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.59** 0.21 -0.66** 0.20 -0.63** 0.14
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.22 0.31 -0.320 0.28 -0.24 0.20
Age -0.17** 0.06 -0.090 0.07 -0.13** 0.04
Age-Squared 0.00** 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00** 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.08 0.24 -0.45* 0.20 -0.26+ 0.15
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.14 0.21 -0.45* 0.19 -0.30* 0.14
Years of Education 0.01 0.02 0.040 0.02 0.02 0.02
No English (ref=other) -0.64* 0.30 -0.74** 0.28 -0.70** 0.20
Entry into US Labor Market 0.06 0.04 0.06+ 0.04 0.06* 0.03
Constant -113.12 77.50 -129.02+ 72.80 -124.82* 51.56
N 244 248 492
Adjusted R-Squared 0.06 0.15 0.11
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.D2: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Gender Composition, 
Legal Status Transitioners, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.01 0.09 0.010 0.09 -0.01 0.06
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.21 0.13 -0.26+ 0.14 -0.04 0.09
Age 0.02 0.02 0.020 0.03 0.02 0.02
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.06 0.09 -0.18* 0.09 -0.14* 0.06
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.16+ 0.09 0.060 0.09 -0.04 0.06
Years of Education 0.00 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.47** 0.12 -0.100 0.12 -0.28** 0.09
Entry into US Labor Market 0.02 0.02 0.04** 0.02 0.04** 0.01
Constant -39.62 32.01 -90.81** 32.34 -73.81** 22.53
N 229 231 460
Adjusted R-Squared 0.11 0.06 0.06
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.D3: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Gender Composition, 
Legal Status Transitioners, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.15 0.18 0.070 0.18 0.11 0.13
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.17 0.26 -0.150 0.26 -0.17 0.18
Age -0.07* 0.04 -0.08* 0.04 -0.08** 0.03
Age-Squared 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00** 0.00
Female (ref=male) 1.11** 0.33 1.19** 0.39 1.14** 0.25
Married (ref=not) -0.08 0.13 -0.120 0.14 -0.10 0.10
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.04 0.13 -0.010 0.15 -0.04 0.10
Years of Education 0.02 0.02 0.020 0.02 0.02 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.01 0.03 0.000 0.03 -0.00 0.02
No English (ref=other) -0.15 0.15 -0.160 0.16 -0.15 0.11
Entry into US Labor Market 0.02 0.03 0.020 0.03 0.02 0.02
Constant -32.91 60.02 -41.30 63.81 -38.50 43.13
N 349 358 707
Adjusted R-Squared 0.16 0.21 0.2
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.D4: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Gender Composition, NIS 
Continuously Legal (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.07 0.29 -0.020 0.30 0.02 0.21
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.12 0.39 -0.190 0.41 -0.16 0.28
Age -0.11* 0.05 -0.12* 0.06 -0.12** 0.04
Age-Squared 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00** 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.12 0.21 -0.070 0.23 -0.10 0.16
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.05 0.21 -0.180 0.24 -0.14 0.15
Years of Education 0.03 0.02 0.020 0.03 0.03 0.02
No English (ref=other) -0.05 0.24 -0.020 0.26 -0.04 0.17
Entry into US Labor Market 0.01 0.04 0.030 0.05 0.02 0.03
Constant -10.89 89.82 -51.03 96.68 -33.43 64.72
N 212 216 428
Adjusted R-Squared 0.01 0.01 0.01
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.D5: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Gender Composition, NIS 
Continuously Legal, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.24 0.15 0.160 0.15 0.21* 0.10
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.06 0.22 0.020 0.23 -0.02 0.16
Age 0.00 0.04 0.010 0.04 0.01 0.02
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.09 0.12 -0.29* 0.12 -0.19* 0.08
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.03 0.11 0.21+ 0.11 0.12 0.08
Years of Education -0.00 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.00 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.38** 0.13 -0.46** 0.14 -0.42** 0.10
Entry into US Labor Market 0.04 0.03 0.020 0.03 0.03 0.02
Constant -76.83 56.65 -33.56 58.58 -55.98 40.00
N 140 142 282
Adjusted R-Squared 0.05 0.10 0.09
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.D6: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Gender Composition, NIS 
Continuously Legal, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.07 0.16 0.100 0.16 0.02 0.11
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.02 0.26 0.330 0.25 0.18 0.18
Age -0.01 0.04 0.000 0.04 -0.01 0.03
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) 2.41** 0.37 2.34** 0.35 2.38** 0.25
Married (ref=not) -0.10 0.12 -0.38** 0.12 -0.25** 0.09
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.36** 0.13 -0.180 0.13 -0.27** 0.09
Years of Education 0.08** 0.02 0.06** 0.02 0.07** 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.08* 0.04 -0.07* 0.03 -0.07** 0.02
No English (ref=other) -0.17 0.15 -0.010 0.14 -0.10 0.10
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 -0.00 0.01
Constant 20.41 22.99 -15.30 23.12 3.62 16.17
N 462 446 908
Adjusted R-Squared 0.30 0.3 0.31
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.D7: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Gender Composition, 
Continuously Unauthorized (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.05 0.23 0.320 0.22 0.14 0.16
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.19 0.35 0.59+ 0.34 0.40+ 0.24
Age -0.04 0.05 0.000 0.06 -0.01 0.04
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.04 0.18 -0.43* 0.17 -0.21+ 0.12
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.54** 0.18 -0.280 0.17 -0.40** 0.12
Years of Education 0.07** 0.02 0.06** 0.02 0.07** 0.02
No English (ref=other) -0.19 0.20 -0.040 0.19 -0.12 0.14
Entry into US Labor Market -0.02 0.02 0.000 0.02 -0.01 0.01
Constant 34.43 30.83 -12.50 31.23 12.91 21.75
N 329 317 646
Adjusted R-Squared 0.05 0.04 0.05
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.D8: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Gender Composition, 
Continuously Unauthorized, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.10 0.14 -0.250 0.15 -0.18+ 0.10
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.28 0.24 -0.220 0.28 -0.26 0.18
Age -0.00 0.03 0.000 0.04 -0.01 0.03
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.33** 0.11 -0.22+ 0.12 -0.28** 0.08
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.16 0.14 0.100 0.16 0.14 0.10
Years of Education -0.01 0.02 -0.020 0.02 -0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.11 0.14 0.060 0.15 -0.02 0.10
Entry into US Labor Market 0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01 0.01
Constant -16.07 22.34 -19.44 24.01 -17.09 16.10
N 133 129 262
Adjusted R-Squared 0.04 0.01 0.05
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.D9: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Gender Composition, 
Continuously Unauthorized, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.18** 0.06 -0.18** 0.06 -0.18** 0.04
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.06 0.10 -0.18+ 0.10 -0.06 0.07
Age -0.05** 0.02 -0.03* 0.02 -0.04** 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00** 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00** 0.00
Female (ref=male) 1.84** 0.15 1.81** 0.15 1.83** 0.11
Married (ref=not) -0.03 0.06 -0.10+ 0.06 -0.07+ 0.04
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.09 0.06 -0.090 0.06 -0.09* 0.04
Years of Education 0.05** 0.01 0.05** 0.01 0.05** 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.05** 0.01 -0.04** 0.01 -0.04** 0.01
No English (ref=other) 0.01 0.08 0.010 0.08 0.01 0.06
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant 6.86 8.05 8.15 8.02 7.22 5.64
N 1,813 1,822 3,635
Adjusted R-Squared 0.31 0.33 0.32
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.D10: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Gender Composition, 
SIPP Continuously Legal (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.21* 0.10 -0.28** 0.10 -0.24** 0.07
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.12 0.16 -0.33* 0.17 -0.10 0.12
Age -0.07** 0.03 -0.040 0.03 -0.06** 0.02
Age-Squared 0.00** 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00** 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.03 0.10 -0.150 0.10 -0.09 0.07
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.18+ 0.09 -0.17+ 0.09 -0.17** 0.07
Years of Education 0.05** 0.01 0.05** 0.01 0.05** 0.01
No English (ref=other) 0.07 0.14 0.020 0.14 0.05 0.10
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.01+ 0.00
Constant 15.33 13.31 17.13 13.50 16.32+ 9.40
N 1,048 1,061 2,109
Adjusted R-Squared 0.04 0.04 0.04
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.D11: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Gender Composition, 
SIPP Continuously Legal, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.14** 0.05 -0.080 0.05 -0.11** 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.04 0.08 -0.020 0.07 -0.03 0.05
Age -0.03* 0.01 -0.02* 0.01 -0.03** 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00** 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00** 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.01 0.05 -0.060 0.04 -0.04 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.04 0.05 0.020 0.05 0.03 0.03
Years of Education 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.01** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.08 0.07 -0.010 0.07 -0.05 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Constant 0.29 6.85 -0.09 6.19 -0.51 4.58
N 765 761 1,526
Adjusted R-Squared 0.02 0.03 0.03
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.D12: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Gender Composition, 
SIPP Continuously Legal, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.09* 0.05 -0.12* 0.05 -0.11** 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.14 0.12 -0.130 0.12 -0.13 0.08
Age -0.04** 0.01 -0.04** 0.01 -0.04** 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00
Female (ref=male) 2.11** 0.22 2.52** 0.23 2.32** 0.16
Married (ref=not) -0.05 0.05 -0.050 0.05 -0.05 0.04
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.07 0.05 -0.040 0.05 -0.06 0.04
Years of Education 0.09** 0.01 0.11** 0.01 0.10** 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.08** 0.02 -0.11** 0.02 -0.09** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.03 0.14 0.130 0.13 0.05 0.10
Entry into US Labor Market 0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.00
Constant -14.17 11.12 -3.81 11.26 -7.68 7.63
N 1,974 1,978 3,952
Adjusted R-Squared 0.29 0.3 0.3
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.D13: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Gender Composition, 
U.S.-Born Latinos (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.14 0.09 -0.22* 0.09 -0.18** 0.06
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.19 0.21 -0.180 0.21 -0.18 0.15
Age -0.07** 0.02 -0.06* 0.03 -0.07** 0.02
Age-Squared 0.00** 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00** 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.03 0.09 -0.090 0.09 -0.06 0.07
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.13 0.09 -0.060 0.09 -0.09 0.07
Years of Education 0.09** 0.02 0.12** 0.02 0.11** 0.01
No English (ref=other) 0.04 0.24 0.330 0.24 0.19 0.17
Entry into US Labor Market 0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.01
Constant -29.72 25.60 3.47 25.91 -10.92 17.13
N 1,020 1,018 2,038
Adjusted R-Squared 0.05 0.06 0.06
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.D14: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Gender Composition, 
U.S.-Born Latinos, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.04 0.04 -0.020 0.04 -0.03 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.03 0.09 -0.080 0.09 -0.05 0.06
Age -0.01 0.01 -0.02* 0.01 -0.01* 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.03 0.04 -0.010 0.04 -0.02 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.03 0.04 -0.010 0.04 -0.02 0.03
Years of Education 0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.04 0.10 -0.040 0.10 -0.04 0.07
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Constant 0.13 7.32 -6.18 7.25 -2.84 5.02
N 985 972 1,957
Adjusted R-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.D15: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Gender Composition, 
U.S.-Born Latinos, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.21** 0.05 -0.19** 0.04 -0.20** 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.10 0.07 -0.080 0.06 -0.09* 0.04
Age 0.01 0.01 -0.03* 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.00+ 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) 0.14+ 0.08 -0.020 0.10 0.08 0.06
Married (ref=not) -0.12* 0.05 0.030 0.04 -0.03 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.22** 0.04 -0.26** 0.04 -0.24** 0.03
Years of Education 0.02** 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.02** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.01 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.19** 0.06 -0.060 0.05 -0.13** 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market 0.01+ 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.01 0.01
Constant -30.22+ 16.52 5.84 13.96 -10.92 10.54
N 467 479 946
Adjusted R-Squared 0.18 0.25 0.21
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.E1: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Ethnic Composition, 
Legal Status Transitioners (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.23** 0.05 -0.19** 0.05 -0.21** 0.04
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.07 0.08 -0.050 0.08 -0.07 0.05
Age 0.02 0.01 0.010 0.02 0.01 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00* 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00* 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.03 0.06 0.080 0.05 0.06 0.04
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.18** 0.05 -0.26** 0.05 -0.22** 0.04
Years of Education 0.01* 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.02** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.00 0.07 0.030 0.07 0.01 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Constant 6.35 19.26 7.65 19.49 10.22 13.30
N 244 248 492
Adjusted R-Squared 0.19 0.22 0.21
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.E2: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Ethnic Composition, 
Legal Status Transitioners, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.14+ 0.08 -0.19** 0.06 -0.17** 0.05
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.07 0.11 -0.120 0.08 -0.09 0.07
Age -0.02 0.02 -0.05** 0.02 -0.03** 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00* 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.19* 0.07 -0.020 0.05 -0.10* 0.04
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.28** 0.08 -0.25** 0.06 -0.27** 0.05
Years of Education 0.02* 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.02** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.32** 0.10 -0.110 0.08 -0.22** 0.06
Entry into US Labor Market 0.03* 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.01+ 0.01
Constant -54.33* 27.53 -0.54 20.30 -27.63+ 16.60
N 229 231 460
Adjusted R-Squared 0.23 0.30 0.26
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.E3: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Ethnic Composition, 
Legal Status Transitioners, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.04 0.09 -0.090 0.07 -0.07 0.06
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.15 0.13 -0.150 0.09 -0.14+ 0.08
Age -0.00 0.02 -0.010 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) 0.00 0.18 -0.180 0.14 -0.09 0.11
Married (ref=not) 0.02 0.07 -0.010 0.05 0.01 0.04
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.20** 0.07 -0.26** 0.05 -0.22** 0.04
Years of Education 0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.01 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.00 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.16* 0.08 -0.10+ 0.06 -0.13** 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market -0.02 0.02 -0.03** 0.01 -0.03** 0.01
Constant 42.82 31.56 67.01** 22.72 51.33** 19.19
N 349 358 707
Adjusted R-Squared 0.04 0.11 0.07
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.E4: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Ethnic Composition, NIS 
Continuously Legal (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.03 0.13 -0.090 0.09 -0.06 0.07
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.28+ 0.17 -0.150 0.11 -0.20* 0.10
Age 0.01 0.02 -0.010 0.02 0.00 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.09 0.09 0.100 0.07 0.10+ 0.06
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.15+ 0.09 -0.19** 0.07 -0.16** 0.06
Years of Education -0.00 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.00 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.18+ 0.10 -0.080 0.07 -0.13* 0.06
Entry into US Labor Market -0.04+ 0.02 -0.03* 0.01 -0.03** 0.01
Constant 74.69+ 38.23 57.26* 27.30 62.02** 23.21
N 212 216 428
Adjusted R-Squared 0.06 0.08 0.08
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.E5: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Ethnic Composition, NIS 
Continuously Legal, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.01 0.15 -0.050 0.10 -0.03 0.09
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.02 0.22 -0.180 0.16 -0.06 0.13
Age -0.02 0.04 -0.030 0.03 -0.02 0.02
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.08 0.12 -0.15+ 0.08 -0.11 0.07
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.29** 0.11 -0.34** 0.08 -0.30** 0.07
Years of Education 0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01+ 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.15 0.13 -0.17+ 0.10 -0.16+ 0.08
Entry into US Labor Market 0.02 0.03 -0.030 0.02 -0.01 0.02
Constant -33.69 57.14 63.18 41.70 11.98 34.59
N 140 142 282
Adjusted R-Squared 0.03 0.15 0.1
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.E6: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Ethnic Composition, NIS 
Continuously Legal, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7
Mexico -0.05 0.09 0.090 0.08 0.02 0.06
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.16 0.14 0.150 0.13 0.16 0.10
Age 0.04+ 0.02 0.010 0.02 0.03+ 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00+ 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.29 0.20 -0.250 0.17 -0.27* 0.13
Married (ref=not) -0.06 0.07 0.030 0.06 -0.02 0.05
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.50** 0.08 -0.42** 0.07 -0.46** 0.05
Years of Education 0.00 0.01 0.02+ 0.01 0.01 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.04* 0.02 0.03+ 0.02 0.04** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.21* 0.08 -0.17* 0.07 -0.19** 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.00 0.00
Constant 5.05 12.87 7.13 11.68 5.69 8.65
N 462 446 908
Adjusted R-Squared 0.12 0.12 0.12
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.E7: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Ethnic Composition, 
Continuously Unauthorized (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
 
 
v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7
Mexico 0.02 0.13 0.120 0.15 0.07 0.10
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.12 0.24 0.040 0.28 0.08 0.18
Age -0.03 0.03 -0.040 0.04 -0.04 0.03
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.13 0.11 -0.040 0.12 -0.09 0.08
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.41** 0.14 -0.49** 0.16 -0.45** 0.10
Years of Education 0.04** 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.04** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.35* 0.14 -0.33* 0.16 -0.34** 0.10
Entry into US Labor Market -0.02+ 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.02* 0.01
Constant 42.47+ 22.15 25.46 24.15 35.24* 16.03
N 133 129 262
Adjusted R-Squared 0.13 0.13 0.15
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.E9: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Ethnic Composition, 
Continuously Unauthorized, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
  187 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.13** 0.03 -0.14** 0.03 -0.14** 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.12** 0.04 -0.13** 0.04 -0.12** 0.03
Age -0.01 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.01+ 0.00
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.02 0.06 -0.030 0.06 -0.03 0.05
Married (ref=not) 0.00 0.02 -0.010 0.02 -0.00 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.27** 0.02 -0.27** 0.02 -0.27** 0.02
Years of Education 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.00 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.15** 0.04 -0.13** 0.03 -0.14** 0.02
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant 4.67 3.40 0.48 3.33 2.95 2.36
N 1,813 1,822 3,635
Adjusted R-Squared 0.16 0.19 0.17
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.E10: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Ethnic Composition, 
SIPP Continuously Legal (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.18** 0.04 -0.17** 0.03 -0.18** 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.13* 0.06 -0.09+ 0.06 -0.11** 0.04
Age -0.00 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.00 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.01 0.03 0.000 0.03 -0.00 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.29** 0.03 -0.27** 0.03 -0.28** 0.02
Years of Education 0.02** 0.00 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.19** 0.05 -0.13** 0.05 -0.16** 0.03
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant 6.89 4.59 1.21 4.61 4.35 3.22
N 1,048 1,061 2,109
Adjusted R-Squared 0.16 0.17 0.17
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.E11: OLS Regression Results PredictingLog of Ethnic Composition, 
SIPP Continuously Legal, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.07+ 0.04 -0.10** 0.04 -0.09** 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.11+ 0.06 -0.18** 0.06 -0.14** 0.04
Age -0.02* 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.02* 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00+ 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00+ 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.01 0.03 -0.030 0.03 -0.02 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.25** 0.04 -0.27** 0.04 -0.26** 0.03
Years of Education 0.03** 0.01 0.04** 0.00 0.03** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.09+ 0.05 -0.14** 0.05 -0.11** 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant 2.66 5.06 0.19 4.82 1.81 3.46
N 765 761 1,526
Adjusted R-Squared 0.16 0.20 0.19
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.E12: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Ethnic Composition, 
SIPP Continuously Legal, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7
Mexico -0.03* 0.01 0.000 0.02 -0.02+ 0.01
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.18** 0.04 -0.07+ 0.04 -0.12** 0.03
Age 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) 0.26** 0.07 0.22** 0.08 0.24** 0.05
Married (ref=not) 0.01 0.02 0.000 0.02 0.00 0.01
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.15** 0.02 -0.16** 0.02 -0.15** 0.01
Years of Education 0.04** 0.00 0.04** 0.00 0.04** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.01** 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.01** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.11** 0.04 -0.22** 0.05 -0.17** 0.03
Entry into US Labor Market 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant -3.19 3.41 -0.05 4.06 0.47 2.57
N 1,974 1,978 3,952
Adjusted R-Squared 0.15 0.13 0.13
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.E13: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Ethnic Composition, 
U.S.-Born Latinos (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.09** 0.02 -0.030 0.03 -0.06** 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.09 0.05 -0.13* 0.07 -0.11** 0.04
Age 0.00 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.00 0.00
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.01 0.02 -0.010 0.03 -0.00 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.15** 0.02 -0.16** 0.03 -0.16** 0.02
Years of Education 0.04** 0.00 0.04** 0.01 0.04** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.13* 0.06 -0.29** 0.08 -0.21** 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Constant -3.69 6.61 -8.32 8.16 -1.33 4.95
N 1,020 1,018 2,038
Adjusted R-Squared 0.14 0.1 0.12
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.E14: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Ethnic Composition, 
U.S.-Born Latinos, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.02 0.02 0.020 0.02 0.02 0.01
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.28** 0.05 0.000 0.05 -0.14** 0.04
Age 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.02 0.02 0.000 0.02 0.01 0.01
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.14** 0.02 -0.15** 0.02 -0.14** 0.01
Years of Education 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.10* 0.05 -0.14* 0.06 -0.12** 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant -4.12 3.72 2.14 4.17 -0.19 2.73
N 985 972 1,957
Adjusted R-Squared 0.13 0.12 0.12
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.E15: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Ethnic Composition, 
U.S.-Born Latinos, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.13** 0.04 -0.17** 0.04 -0.14** 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.02 0.06 -0.070 0.06 -0.02 0.04
Age 0.01 0.01 -0.04** 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) 0.09 0.07 -0.090 0.10 0.02 0.06
Married (ref=not) -0.11* 0.05 0.010 0.04 -0.03 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.10* 0.04 -0.17** 0.04 -0.14** 0.03
Years of Education 0.03** 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.03** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 -0.00 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.18** 0.06 -0.060 0.05 -0.13** 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market 0.03** 0.01 -0.010 0.01 0.01 0.01
Constant -52.19** 16.15 22.02 13.75 -15.94 10.42
N 467 479 946
Adjusted R-Squared 0.16 0.21 0.17
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.F1: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Skill Composition, Legal 
Status Transitioners (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.24** 0.05 -0.17** 0.04 -0.19** 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.12+ 0.07 -0.100 0.06 -0.09+ 0.05
Age -0.01 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.00 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.02 0.06 0.050 0.05 0.05 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.03 0.05 -0.16** 0.04 -0.10** 0.03
Years of Education 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.03 0.07 -0.030 0.06 -0.04 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market 0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.01
Constant -16.95 18.16 9.12 16.37 -2.63 11.99
N 244 248 492
Adjusted R-Squared 0.16 0.19 0.17
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.F2: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Skill Composition, Legal 
Status Transitioners, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
  191 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.02 0.07 -0.18** 0.06 -0.07 0.05
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.11 0.11 -0.020 0.09 0.06 0.07
Age 0.00 0.02 -0.06** 0.02 -0.02 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.14+ 0.07 -0.040 0.06 -0.07 0.05
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.17* 0.07 -0.19** 0.06 -0.18** 0.05
Years of Education 0.03** 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.03** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.31** 0.10 -0.070 0.09 -0.20** 0.07
Entry into US Labor Market 0.03* 0.01 -0.020 0.01 0.01 0.01
Constant -67.58* 27.27 32.56 22.58 -20.63 17.41
N 229 231 460
Adjusted R-Squared 0.19 0.22 0.19
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.F3: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Skill Composition, Legal 
Status Transitioners, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7
Mexico -0.07 0.06 -0.060 0.07 -0.07 0.05
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.06 0.09 -0.140 0.11 -0.09 0.07
Age -0.01 0.01 -0.03+ 0.02 -0.01 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) 0.03 0.11 -0.040 0.16 -0.01 0.09
Married (ref=not) 0.05 0.04 0.040 0.06 0.05 0.04
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.03 0.04 -0.11+ 0.06 -0.06+ 0.04
Years of Education 0.01* 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01* 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.00 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.11* 0.05 -0.19** 0.06 -0.15** 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01 0.01 -0.03* 0.01 -0.02* 0.01
Constant 15.60 20.00 58.32* 25.52 34.66* 15.99
N 349 358 707
Adjusted R-Squared 0.04 0.08 0.07
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.F4: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Skill Composition, NIS 
Continuously Legal (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
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v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7
Mexico -0.09 0.09 -0.080 0.10 -0.08 0.07
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.06 0.11 -0.160 0.14 -0.11 0.09
Age -0.01 0.02 -0.030 0.02 -0.02 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.09 0.06 0.14+ 0.08 0.12* 0.05
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.00 0.06 -0.070 0.08 -0.03 0.05
Years of Education 0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01+ 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.12+ 0.07 -0.17* 0.09 -0.15** 0.06
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01 0.01 -0.03+ 0.02 -0.02* 0.01
Constant 27.31 26.40 58.39+ 32.56 41.28* 20.54
N 212 216 428
Adjusted R-Squared 0.05 0.08 0.08
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.F5: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Skill Composition, NIS 
Continuously Legal, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7
Mexico -0.03 0.08 0.010 0.11 -0.01 0.07
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.06 0.12 -0.120 0.17 -0.07 0.10
Age -0.01 0.02 -0.020 0.03 -0.01 0.02
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.02 0.07 -0.110 0.09 -0.06 0.05
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.06 0.06 -0.140 0.08 -0.09+ 0.05
Years of Education 0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.11 0.08 -0.26* 0.10 -0.19** 0.06
Entry into US Labor Market 0.01 0.02 -0.020 0.02 -0.00 0.01
Constant -20.72 31.89 33.68 43.59 3.43 26.55
N 140 142 282
Adjusted R-Squared 0.01 0.06 0.06
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.F6: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Skill Composition, NIS 
Continuously Legal, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.18* 0.08 0.010 0.07 -0.09 0.06
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.03 0.13 0.070 0.12 0.05 0.09
Age 0.03 0.02 0.000 0.02 0.02 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.02 0.19 -0.070 0.17 -0.05 0.13
Married (ref=not) -0.04 0.06 0.020 0.06 -0.01 0.04
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.23** 0.07 -0.27** 0.06 -0.25** 0.05
Years of Education 0.01 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.02* 0.01
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.02 0.02 0.010 0.02 0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.09 0.08 -0.060 0.07 -0.07 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market 0.00 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.00 0.00
Constant -4.44 11.88 11.54 11.10 2.17 8.10
N 462 446 908
Adjusted R-Squared 0.06 0.06 0.06
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.F7: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Skill Composition, 
Continuously Unauthorized (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.21+ 0.12 0.100 0.09 -0.06 0.07
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.06 0.18 0.210 0.13 0.13 0.11
Age 0.04 0.03 0.000 0.02 0.03 0.02
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.06 0.09 0.060 0.07 -0.01 0.06
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.26** 0.09 -0.24** 0.07 -0.25** 0.06
Years of Education 0.01 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.02** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.05 0.10 -0.050 0.07 -0.05 0.06
Entry into US Labor Market 0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.01 0.00
Constant -19.16 15.65 0.53 12.14 -12.04 9.93
N 329 317 646
Adjusted R-Squared 0.05 0.07 0.06
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.F8: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Skill Composition, 
Continuously Unauthorized, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.13 0.08 -0.140 0.15 -0.14+ 0.08
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.05 0.15 -0.160 0.28 -0.11 0.15
Age -0.01 0.02 0.000 0.04 -0.00 0.02
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.00 0.07 -0.100 0.12 -0.05 0.07
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.05 0.09 -0.34* 0.16 -0.19* 0.09
Years of Education 0.03** 0.01 0.03+ 0.02 0.03** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.16+ 0.09 -0.090 0.16 -0.13 0.09
Entry into US Labor Market -0.02* 0.01 -0.020 0.01 -0.02** 0.01
Constant 34.33* 13.62 35.62 24.11 34.96* 13.56
N 133 129 262
Adjusted R-Squared 0.11 0.05 0.09
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.F9: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Skill Composition, 
Continuously Unauthorized, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.17** 0.02 -0.15** 0.03 -0.16** 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.13** 0.04 -0.14** 0.04 -0.14** 0.03
Age -0.00 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.00 0.00
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.10+ 0.06 0.010 0.07 -0.05 0.05
Married (ref=not) 0.02 0.02 0.010 0.03 0.02 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.11** 0.02 -0.18** 0.03 -0.15** 0.02
Years of Education 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.01+ 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.01 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.16** 0.03 -0.11** 0.04 -0.13** 0.03
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00* 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00
Constant 5.93+ 3.14 1.45 3.63 4.04+ 2.38
N 1,813 1,822 3,635
Adjusted R-Squared 0.17 0.15 0.16
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.F10: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Skill Composition, SIPP 
Continuously Legal (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.17** 0.03 -0.16** 0.04 -0.16** 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.09+ 0.05 -0.100 0.07 -0.10* 0.04
Age 0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.00 0.03 0.010 0.04 0.00 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.14** 0.03 -0.19** 0.04 -0.16** 0.02
Years of Education 0.03** 0.00 0.04** 0.00 0.03** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.18** 0.04 -0.050 0.06 -0.11** 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01* 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00* 0.00
Constant 9.92* 4.21 3.07 5.43 7.28* 3.40
N 1,048 1,061 2,109
Adjusted R-Squared 0.16 0.12 0.14
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.F11: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Skill Composition, SIPP 
Continuously Legal, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.15** 0.04 -0.14** 0.03 -0.15** 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.19** 0.06 -0.19** 0.05 -0.19** 0.04
Age -0.02* 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.03 0.03 0.000 0.03 0.02 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.07+ 0.04 -0.18** 0.03 -0.12** 0.02
Years of Education 0.04** 0.00 0.03** 0.00 0.04** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.12* 0.05 -0.18** 0.05 -0.15** 0.03
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant 1.83 4.72 0.25 4.57 0.82 3.26
N 765 761 1,526
Adjusted R-Squared 0.2 0.21 0.2
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.F12: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Skill Composition, SIPP 
Continuously Legal, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.03 0.02 -0.05* 0.02 -0.04** 0.01
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.04 0.04 -0.030 0.04 -0.04 0.03
Age -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.01 -0.00 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) 0.19* 0.08 0.23** 0.09 0.20** 0.06
Married (ref=not) 0.00 0.02 0.000 0.02 0.00 0.01
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.07** 0.02 -0.10** 0.02 -0.09** 0.01
Years of Education 0.04** 0.00 0.04** 0.00 0.04** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.01 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.01+ 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.09+ 0.05 -0.19** 0.05 -0.14** 0.03
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01** 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.01** 0.00
Constant 17.64** 4.03 9.16* 4.18 12.86** 2.80
N 1,974 1,978 3,952
Adjusted R-Squared 0.11 0.12 0.12
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.F13: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Skill Composition, U.S.-
Born Latinos (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.06* 0.03 -0.07* 0.03 -0.06** 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.02 0.06 -0.050 0.07 -0.04 0.05
Age -0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.00 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.01 0.03 -0.020 0.03 -0.01 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.07** 0.03 -0.11** 0.03 -0.09** 0.02
Years of Education 0.05** 0.00 0.04** 0.01 0.04** 0.00
No English (ref=other) 0.05 0.07 -0.26** 0.08 -0.11* 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant -2.31 7.73 3.42 8.58 2.84 5.44
N 1,020 1,018 2,038
Adjusted R-Squared 0.09 0.09 0.09
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.F14: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Skill Composition, U.S.-
Born Latinos, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.00 0.02 -0.020 0.02 -0.01 0.01
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.05 0.05 -0.020 0.05 -0.04 0.04
Age 0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00** 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.01 0.02 0.020 0.02 0.01 0.01
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.08** 0.02 -0.08** 0.02 -0.08** 0.02
Years of Education 0.03** 0.00 0.04** 0.00 0.03** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.23** 0.06 -0.10+ 0.06 -0.16** 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01** 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 -0.01** 0.00
Constant 24.35** 4.41 10.78** 4.10 16.10** 2.95
N 985 972 1,957
Adjusted R-Squared 0.14 0.11 0.12
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.F15: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Skill Composition, U.S.-
Born Latinos, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.08** 0.02 -0.020 0.04 -0.04* 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.04 0.03 0.030 0.05 0.01 0.03
Age -0.00 0.01 -0.02+ 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00+ 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.04 0.04 -0.17+ 0.09 -0.09* 0.04
Married (ref=not) -0.01 0.02 0.010 0.04 0.01 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.03 0.02 -0.07+ 0.03 -0.05* 0.02
Years of Education 0.01** 0.00 0.01* 0.01 0.01** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.00 0.00 0.010 0.01 0.00 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.01 0.03 0.020 0.05 -0.00 0.03
Entry into US Labor Market 0.01** 0.00 -0.010 0.01 0.00 0.00
Constant -29.81** 8.47 17.83 13.03 -6.76 7.71
N 467 479 946
Adjusted R-Squared 0.14 0.05 0.07
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.G1: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Working Poor 
Composition, Legal Status Transitioners (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.12** 0.03 -0.020 0.05 -0.06+ 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.02 0.05 0.020 0.07 0.02 0.04
Age -0.00 0.01 -0.010 0.02 0.00 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.00 0.04 0.040 0.05 0.04 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.02 0.03 -0.060 0.05 -0.05 0.03
Years of Education 0.01** 0.00 0.010 0.01 0.01** 0.00
No English (ref=other) 0.08 0.05 0.020 0.07 0.04 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market 0.02* 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.01 0.01
Constant -31.65* 12.63 -3.88 19.19 -18.86+ 11.25
N 244 248 492
Adjusted R-Squared 0.12 0.01 0.04
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.G2: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Working Poor 
Composition, Legal Status Transitioners, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.02 0.03 -0.020 0.05 -0.01 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.05 0.04 0.050 0.08 0.02 0.04
Age -0.01+ 0.01 -0.03+ 0.01 -0.02* 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00+ 0.00 0.00+ 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.01 0.03 -0.010 0.05 -0.00 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.05+ 0.03 -0.09+ 0.05 -0.07* 0.03
Years of Education 0.02** 0.00 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.11** 0.04 0.010 0.07 -0.06 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market 0.01+ 0.01 -0.02* 0.01 -0.00 0.01
Constant -19.09+ 11.16 39.61* 18.34 9.56 10.69
N 229 231 460
Adjusted R-Squared 0.25 0.08 0.12
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.G3: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Working Poor 
Composition, Legal Status Transitioners, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.00 0.03 0.020 0.06 0.01 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.02 0.05 -0.030 0.08 0.00 0.05
Age 0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.09 0.06 -0.160 0.12 -0.12+ 0.07
Married (ref=not) 0.01 0.02 -0.030 0.04 -0.00 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.01 0.02 -0.11* 0.05 -0.05* 0.02
Years of Education 0.01* 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.01 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.01 -0.00 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.00 0.03 -0.11* 0.05 -0.05+ 0.03
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Constant 9.02 10.97 29.89 20.08 17.89 11.32
N 349 358 707
Adjusted R-Squared 0.10 0.06 0.07
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.G4: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Working Poor 
Composition, NIS Continuously Legal (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.02 0.04 -0.020 0.07 -0.02 0.04
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.03 0.05 -0.100 0.10 -0.07 0.05
Age 0.02** 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00** 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.01 0.03 0.030 0.06 0.02 0.03
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.01 0.03 -0.060 0.06 -0.03 0.03
Years of Education 0.01+ 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.00 0.03 -0.090 0.06 -0.05 0.03
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01+ 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.01+ 0.01
Constant 19.69+ 11.32 27.76 22.73 23.47+ 12.44
N 212 216 428
Adjusted R-Squared 0.08 0.02 0.04
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.G5: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Working Poor 
Composition, NIS Continuously Legal, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.04 0.06 0.090 0.10 0.07 0.06
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.10 0.09 0.050 0.16 0.10 0.09
Age -0.00 0.01 -0.020 0.02 -0.01 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.01 0.05 -0.110 0.08 -0.04 0.05
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.05 0.04 -0.16* 0.08 -0.10* 0.04
Years of Education 0.01+ 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01 0.01
No English (ref=other) 0.01 0.06 -0.140 0.09 -0.07 0.05
Entry into US Labor Market 0.01 0.01 -0.010 0.02 0.00 0.01
Constant -12.18 23.39 17.88 39.70 -0.58 22.73
N 140 142 282
Adjusted R-Squared 0.01 0.02 0.02
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.G6: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Working Poor 
Composition, NIS Continuously Legal, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.03 0.05 0.000 0.04 0.01 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.05 0.07 0.070 0.06 0.01 0.05
Age 0.00 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.00 0.01
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.17 0.11 -0.22** 0.08 -0.19** 0.07
Married (ref=not) -0.06+ 0.04 -0.020 0.03 -0.04+ 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.08* 0.04 -0.08* 0.03 -0.08** 0.02
Years of Education 0.01* 0.01 0.02** 0.00 0.01** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01+ 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.07 0.04 -0.06+ 0.03 -0.06* 0.03
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant -0.28 6.64 5.85 5.46 2.10 4.28
N 462 446 908
Adjusted R-Squared 0.04 0.09 0.06
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.G7: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Working Poor 
Composition,  Continuously Unauthorized (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.01 0.05 -0.030 0.03 -0.02 0.03
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.15+ 0.08 0.030 0.05 -0.06 0.05
Age 0.02 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.01 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.05 0.04 0.010 0.02 -0.02 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.08* 0.04 -0.06* 0.02 -0.07** 0.02
Years of Education 0.01* 0.01 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.00
No English (ref=other) 0.02 0.05 0.000 0.03 0.01 0.03
Entry into US Labor Market 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Constant -7.58 7.04 0.10 4.41 -4.40 4.19
N 329 317 646
Adjusted R-Squared 0.04 0.07 0.05
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.G8: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Working Poor 
Composition,  Continuously Unauthorized, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.11 0.09 0.040 0.09 0.07 0.06
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.15 0.16 0.120 0.18 0.13 0.12
Age -0.02 0.02 -0.020 0.03 -0.02 0.02
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.09 0.07 -0.090 0.08 -0.09+ 0.05
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.05 0.10 -0.130 0.10 -0.09 0.07
Years of Education 0.02* 0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.03** 0.01
No English (ref=other) -0.25* 0.10 -0.19+ 0.10 -0.23** 0.07
Entry into US Labor Market -0.01 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.01+ 0.01
Constant 18.09 15.05 17.77 15.29 17.33+ 10.48
N 133 129 262
Adjusted R-Squared 0.07 0.07 0.1
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.G9: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Working Poor 
Composition,  Continuously Unauthorized, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
 
  202 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.09** 0.02 -0.06** 0.01 -0.07** 0.01
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.05+ 0.03 -0.06** 0.02 -0.05** 0.02
Age 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.10* 0.04 -0.060 0.04 -0.08** 0.03
Married (ref=not) 0.01 0.02 0.010 0.01 0.01 0.01
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.04* 0.02 -0.04** 0.01 -0.04** 0.01
Years of Education 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.09** 0.02 -0.07** 0.02 -0.08** 0.02
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Constant 5.31* 2.16 7.05** 1.91 5.87** 1.43
N 1,813 1,822 3,635
Adjusted R-Squared 0.10 0.1 0.1
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.G10: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Working Poor 
Composition,  SIPP Continuously Legal (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.10** 0.03 -0.07** 0.02 -0.08** 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.04 0.04 -0.060 0.04 -0.05+ 0.03
Age 0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.01 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.01 0.02 0.010 0.02 0.01 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.06* 0.02 -0.05* 0.02 -0.05** 0.02
Years of Education 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.13** 0.04 -0.07* 0.03 -0.10** 0.02
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00+ 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Constant 5.63+ 3.40 8.04** 2.98 6.50** 2.24
N 1,048 1,061 2,109
Adjusted R-Squared 0.07 0.07 0.08
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.G11: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Working Poor 
Composition,  SIPP Continuously Legal, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.07** 0.02 -0.04** 0.02 -0.05** 0.01
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.06* 0.03 -0.07** 0.03 -0.06** 0.02
Age -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.01 0.02 0.000 0.01 0.01 0.01
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.01 0.02 -0.020 0.02 -0.02 0.01
Years of Education 0.02** 0.00 0.02** 0.00 0.02** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.05+ 0.02 -0.08** 0.02 -0.06** 0.02
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00* 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Constant 5.20* 2.33 5.87** 2.14 5.19** 1.57
N 765 761 1,526
Adjusted R-Squared 0.19 0.16 0.18
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.G12: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Working Poor 
Composition,  SIPP Continuously Legal, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.01 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.01 0.01
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.02 0.03 -0.040 0.03 -0.03 0.02
Age 0.01** 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.01** 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00** 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.15* 0.06 -0.10+ 0.05 -0.13** 0.04
Married (ref=not) 0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01 0.01
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.03** 0.01 -0.03* 0.01 -0.03** 0.01
Years of Education 0.03** 0.00 0.02** 0.00 0.02** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.01* 0.00 0.01+ 0.00 0.01** 0.00
No English (ref=other) 0.03 0.04 -0.040 0.03 -0.01 0.02
Entry into US Labor Market 0.00 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00* 0.00
Constant -0.75 2.96 9.49** 2.60 3.92* 1.90
N 1,974 1,978 3,952
Adjusted R-Squared 0.09 0.07 0.08
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.G13: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Working Poor 
Composition, U.S.-Born Latinos (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.04* 0.02 -0.020 0.02 -0.03* 0.01
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.01 0.05 -0.060 0.04 -0.03 0.03
Age 0.01 0.01 0.000 0.00 0.01+ 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.01 0.02 0.020 0.02 0.02 0.01
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.02 0.02 -0.03+ 0.02 -0.03* 0.01
Years of Education 0.02** 0.00 0.02** 0.00 0.02** 0.00
No English (ref=other) 0.02 0.05 -0.08+ 0.04 -0.03 0.04
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant 2.25 5.77 1.67 4.73 2.09 3.51
N 1,020 1,018 2,038
Adjusted R-Squared 0.06 0.05 0.06
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.G14: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Working Poor 
Composition, U.S.-Born Latinos, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.02 0.02 0.000 0.02 0.01 0.01
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.03 0.04 -0.020 0.04 -0.03 0.03
Age 0.01** 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.01** 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00** 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.01 0.02 0.000 0.02 0.00 0.01
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.05** 0.02 -0.020 0.02 -0.03** 0.01
Years of Education 0.04** 0.00 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00
No English (ref=other) 0.03 0.04 0.010 0.04 0.02 0.03
Entry into US Labor Market 0.00 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 -0.00* 0.00
Constant -3.16 3.19 12.94** 3.10 4.13+ 2.17
N 985 972 1,957
Adjusted R-Squared 0.13 0.10 0.11
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.G15: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Working Poor 
Composition, U.S.-Born Latinos, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.01 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.00 0.00
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.01
Age -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.03* 0.01 -0.06** 0.01 -0.04** 0.01
Married (ref=not) 0.00 0.01 0.01+ 0.01 0.01* 0.00
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.01 0.01 0.000 0.00 -0.01 0.00
Years of Education 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.02* 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.02** 0.01
Entry into US Labor Market 0.01** 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00** 0.00
Constant -17.64** 2.71 2.22 1.86 -7.12** 1.64
N 467 479 946
Adjusted R-Squared 0.16 0.16 0.13
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.H1: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Food Stamp Recipiency 
Composition, Legal Status Transitioners (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
  
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.03** 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.01+ 0.01
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.02 0.01 -0.020 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Age -0.01* 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Age-Squared 0.00* 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.00 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01* 0.01
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.01
Years of Education 0.00+ 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.02 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Entry into US Labor Market 0.01** 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00** 0.00
Constant -14.52** 3.25 2.08 2.62 -5.88** 2.11
N 244 248 492
Adjusted R-Squared 0.16 0.01 0.07
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.H2: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Food Stamp Recipiency 
Composition, Legal Status Transitioners, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.01 0.01 -0.010 0.01 0.01 0.01
El Salvador/Guatemala 0.00 0.02 0.02+ 0.01 0.02 0.01
Age -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.00 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01 0.01
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.03* 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.02** 0.01
Years of Education 0.00+ 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.03* 0.02 -0.010 0.01 -0.03** 0.01
Entry into US Labor Market 0.01** 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00* 0.00
Constant -18.19** 4.40 3.72 2.69 -6.54* 2.57
N 229 231 460
Adjusted R-Squared 0.13 0.17 0.12
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.H3: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Food Stamp Recipiency 
Composition, Legal Status Transitioners, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.00 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.00 0.01
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.01 0.01 -0.02* 0.01 -0.02+ 0.01
Age 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.05** 0.02 -0.06** 0.02 -0.05** 0.01
Married (ref=not) 0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.00
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.02* 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.01+ 0.00
Years of Education 0.00* 0.00 0.00+ 0.00 0.00** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
No English (ref=other) 0.00 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.01+ 0.01
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant 0.09 2.82 4.86+ 2.82 2.17 1.97
N 349 358 707
Adjusted R-Squared 0.24 0.21 0.23
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.H4: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Food Stamp Recipiency 
Composition, NIS Continuously Legal (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.01+ 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.01* 0.01
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.01 0.01 -0.020 0.01 -0.02* 0.01
Age -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.00 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.00
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.01+ 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01+ 0.00
Years of Education 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00** 0.00
No English (ref=other) 0.01 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.01+ 0.00
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant 2.22 2.19 2.07 2.41 2.16 1.60
N 212 216 428
Adjusted R-Squared 0.04 0.02 0.05
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.H5: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Food Stamp Recipiency 
Composition, NIS Continuously Legal, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico 0.01 0.02 -0.010 0.02 0.00 0.01
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.00 0.03 -0.04+ 0.03 -0.02 0.02
Age 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.01
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.03* 0.01 -0.010 0.01 0.01 0.01
Years of Education 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.00 0.02 0.03+ 0.02 0.01 0.01
Entry into US Labor Market 0.00 0.00 -0.010 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant -3.19 7.00 10.33 6.69 2.59 4.79
N 140 142 282
Adjusted R-Squared 0.01 0.01 0.01
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.H6: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Food Stamp Recipiency 
Composition, NIS Continuously Legal, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.02+ 0.01 -0.020 0.03 -0.02 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.01 0.02 0.000 0.05 -0.01 0.03
Age 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.04 0.03 -0.050 0.07 -0.05 0.04
Married (ref=not) -0.00 0.01 -0.040 0.02 -0.02 0.01
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.01 0.01 -0.020 0.03 -0.02 0.01
Years of Education 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.00
No English (ref=other) 0.00 0.01 0.020 0.03 0.01 0.01
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Constant 0.64 1.62 -2.14 4.61 -0.59 2.37
N 462 446 908
Adjusted R-Squared 0.02 0.01 0.01
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.H7: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Food Stamp Recipiency 
Composition, Continuously Unauthorized (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.01 0.01 0.000 0.04 -0.01 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.01 0.02 0.020 0.07 0.01 0.03
Age 0.00+ 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.01
Age-Squared -0.00+ 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.01 0.01 -0.040 0.03 -0.01 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.01+ 0.01 -0.030 0.03 -0.02 0.02
Years of Education 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
No English (ref=other) 0.01 0.01 0.020 0.04 0.01 0.02
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Constant 0.48 1.38 -2.69 6.32 -0.71 3.09
N 329 317 646
Adjusted R-Squared 0.02 0.02 0.01
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.H8: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Food Stamp Recipiency 
Composition, Continuously Unauthorized Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.04 0.03 -0.05+ 0.03 -0.04* 0.02
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.02 0.05 -0.040 0.05 -0.03 0.03
Age -0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.00 0.00
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.03 0.02 -0.030 0.02 -0.03* 0.02
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.01 0.03 0.000 0.03 -0.01 0.02
Years of Education -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.01 0.03 0.010 0.03 0.00 0.02
Entry into US Labor Market 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Constant -0.33 4.57 -1.21 4.49 -0.89 3.13
N 133 129 262
Adjusted R-Squared 0.03 0.01 0.01
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.H9: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Food Stamp Recipiency 
Composition, Continuously Unauthorized, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.02** 0.01 -0.02* 0.01 -0.02** 0.01
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.01 0.01 0.000 0.02 -0.01 0.01
Age -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.03 0.02 0.010 0.03 -0.01 0.02
Married (ref=not) -0.00 0.01 0.010 0.01 0.00 0.01
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.01 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Years of Education 0.00** 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.00 0.01 -0.020 0.02 -0.01 0.01
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Constant 0.72 0.98 4.80** 1.46 2.60** 0.87
N 1,813 1,822 3,635
Adjusted R-Squared 0.03 0.02 0.02
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.H10: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Food Stamp Recipiency 
Composition, SIPP Continuously Legal (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.02+ 0.01 -0.04* 0.02 -0.03** 0.01
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.00 0.02 0.000 0.03 -0.00 0.02
Age 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.00 0.01 0.030 0.02 0.01 0.01
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.01 0.01 -0.020 0.02 -0.01 0.01
Years of Education 0.00** 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.01 0.02 -0.020 0.03 -0.02 0.02
Entry into US Labor Market 0.00 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00* 0.00
Constant -0.69 1.55 7.69** 2.55 3.31* 1.48
N 1,048 1,061 2,109
Adjusted R-Squared 0.02 0.02 0.01
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.H11: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Food Stamp Recipiency 
Composition, SIPP Continuously Legal, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.02** 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.01** 0.00
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.02 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Age -0.00 0.00 0.00+ 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 -0.00+ 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.01 0.01 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.01 0.00
Years of Education 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00
No English (ref=other) 0.00 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.00 0.01
Entry into US Labor Market -0.00* 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Constant 2.49* 1.04 1.37* 0.69 1.68** 0.62
N 765 761 1,526
Adjusted R-Squared 0.07 0.07 0.06
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.H12: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Food Stamp Recipiency 
Composition, SIPP Continuously Legal, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.01 0.01 0.000 0.00 -0.01+ 0.00
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.02 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 -0.02* 0.01
Age 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Female (ref=male) -0.14** 0.03 -0.08** 0.02 -0.11** 0.02
Married (ref=not) 0.01 0.01 0.000 0.00 0.01+ 0.00
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.00 0.01 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Years of Education 0.00* 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00
Female-Educ. Interaction 0.01** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.01** 0.00
No English (ref=other) 0.01 0.02 0.010 0.01 0.01 0.01
Entry into US Labor Market 0.00+ 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Constant -2.57+ 1.37 0.42 0.74 -1.32+ 0.75
N 1,974 1,978 3,952
Adjusted R-Squared 0.04 0.08 0.05
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"female" is "male"; reference for "married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is 
"other state"; reference for "no English" is "other" 
Table 5.H13: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Food Stamp Recipiency 
Composition, U.S.-Born Latinos (Total Sample)
Unpooled Pooled
t2t1
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.01** 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 -0.01** 0.00
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.01* 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 -0.02** 0.00
Age 0.00** 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00** 0.00
Age-Squared -0.00** 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00** 0.00
Married (ref=not) -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Trad. State (ref=other) -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Years of Education 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00
No English (ref=other) -0.00 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.00 0.01
Entry into US Labor Market 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant -0.35 0.87 0.92 0.84 -0.00 0.57
N 1,020 1,018 2,038
Adjusted R-Squared 0.07 0.07 0.07
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.H14: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Food Stamp Recipiency 
Composition, U.S.-Born Latinos, Men
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
  
  212 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Mexico -0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.00 0.01
El Salvador/Guatemala -0.02 0.03 -0.03+ 0.01 -0.02 0.02
Age -0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Age-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married (ref=not) 0.02+ 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.01* 0.01
Trad. State (ref=other) 0.00 0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.00 0.01
Years of Education 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.00
No English (ref=other) 0.03 0.03 0.020 0.02 0.02 0.02
Entry into US Labor Market 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Constant -3.62 2.32 0.05 1.16 -2.07 1.26
N 985 972 1,957
Adjusted R-Squared 0.03 0.06 0.04
+ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Note: Reference category for "Mexico" and "El Salvador/Guatemala" is "other"; reference for 
"married" is "not married"; reference for "traditional state" is "other state"; reference for "no 
English" is "other" 
Table 5.H15: OLS Regression Results Predicting Log of Food Stamp Recipiency 
Composition, U.S.-Born Latinos, Women
Unpooled Pooled
t1 t2
 
 
 
 
 
